Foreign Relations of the United States, 1951, Korea and China, Volume VII, Part 1

795.00/6–2851: Telegram

The United States Deputy Representative at the United Nations (Gross) to the Secretary of State

secret   priority

New York, June 28, 1951—7:13 p. m.

1738. In connection with Malik speech and subsequent developments, following points are suggested for consideration of Dept:

1. It is to be expected that UN membership generally agree that UC possesses requisite authority under existing UN resolutions to negotiate and accomplish a cease-fire and armistice. Question arises, however, whether subsequent UN action is necessary or desirable. It will be recalled that point 8 of cease-fire points published by group on cease-fire (A/C.1/643, Jan. 2, 1951) provides that the GA should be asked to confirm the cease-fire arrangements, which shall continue in effect until superseded by further steps approved by UN. Following questions are suggested by this provision:

(a) Should GA confirmation be sought in a res which is confined exclusively to military arrangements made by field commanders? There may be advantage in treating this question in a more general res. Such a res might give due weight to high priority of economic rehabilitation in post-armistice phase. With regard to the post armistice political problems, a res might modify terms of reference and composition of UNCURK, and define its relationship with such armistice supervisory group as may be constituted. Consideration might also be given to future role of UNKRA, its composition and its relationship to occupational authorities. It is clear that the difficulties which have arisen with regard to settling the role of the Agent General cannot continue to be tolerated and that it is of the utmost importance to place this matter at once in a position which will make it possible to do the job which will remain to be done after an armistice.

(b) What UN political aspects may arise with regard to question of withdrawal of Chi Com forces? If Chi Com are required to withdraw by “appropriate stages” or otherwise beyond the Yalu River, there may be pressure for UN guarantees to respect Chi frontier with Korea and to protect legitimate Chi and Korean interests in the frontier zone. Dept will recall this provision in six-power res (A/C.1/638, Dec 6, 1950) which was vetoed in SC.¹ This problem also suggests question what commitments might be made or expected of NK authorities without involving establishment of status for NK regime.

(c) If GA confirmation is sought, question may arise re participation of Chi Coms and NK authorities at GA deliberations. It is suggested that Dept consider this in advance of question arising and advise us of position to be taken in diplomatic preparation.

2. Korean armistice may well result in renewed pressures to seat Chi Coms in UN organs. Such development is foreshadowed by public statements of Morrison, Lange and others, favoring postponement of consideration of question until peace has been arranged. In addition, SYG Lie, Rau and others may renew suggestions to re-activate GA comite of 7 on Chi representation. I suggest Dept urgently consider whether we should not without delay engage in vigorous diplomatic activity and obtain as many commitments as possible from member states to refrain from raising question of Chi Com representation after accomplishment of armistice. If we delay such diplomatic activity until after armistice, we may be confronted with pressures which might now be anticipated and prevented.

3. Relationship of GOC to armistice negotiations. Clearly Soviet maneuver and Malik refusal to see Entezam are calculated designs to bypass GOC. Although I do not see any necessity for us to take initiative with the GOC, there may be advantage from UN standpoint in our maintaining friendly relations with GOC and conferring with them (subject to obvious security requirements). Specific suggestion is made that Entezam might be invited to Dept for consultation.

4. Special problem might arise with regard to the creation and composition of an armistice supervisory comm. Unless such a commission is to be composed exclusively of military personnel, it may be necessary to consult with SYG and selected UN members to agree upon commission membership. It will be recalled that when Crittenberger and I discussed this matter with cease-fire group in Dec. (ourtel No. 974, Dec. 15, 1950),² various alternatives, possibilities were discussed, although of course no conclusion was reached. If UNCURK or a designee of UNCURK were to be used, this would require consultations here and possibly GA action.

Gross

1. The Soviet veto took place on November 30, 1950; see the editorial note, Foreign Relations, 1950, vol. vii, p. 1268.
2. For text, see Foreign Relations, 1950, vol. vii, p. 1554.