795.00/6–2951
Memorandum of Conversation, by John R. Heidemann of the Bureau of Far Eastern Affairs
Subject: Briefing of Ambassadors on Korea
| Participants: | Australia | —Mr. McNichol, Second Secretary |
| Belgium | —Ambassador Silvercruys | |
| Mr. Rothschild. Counselor | ||
| Canada | —Mr. Ignatieff, Counselor | |
| Mr. Campbell, Second Secretary | ||
| Colombia | —Ambassador Apriano Restrepo-Jaramil | |
| Dr. Mejia-Palacio, Minister Counselor | ||
| Ethiopia | —Mr. Tesemma, First Secretary | |
| France | —Ambassador Bonnet | |
| Mr. Fequant, Second Secretary | ||
| Great Britain | —Mr. Tomlinson. Counselor | |
| Greece | —Mr. Kalergis, Minister Counselor | |
| Luxembourg | —Absent | |
| Netherlands | —Dr. de Beus, Minister Plenipotentiary | |
| New Zealand | —Mr. Corner, First Secretary | |
| Philippines | —Mr. de Castro, First Secretary | |
| Thailand | —Ambassador Wan | |
| Turkey | —Mr. Esenbel, Counselor | |
| Union of South Africa | —Ambassador Jooste | |
| Mr. Jarvie, Counselor | ||
| United States | —FE, Mr. Rusk | |
| UNA, Mr. Hickerson | ||
| FE, Mr. Merchant | ||
| FE, Mr. Connors | ||
| EUR, Mr. Raynor | ||
| UNP, Mr. Stein | ||
| EUR, Mr. McClelland | ||
| FE, Mr. Hackler | ||
| FE, Mr. Heidemann | ||
| Army, Captain Pope |
Following a brief résumé by Captain Pope of the military developments in the past two days, Mr. Rusk stated that we had been considering what further steps should be taken in regard to a possible cease-fire in Korea since we felt that we had received all the clarification from the Soviets we would be getting. We had moved, Mr. Rusk declared, on the assumption that the communists did want a bona fide cease-fire. But we had been embarrassed by having no information on the precise steps the North Korean and Chinese Communists would be willing to take to achieve this end. We now wished to determine whether the opposing commanders in the field felt the same way about a cease-fire as Moscow and Peiping. We had discussed with General Ridgway the type of statement he might make at this time, the General stating that he felt it would be practical to indicate to the opposing commanders that a meeting could be arranged. Mr. Rusk informed the group that a statement on the cease-fire had been drafted and that General Ridgway was scheduled to make it public at six p. m., Washington time.1 After having distributed a copy of the statement to the group, Mr. Rusk explained that the purpose of the statement was to discover whether the commanders on the other side would be interested in a meeting in the field to arrange a cease-fire. We felt that it was important to continue with the idea that the other side had taken the initiative in this matter but not to say that they were suing for peace, thereby raising prestige obstacles. But we did desire to put the responsibility on the communists, to get the idea across that they had brought the topic up. Noting that Ridgway had been cast as the United [Page 594] Nations Commander, Mr. Rusk commented that the word government had purposely not been injected into the statement in order to accommodate the other side. At the same time, we wished to make it clear that Ridgway had received instructions, we having had unfortunate experiences in this respect. We did not pretend that Ridgway himself had been approached but rather that he had been informed that an approach had been made. We did not suggest a date, but in order to move the whole matter ahead a step we had proposed a place, aboard a Danish hospital ship in the harbor of Wonsan, which, we felt, would be convenient to both sides. Mr. Rusk reported that the Danish ship would function for this purpose as a Danish rather than a United Nations ship and that the Danish Government, when approached, had declared that it would be happy to make the ship available for this purpose.
In any cease-fire negotiations, General Ridgway will operate under directives from Washington and inter-government negotiations will take place here, since it would be too great a burden for Ridgway to conduct such negotiations in Tokyo in addition to all his other pressing duties. Ambassador Jooste asked whether there would be further collaboration in Washington on the directives to be sent Ridgway. Mr. Rusk said that discussions were to be held here on the general nature of the directives concerning a cease-fire. He pointed out that we already have an important area of agreement with the other side, namely, that any cease-fire talks should be military and not political in nature. He noted that an important element in the truce would be the question of supervision. We felt that it should be made difficult for either side surreptiously to build up its forces with a view to renewing hostilities and, to this end, we felt that the opposing commanders should have knowledge of any prejudicial activity on the part of the other. He declared that we would not accede to any demand to withdraw the United Nations Air Force. Mr. Rusk stated that we are drafting a set of general cease-fire principles, but have reached no final decision on the matter. He said that he would have to find out from his seniors just how much consultation we would undertake with the group. Upon Mr. McNichol’s asking whether the group would be consulted on the progress of the cease-fire, Mr. Rusk stated that we would discuss those developments which could be reasonably discussed but would make no commitment that something might arise which might better be kept quiet. We would not, he observed, like to see the peace we all hope for ruined by premature public debate. In regard to Gromyko’s several references to political and territorial matters, which [Page 595] the Ambassador of Colombia found somewhat contradictory, Mr. Rusk voiced our view that political and territorial questions should remain for intergovernment exploration. Mr. Rusk went on to say that it was necessary in these first military steps to get something we could live with for some time, since it might prove difficult to reach any solution on the broader aspects of the situation.
Mr. Tomlinson, recalling ROK President Rhee’s bitter reaction to Malik’s speech, asked what the attitude of the ROK would be since its loyalty might well prove extremely important. Mr. Rusk said we have had no clear and certain indication of the ROK’s attitude. He told the group that the public statements made by ROK representatives so far have been made in spite of our approaches and that the private statements we have from them have been entirely consistent with their public statements. He announced that the Korean Ambassador was going to join the group as an observer and said that the group must be careful not to let the Koreans feel that their views are not closely considered. We are hopeful, Mr. Rusk declared, that even though the ROK can’t abandon the unification of Korea as a national policy, its immediate action would be in line with UN and US policy.
Mr. Rusk concluded the session by observing that if we can reasonably call off the fighting in Korea, we should do so, because such an action would be in accord with UN objectives and because, if the conflict continues, there is every possibility that it will grow rather than shrink. Our choice, therefore, is clearly an acceptable cease-fire or an expansion of the conflict. Mr. Rusk added that he had heard no member of the group speak in favor of the latter course and that he assumed their respective governments all favored an effort to achieve a cease-fire.