Foreign Relations of the United States, 1951, Korea and China, Volume VII, Part 1

795.00/7–651

Memorandum of Conversation, by Frank P. Lockhart of the Bureau of Far Eastern Affairs

secret

[Washington,] July 6, 1951.

Subject: Briefing of Ambassadors on Korea

Participants:	Australia	—Mr. McNichol, Second Secretary
	Belgium	—Ambassador Silvercruys
		Mr. Rothschild, Counselor
	Canada	—Ambassador Wrong:
		Mr. Campbell, Second Secretary
	Colombia	—Ambassador Apriano Restrepo-Jaramil
		Dr. Mejia-Palacio, Minister Counselor
	Ethiopia	—Mr. Tesemma, First Secretary
	France	—Mr. Fequant, Second Secretary
	Great Britain	—Mr. Greenhill, First Secretary
	Greece	—Ambassador Politis
	Korea	—Ambassador Yu Chan Yang
	Luxembourg	—Absent
	Netherlands	—Dr. de Beus, Minister Plenipotentiary
		Baron van Boetzelaer, First Secretary
	New Zealand	—Mr. Corner, First Secretary
	Philippines	—Mr. de Castro, First Secretary
	Thailand	—Mr. Kridakon, Counselor
		Mr. Prasong, Second Secretary
	Turkey	—Mr. Benler. First Secretary
	Union of South Africa	—Mr. Jarvie, Counselor
		Mr. Dirkse-van-Schalkwyk, First Secretary
	United States	—FE, Mr. Rusk
		UNA. Mr. Hickerson
		EUR, Mr. Raynor
		UNP, Mr. Wainhouse
		EUR, Mr. McClelland
		FE, Mr. Hackler
		FE, Mr. Lockhart
		Army, Captain Pope

Captain Pope stated that the enemy was continuing to make light probing attacks in the west and the east and that the United Nations forces in the central sector were receiving a considerable amount of artillery and mortar fire from the enemy. The greatest amount of enemy artillery and mortar fire was received in the area held by the 1st United States Cavalry Division. The 9th and 2nd Divisions of the Republic of Korea were repulsing daily enemy attacks. On July 5 the enemy made a rather heavy attack at another point in the central sector forcing the right flank of a United Nations unit to retire under heavy pressure.

Captain Pope stated that of the average of 2,000 enemy vehicles sighted daily about 1,000 were southbound. This indicated, according to the Far Eastern Command, that the enemy was receiving enough supplies in excess of its daily requirements to permit a build-up of strength. In this connection, the Far Eastern Command estimated that the enemy will continue to exercise its capability to reinforce with Chinese Communist personnel. Such is indicated by a reliable report received by the Command that 80,000 fresh enemy troops had recently arrived in North Korea from Manchuria.

Captain Pope stated that the Far Eastern Command had also received an unassessed informational report to the effect that the enemy representatives going to the Kaesong talks would come as representatives of the victors in the Korean war and would not accede to any demands set forth by the Republic of Korea. The informational report also stated that the enemy would resume the offensive. At a later point in the briefing, the Korean Ambassador inquired whether the Chinese Communists had announced that they would not accede to any objectives of the Republic of Korea. It was clarified for the Ambassador that the report mentioned by the Far Eastern Command was merely a report which had not been evaluated or confirmed, and that it was not an announcement by Peiping.

Mr. Hickerson stated that we had given more thought to the matter of the British proposal for the appointment of a Protecting Power to look after the interests of the United Nations personnel held as prisoners of war by the enemy and were now inclined to the view that if the statement were sent on the verge of the armistice talks at Kaesong confusion in the public mind might result. He asked for the views of the Ambassadors. Led off by the Canadian and the Greek Ambassadors and the British representatives, the group agreed that the proposed statement should be postponed for the time being, until there was some indication as to what direction the armistice talks would take. The Netherlands representative noted that his Government had no objection to the proposal put forward by the Belgian Ambassador at the last briefing suggesting that the statement, if issued at this time, be amended so as not to prejudice the matter of prisoners of war to be discussed at the armistice talks in Kaesong.¹

In connection with the Kaesong talks, the British representative stated that his Government was most interested in having consideration given during the talks to the matter of giving priority to the repatriation of the sick and wounded prisoners of war in enemy hands so as to provide them immediate medical care. He asked whether such meritorious arrangements could be undertaken without complicating the issue. Mr. Rusk replied that we could give further thought to the suggestion and stated that we had no information how General Ridgway proposed to proceed on the matter. Mr. Rusk pointed out that the enemy had adamantly refused to give information concerning the condition or locations of prisoners and other details which could facilitate such a repatriation. He added that we hope to get the International Red Cross into the prisoner camps as soon as possible.

