795.00/6–2951: Telegram
The Secretary of State to the Embassy in Korea
1003. Eyes only Muccio. US Govt at this point unable gauge with confidence seriousness or purpose of Sovts in apparent move for cease-fire in Malik broadcast Jun 23. Absence insistence as in past on concurrent settlement Formosan and UN representation, coupled with gen endorsement by Peiping, Sov press treatment, and promptness if not satis character Gromyko’s replies to Kirk’s questions, prevent discounting overture as propaganda only. Dept will keep you informed of developments.
You shld know that if further exploration confirms willingness other side accept armistice at or in neighborhood present battle line with appropriate safeguards for security UN forces, and against renewal hostilities, USGovt and other UN members principally involved prepared accept armistice on such terms and attempt negotiate more durable arrangement permitting gradual withdrawal US forces from Korea, Dept aware this is explosive issue with ROK. You will have to muster every available resource and argument to avoid development ugly situation which might jeopardize security UN forces and their lines of communication in ROK. Dept can understand basis for Rhee’s and other leaders’ opposition to any settlement Korean war leaving country divided and with risk of new invasion omni-present. Dept in this msg attempting provide you additional background and arguments to supplement and reinforce those you have been employing so vigorously in ur successful effort up to this point to prevent situation’s getting out of hand. Dept desires ur suggestions as to any actions which might be initiated here further to support ur hand. Are there, for example, any private or unofficial influences in US which cld helpfully be mobilized to apply to Rhee? Wld visit to this country by PriMin to talk to top US officials, or early visit to Pusan by influential and well known US personage be helpful and effective?
In ur discussions with Rhee and other officials Dept believes you should constantly hammer fol points:
- (1)
- ROK does not possess, and never has, any internatl recognition of any present auth north of 38th Parallel.
- (2)
- An independent and unified Korea has been US polit aim since 1943 and UN aim since 1947 but neither US nor UN at any time has taken position that unification shld be achieved by force regardless of circumstances.
- (3)
- Jun 25 and 27 SC resolutions related to repelling the aggression and restoring internatl peace and security in the area: Oct 7 GA Res authorized but did not require pacification North Korea and [Page 589] unification of country by mil means. Under circumstances early Oct when North Korean armies were in dissolution and presumption was tenable that neither Sovts nor Chi Commies wld attempt salvage situation, unification appeared possible by UN forces filling vacuum in North Korea. Entrance Chi in force and increasingly meanacing attitude USSR created new situation involving global power relationship Sov bloc versus free world and required US in own natl security interest to reassess its position and review proportion its total mil resources which cld be committed on Korean peninsula.
- (4)
- ROKs must be brought realize outbreak of world war wld be for them a disaster since major theaters wld be elsewhere and their future then wld be indefinite prolongation horrors of war and probability of being overrun and destroyed as a nation.
- (5)
- All ROK’s future hopes rest on free world which brought it into existence and has supported it in its hour of need. Future peace and prosperity ROK dependent on peace of world. This in turn rests on free world’s ability build its strength and thereby make possible comprehensive and enduring settlement with Sov bloc which will remove menace which now hangs over entire free world and which in Korea has challenged very existence ROK. If a settlement of Korean hostilities, with assurances that the aggression will not be renewed, can be obtained at this time in the interest of reducing the risk of world-wide hostilities and gaining further time for free world to rebuild its strength and defenses, then it is clearly in interest of ROKS themselves to accept with all possible grace such an arrangement. ROKS must realize their security and hopes for a unified country can only be found in context of abandonment Commie aggressive designs by confrontation Moscow and its satellites with situation of strength in free world which wld remove all incentive for aggression anywhere.
- (6)
- Lastly, just as long-term future of hope and promise for ROKs depends on continuing loval assn with US and free world, so all hope of reconstruction in immed period fol local settlement rests on resources and will to help of US. US’s post V–J Day and pre-invasion record of material and moral support, as well as US instant reaction to invasion by North Koreans, shld adequately testify to what collaborative future with US wld hold. On other hand, if ROKs by intransigent and inflammatory statements and provocative or violent actions shld jeopardize or make more difficult settlement at this time in Korea, which wld be acceptable to US and UN, then ROKs can inevitably expect a revulsion of feeling against them on part of Amer people who are so keenly conscious that at cost of nearly 100,000 battle casualties US has saved ROK from destruction, in addition to sacrifice made in World War II from which came hope for free Korea.
I am fully aware immense difficulty ur task and appreciative ur accomplishment. The days immed ahead promise to be even more difficult and will require combination of hardbitten realism and sympathetic understanding in ur handling of Rhee and his Govt. If satis settlement in vicinity of present battle line can be achieved we will be able understand disappointment and dashed hopes of ROKs but we [Page 590] cannot accept reckless or foolish action which wld place in jeopardy their and our own natl security interests.
It is possible that ROK leaders may be able to give assurances that, despite their contd public position on unification, they wld act with moderation and not permit relations with us to become marked with hostility and acrimony.