Foreign Relations of the United States, 1951, Korea and China, Volume VII, Part 1

795.00/1–1151

Memorandum of Telephone Conversation, by Lucius D. Battle, Special Assistant to the Secretary of State ¹

top secret

[Washington,] January 11, 1951.

Participants:	General Marshall2
	Mr. Acheson

The Secretary telephoned General Marshall to inquire whether the General thought that the meeting which was now scheduled for Saturday noon³ on the reply to General MacArthur should take place sooner in view of what Mr. Acheson understood was General Marshall’s purpose to send someone to Tokyo.

The General replied that he did not think that the two matters were closely connected. He added that he thought that a meeting on the draft which had been considered this morning (at ten o’clock meeting at Pentagon?)⁴ might obviate the need for a meeting on Saturday. But in any case, since he thought the purpose of sending someone out was to get rather than give information, it did not matter whether the proposed Saturday meeting took place before or after his departure.

Secretary Acheson said he thought the purpose of sending someone was both to take out some kind of instruction and to get some information. Secretary Marshall said his main idea in thinking of sending someone, while their going was ostensibly to send instructions along, was to get information. This was the crucial point which we cannot obtain at all here. The only way he could see to get the information needed was to send someone to get it.

The Secretary said he would like to outline his views. After he started to do this, the General asked whether he could call back as he was not free to talk at that time.

About 15 minutes later the General called back and resumed the conversation.

The General said that the point in his mind, which he had been struggling with and on which he did not think he was in agreement with the Chiefs of Staff, was the actual status of morale in Korea, and he wanted to have someone go out and take a look. He mentioned that General Smith⁵ was going out tomorrow to Tokyo in General Marshall’s plane. Later in the conversation the Secretary and General Marshall discussed the possibility of sending someone along with General Smith to accomplish Secretary Marshall’s mission of investigating morale and status and any further mission that might come of the ideas which Mr. Acheson put forth, as outlined below. They agreed that this would probably be a good idea and that having someone go for General Marshall with General Smith might desirably camouflage the mission.

The General then asked why the President had in mind postponing discussion of the matter until Saturday, and Mr. Acheson said that he had learned from the President that this time had been set by the White House staff without being referred to the President, who had told Mr. Acheson he was quite willing to have the meeting earlier if Secretaries Marshall and Acheson thought it should be earlier.

General Marshall then said that he had two or three specific points that he had objected to in his talk with General Bradley⁶ on the draft which had been put to him. In the first place, he did not like the first sentence, because we seem to make the decision that there is evidence that we cannot continue to hold. The General’s reaction was that it would be more to the point to say that it appears from the evidence in General MacArthur’s messages that it is not feasible to make a continuing defense. He wanted to make it plain that this indication came from General MacArthur, rather than that we made that decision here.

The next thing to which he objected was the word “indefinitely”. He thought it should be more clearly defined. In view of what (MacArthur) has already said about his need for more reinforcements, the word “indefinitely” stretched it out to a point without limitation. General Marshall thought that some phrase such as “considerable period” should be substituted.

General Marshall said that on the matter of the timing of our action here, he was most anxious to get somebody’s actual assessment and not just guessing and posterity messages. He was, therefore, concerned over delaying until Saturday noon.

The Secretary then outlined what in his view should be the procedure. He thought a memorandum should be prepared which could be carried out. He did not think a “directive” was necessary, since the existing directives are adequate for the present. Whatever happens, General MacArthur will be doing the same thing for the next two or three weeks—that is, falling back to a position which can either be held or held long enough to evacuate. If the decision to evacuate is made, General MacArthur would be doing the same thing. Therefore, it seemed important to Secretary Acheson that whoever went out should take a memorandum, approved by the President, General Marshall, Joint Chiefs and NSC. The Secretary stressed later that what he had in mind was a “memorandum” and not an “order”, and felt that unless such a memorandum were taken out and the person who went had clearly in mind exactly what the President had in mind, that person might become involved in a good deal of inconclusive talk and argument as to what the purpose of the campaign is, etc. and the result would be further inconclusive cables, but not the facts, which the memorandum would be designed to bring out. He then outlined his ideas as to what the memorandum should say.

In the first place, it should say that from General MacArthur’s reports, it appears that if the Chinese choose to exercise all their capabilities they have the ability to drive us out (although this can only be gathered; General MacArthur has not said that it is possible to stay). If the Chinese decide to use all their capabilities, without regard to destruction of life, the first concern of General MacArthur should be to protect his troops against annihilation, and to protect them against engagements which would cause such losses that they could not serve to protect Japan and provide a nucleus for the expansion of the army. The Secretary pointed out that that is what is meant by “severe losses”. In other words, what is desired is a functioning military organization when you get through. His mission, therefore, is to continue resistance in Korea until it appears that the foregoing things mentioned as to be avoided are likely to happen.

There should be a statement of the national purposes, which are behind the fighting and sacrifice in Korea, as follows:

1. We want, if possible, to force the Chinese to take such losses that they may decide to stop. If that is possible, it will have tremendous importance in Asia in showing that the Chinese troops are not invincible, as the Asians now believe.

2. It will give us the necessary time to demonstrate to everyone the determination of American military leadership and that we don’t pull out just because the going is tough. It will convince our friends in Europe that we are not likely to leave them under similar circumstances. It will be helpful in the firming up of Germany and the free people to stand against aggression of the Soviet Union.

3. We are making the greatest possible effort to line people up against Communist China in case they continue the expansionist movement. This will be a great help in giving us time to do that and to show people that we are not withdrawing and asking people to take risks we are not willing to take; that we are not asking them to blockade or bomb unless forced into this action.

These are the things we would like to accomplish, subject always to the preservation of these troops and to the prevention of losses which would prevent them from accomplishing the basic objectives (of protecting Japan and providing nucleus for army expansion).

We could say that we are sending so and so out to go over the memorandum and come back with General MacArthur’s ideas as to what extent these objectives can be achieved and what the time chances involved amount to, the state of morale, and the point at which further continuation of the campaign would gravely prejudice possibility of withdrawal.

The General thought the idea should be considered, although he again said he thought the primary purpose of the trip should be to have someone look into the condition of the troops. He suggested that Mr. Acheson should complete the draft, and he, General Marshall, would talk to General Bradley, and try to clarify the thinking on the time of the departure, who should go, and what should be taken out.

1. The source text contains no indication of authorship but presumably this memorandum was drawn up by Mr. Battle who drafted the memorandum of conversation between Secretary Acheson and General Bradley, infra.
2. George C. Marshall, Secretary of Defense.
3. January 13. The meeting actually was moved ahead to January 12; see the memorandum of conversation by Mr. Jessup, January 12, p. 68.
4. No record of the meeting or the draft referred to have been found in the Department of State files.
5. Walter B. Smith, Director of Central Intelligence.
6. General of the Army Omar N. Bradley, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.