The Australian representative asked whether the United Nations Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea (UNCURK) would have any connection with the impending armistice arrangements. Mr. Hickerson said that it would have no connection since the negotiations and any armistice would be entirely on the military level.

The South African representative asked whether the envisaged mixed military commission to observe the carrying-out of the armistice terms would be continued as such and whether at some future stage the United Nations per se would be brought into the task. Mr. Hickerson replied that it was intended that the commission would be purely military initially to avoid any difficulty since in the past the Chinese Communists had consistently refused to recognize the legitimacy of United Nations bodies. A present attempt to use United Nations machinery would certainly delay a military settlement, Mr. Hickerson stated, adding that we certainly should not insist upon using any. Mr. Rusk pointed out that we are not adverse to using United Nations machinery but the other side is. He added that General Ridgway of course would call upon the full help of the United Nations forces in Korea in the negotiations and would probably select observers from all the United Nations units.

The Korean Ambassador asked whether the Chinese Communist “volunteers” would be invited to participate in discussions of political and territorial matters affecting Korea if the armistice is accepted and such political discussions follow. Mr. Hickerson reminded the Ambassador that the purely military aspect had to be settled first and suggested that any discussion of such a question in the group be postponed, pending the direction of the military talks.

The Canadian Ambassador asked whether the restrictions on the press at Kaesong, to which he had no objection, would continue during the armistice talks. Mr. Hickerson replied that in all probability they would since the fine points of negotiation and policy demanded secrecy and security during the period of negotiations. He added that he wished something could be done about the press in New York which had recently centered stories around the United Nations. One such sensational story had erroneously reported that the General Assembly would be called into special session to discuss the armistice. He pointed out that the General Assembly is officially in session at this time, although in recess. He added that such stories could give a false impression and create an unfortunate situation. He reiterated that a report containing the decision reached at the Kaesong talks should go to the United Nations, either the General Assembly or the Security Council, for approval but that nothing should be done by the United Nations to hold up the agreement reached or to cast any doubt upon the validity of an armistice agreement.

The Belgian Ambassador asked what was planned in connection with keeping the briefing group informed of the progress of the armistice talks and whether special meetings of the Ambassadors would be called. Mr. Hickerson noted that the initial meeting at Kaesong on July 8 would be confined to making the mechanical arrangements for the ensuing talks and that since nothing substantive would be discussed until the meeting tentatively scheduled for the 10th, a special meeting of the Ambassadors was not considered necessary. Mr. Rusk pointed out that calling the Ambassadors into session only upon the receipt of substantive information coming from the armistice talks on the 10th might alert the press into believing that something “big” had taken place. He suggested that the regular meeting on Tuesday² be held as scheduled but delayed until 5 p. m. to allow for the time differential between Washington and Tokyo and to allow sufficient time for transmission and processing of such information as is sent. It was agreed that the next session would be held at that time.

Copies of the latest exchanges of messages between General Ridgway and the commanders of the opposing forces were distributed.³

1. Between October 15 and 19, 1951, all the governments contributing forces to the United Nations action in Korea requested the U.N. Secretary-General to approach the Chinese and North Korean Governments on behalf of the U.N. prisoners of war with the suggestion that the Communist powers permit a neutral state or a humanitarian organization such as the ICRC to act as a Protecting Power for the prisoners under the terms of the 1949 Geneva Conventions. U.N. Secretary-General Lie forwarded a telegram to the Chinese and North Korean authorities conveying the request on November 15, 1951, but no acknowledgment or response was received during the remainder of the year. (398.571/11–2151 and /2–1952)
2. July 10.
3. See editorial note, supra.