795.00/7–651: Telegram
The United States Deputy Representative at the United Nations (Gross) to the Secretary of State
38. Re Korea. As reported to Hickerson by telephone this morning there has been during past 2 or 3 days very considerable development of interest and discussion among UN dels concerning next steps following conclusion of cease-fire in Korea. In general there seems to be strong current of optimism that present discussions will in fact lead to cease-fire. Most of questions raised with us were anticipated in our 1738, June 28.
Lacoste and Jebb have requested opportunity to discuss “next steps” and we plan to meet with them Monday afternoon, July 9. Jebb, as president SC this month, observed in telephone call to me this morning that we cannot be certain that cease-fire will not be accomplished within very brief time, perhaps matter of days. He is particularly anxious, therefore, to know our thinking concerning report by UC on cease-fire, what we contemplate as to nature of report, whether we contemplate report would go to SC or to GA or to some combination of both.
In brief conversation with Padilla Nervo last night he assumed we would be reporting to GA but he also raised question of report to SC. Without stating any conclusion of his own, he wondered whether report should not be addressed to SC since UC was created by SC and is operating under SC resolutions to halt aggression in Korea.
If present cease-fire discussions are successful he assumed there would be clear sailing in SC which in turn could pass report on for GA consideration. If cease-fire discussions do not go altogether well, Padilla questioned whether SC might not be proper forum for attempting to iron out difficulties. If such effort failed in SC, then jurisdiction could, of course, always be transferred to GA. At about this point in conversation Eban joined us. It was clear in context his remarks that Padilla was thinking that process he outlined would take place immediately after conclusion cease-fire discussions. Eban took rather strong and dogmatic exception to this notion. Passing once over lightly question of UC report on cease-fire Eban went on to say quite dogmatically that he felt it would be great mistake for Assembly to become involved immediately after conclusion cease-fire in problem of peaceful settlement of other Korean issues. On contrary he said he felt there should be a “cooling-off period” and that Assembly should not take up question of future of Korea until it convened in its sixth session in Paris.
[Page 630]To all of these remarks I made no comment except to express interest in views Padilla and Eban expressed and to say I knew these matters were being carefully considered in Dept and that we would, of course, wish to take their views into account.
Rafael informed Gross last night that Eban had been to see Malik for discussion of Suez matter (separately reported in mytel 39, July 6).1 In course of Eban-Malik conversation latter was apparently quite willing to talk about Korea, was amiable and optimistic concerning cease-fire prospects. At same time he apparently indicated to Eban that he felt there should not be any rush about getting into settlement of political aspects. There is considerable circumstantial evidence that Israelis are quite actively promoting idea of armistice supervisory commission of which Israel would be a member. We have learned through French del, for example, that France-Presse correspondent here claims to have this story from Israelis.
Later in evening I had quite long talk with Von Balluseck (Netherlands) on his initiative. He inquired about next steps following accomplishment cease-fire about which he was very optimistic. I countered by asking his views. He said, in very much same terms Eban had earlier, he thought there should be cooling-off period before taking up in GA question of peaceful settlement of Korean issues. Assuming cease-fire might be accomplished by about Aug. 1, he said he thought cooling-off period might last until Paris assembly. He said he thought by that time opportunity might be very good for accomplishing peaceful settlement.
I asked Balluseck if he had discussed these views with very many dels and if he felt they reflected in any way general opinion. He was little evasive but finally said that although he did not know for sure he thought UKDel (Jebb at least) and Lacoste felt there should be cooling-off period. He then went on to say he had had long luncheon discussion with Malik (apparently on Balluseck’s initiative). He found Malik quite willing to discuss Korea and he thought so far as Russians were concerned prospects for peaceful settlement following a cooling-off period might be good. I asked Balluseck if he could elaborate Malik’s views. He said Malik had talked about a conference (or commission) of “interested powers” which at suitable time might work out solution of political questions involved in Korea and at same time pick up and deal with those agenda items on which agreement had been reached by deputies in Paris. I asked Balluseck if Malik had given any definition of “interested powers.” Balluseck said Malik had not expressed himself in such detail. Balluseck himself went on to say [Page 631] to me (and I have little doubt he may have said same to Malik) he thought we might consider the powers referred to in connection with fifth of five principles of Jan 13 as being the “interested powers.”2 I indicated skepticism both as to method and composition.
