795.00/6–2951
Memorandum of Teletype Conference, Prepared in the Department of the Army
Nr. DA TT 4890
Subject: Msg JCS 95174—28 June 51.
Conferees:
Washington: | Tokyo: |
Gen O N Bradley CJCS | Gen Ridgway CINCFE |
Mr H F Matthews A/Secy State | Adm Sherman CNO |
Mr D Rusk A/Secy State | Adm Joy COMNAVFE |
Vice Adm A C Davis JCS | Gen Weyland ComGen FEAF |
Gen J L Collins CSA | Gen Hickey C/S FECOM |
Adm L D McCormick CNO | Gen Ennis G2 FECOM |
Lt Gen C L Bolte DCS/P | Gen Wright G3 FECOM |
Maj Gen T D White AF | Col Moorman SGS FECOM |
Col E H J Carns JCS | Col Surles Deputy SGS FECOM |
Mr U A Johnson State | Mr Paul Nitze State Dept |
Lt Col J B Matthews G3 | |
Lt Col W F Kaufman G3 |
. . . . . . . . . . . . . .
[Page 584]Tokyo: FEC–O2 Official Top Secret
- 1.
- . . . .
- 2.
- Concur your paragraph 3.1
- 3.
- Your paragraph 4A—subject to and upon your approval, shall send following msg by radio in clear: “Cmdr in Chief, Chinese Communist Forces in Korea, Supreme Comdr, North Korean Forces. I am informed that you may desire a meeting to discuss an armistice for the cessation of hostilities and all acts of armed force in Korea.
If you desire such a meeting, I request you so inform me.
I am directed to inform you that in the event of your informing me that you desire such a meeting, I shall be prepared to name my participants. I would then suggest a time at which they could meet with yours aboard a Danish hospital ship in Wonsan harbor. Signed M B Ridgway, General, United States Army, Commander in Chief, United Nations Command”, and simultaneously release to press, informing you of exact hour of proposed release.
Your paragraph 4B—if proposed meeting place is rejected, shall then propose Yo-Do, an island near Wonsan, which we occupy.
Your paragraph 4C—prefer to be represented at outset until evidence clear of intention in good faith to proceed with discussions, but, I would be in immediate vicinity of meeting place.
Your paragraph 4D—agree. Will select some senior ROK officer after consultation with Van Fleet.
(End FEC–2)
Washington: DA–3 Top Secret
Comments on your draft FEC–2:
First, message will only be sent on receipt directive from President thru JCS.
Second, it is considered important that your message state initially that you are acting under instructions, although it is not considered desirable that specific reference be made to US Government. Reason for this is to indicate you are acting with full authority but at same time to avoid introducing governmental aspect which Russians and Chinese apparently wish to avoid.
Third, although it is our desire to make it clear that Communists have taken initiative in seeking armistice talks, we do not wish by tone of message to raise prestige obstacles by stressing that they have sued for peace.
Fourth, it was our thought that we should not suggest time or place in your first message but rather that we should expect some response from opposing commander before making any specific proposal.
Fifth, some such phrase as “assure against the resumption of hostilities” [Page 585] should be included in order, without going into details, to cover essential conditions such as adequate supervision of armistice terms.
Sixth, glad to see that in general your text is fairly close to our proposal as slated in paragraph 5, JCS 95174 however exact text your message must be determined here in relation to UN and other consultations.
Final directive from here will contain exact text but we would be glad to have any comments on differences between your text and ours.
Seventh, we contemplate possible release time of 0800 hours Saturday2 Tokyo time. This would permit certain diplomatic and Congressional preparation here. Would that release time be convenient to you?
[(End DA–3)]
Tokyo: FEC–5 Official Top Secret
Ref DA–3.
First para—roger.
Second para—suggest modification of body of msg to read:
“As Commander in Chief of the United Nations Command, I have been instructed to communicate to you the following:
“I am informed that you may desire a meeting to discuss an armistice for the cessation of hostilities and all acts of armed force in Korea;
“If you desire such a meeting, I request you so inform me.
“In the event that you so inform me, I shall be prepared to name my participants. I would also at that time suggest a date at which they could meet with yours aboard a Danish hospital ship in Wonsan harbor.
“M. B. Ridgway,
“General, United States Army
“Commander in Chief
“United Nations Command.”
Third para—no comment.
Fourth para—have not suggested time. Gave careful thought to inclusion of suggested place, concluding it better to do so in order to retain initiative. Meeting aboard ship would be more advantageous to us if accepted. To fail to suggest place would relinquish initiative and consume more time in reaching agreement.
Fifth para—basic factor to me is retention of maximum initiative and freedom of action until enemy representatives have given concrete and acceptable evidence of good faith. Any indication on our part in this initial msg implying that regardless of course of armistice negotiations we would not resume hostilities would be premature and [Page 586] to our distinct disadvantage. Uniform pattern of Communist duplicity and faithlessness is strongest reason for avoiding commitment until positive and acceptable assurances of good faith have been made.
Seventh para—concur.3
[(End FE–5)]
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