795.00/6–2951
Memorandum of Conversation, by the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Rusk)
Subject: Korea
| Participants: | Ambassador Bonnet |
| Mr. Rusk, FE | |
| Mr. Godley, WE |
After this afternoon’s briefing of the Ambassadors, Ambassador Bonnet returned to my office and opened the conversation by complimenting us upon our statement that was given to the Ambassadors and which he said was excellent.
[Page 596]The Ambassador then inquired as to our thinking on the observers to which I replied that we had in mind pairs of American (or other UN) and North Korean or Chinese military officers who would inspect behind both lines. This, it was felt, was essential in that in the absence of some such arrangement it would be impossible for us to reallocate troops in that we had to know whether or not masses of enemy troops were being built up. The Ambassador said he agreed to this point of view and asked whether or not this would be on a United Nations’ basis. I answered that we were not thinking of observers representing the United Nations “per se” but rather the military forces in that were they United Nations it would complicate an already difficult problem and might give the enemy grounds for refusal.
We then discussed the question of a neutral zone, and I was unable to give the Ambassador any definite information on this pointing out that it would have to be negotiated by General Ridgway and might either be a relatively wide zone between the two armies or else more restricted. Its location, of course, would depend upon General Ridgway’s conversations and we had at present no idea what the enemy would demand.
The Ambassador remarked that he was glad to note that we were presently regarding negotiations as an exclusively military matter and that only once the armistice and cease-fire had been arranged would we get into political questions.
Among the difficulties that we anticipate, I referred to prisoners of war and pointed out that as we had some 15,000 Chinese and some 135,000 North Koreans against only some 5,000 United Nations’ troops in enemy hands, this might prove a difficult point in the negotiations.
We also discussed the extent to which the United Nations should be brought into the present negotiations, and the Ambassador expressed his personal agreement with our belief that for the time being the discussions should remain completely military and the United Nations should not be directly involved. He asked if we anticipated any trouble in this connection to which I replied in the negative.
The Ambassador then mentioned the post-armistice problems regarding the political settlement and asked our views on this subject. I pointed out that this was a bridge that we had not yet crossed and thought there would be considerable time before this was broached. The Ambassador concurred and expressed his personal view that the Soviets and/or Chinese Communists would want to keep North Korea as a buffer state between Manchuria and South Korea. I replied that this appeared logical but that we, of course, have to await developments.