Returning to question of cooling-off period, Balluseck said he thought if we waited until sixth session “views of some people might change” re factors involved in peaceful settlement. I asked Balluseck whose views and what factors he was talking about. He mentioned Chinese representation, saying this had been and obviously continued to be an important factor in peaceful settlement of Korean issue. He said of course US view of such matters as Chi representation had “hardened” considerably in recent weeks. He said perhaps our views on this issue might change between now and Paris assembly.
I said that I was not competent to express opinion concerning views of other people but I had not slightest hesitation in expressing opinion that there was not slightest chance of views of American people on this issue changing between now and Paris assembly. Balluseck indicated some hope our view of this matter would nevertheless change. He said issue was bound to arise in assembly and that it would be most unfortunate if when it arises there becomes manifest a sharp division of opinion between US and many of its closest free-world friends. In this connection he referred to UK position, saying that UK had only very recently taken position that consideration of this issue should be postponed only until end of hostilities. We are now confronted with prospect of an early end of hostilities and he assumed that British, therefore, will revert to their earlier position of supporting Chi Commie representation. This was one reason, he said, why he felt it would be better to have cooling-off period since it would be most unfortunate to have division on this and other issues publicly raised in Assembly immediately after accomplishment of cease-fire. I made no comment on these remarks except to repeat that in my view the opinion of the American people would not change on this matter so soon.
Balluseck then said that he thought we Americans were too tough and that too many Americans in high position were probably taking too tough a line. I asked him what Americans he had in mind and what he meant by too tough a line. He mentioned the President’s July 4th speech.3 I told him I thought this speech was one of strongest I had ever read in support of UN and collective security and asked him what difficulty it created in his mind. He backed away from President’s [Page 632] speech and referring vaguely to American leaders said he thought they were stressing much too much at this time the theme of suspicion of the Russians. I told him I found it impossible to understand how anyone who had any knowledge of or experience with Communist behavior during past 5 or 6 years could have any attitude other than one of extreme caution. I said that regardless of one’s views concerning sincerity or lack of sincerity of Malik cease-fire overture, certainly a by-product of this Soviet move which must have been anticipated by the Russians in their interests was the most serious and grave risk that the free nations individually and collectively in the UN would let down their guard. I said that however hopeful one might be that a cease-fire could be accomplished in Korea, it seemed overwhelmingly clear that free-world nations must not only maintain but must increase their effort to build up their defense strength.
Balluseck said he agreed that we must be on our guard and that the effort to build up our defenses must be continued. He said, however, that European people desire peace more than anything else and that he felt very frankly that statements by American leaders were viewed in the eyes of Europeans as overemphasizing the Communist risk and urging too strongly necessity to maintain rearmament effort.
I said there was no people on earth who desired peace more fervently than American people. I also said I thought American people had very realistic understanding of the threat to free nations and of what was necessary to cope with that threat. I said that while of course all of our peoples desired peace it was essential for them to realize fully the necessity of sacrifice to achieve peace. I added that I thought it was the responsibility of govts to bring these lessons home to their peoples and this was precisely, as I saw it, what our American leaders were trying to do.
Balluseck said maybe I was right but he still felt the European reaction to our present attitude was not conducive to the ends we shared.
In course of our discussion Balluseck asked our intentions concerning strategic embargo after a cease-fire. I asked him what he had in mind. He said he felt that following achievement of a cease-fire steps should be taken to lift the strategic embargo. I told him we did not have any new instructions on this question but that speaking personally it seemed very clear to me that precipitate action to lift the embargo might be worst possible mistake we could make. I said it seemed to me that the embargo should be maintained for as long as might be necessary to assure faithful carrying out of any cease-fire. Balluseck observed that since the Communists now seem to be in the [Page 633] mood to make peace we really should leave no stone unturned to make peace and this, in his view, would involve lifting the embargo.4
- Not printed. Documentation on the Suez Canal is printed in vol. v, pp. 343 ff.↩
- i.e., the United States, the United Kingdom, the Soviet Union, and the People’s Republic of China; see the editorial note, p. 64.↩
- Text in Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Harry S. Truman, 1951, p. 370.↩
- The Department’s reply is contained in telegram 30, July 14, to New York, p. 678.↩