795.00/6–2851: Telegram
The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Kirk) to the Secretary of State
2186. Embtels 2180 and 2181 June 27. Dept pass USUN. My comment re Gromyko interview fols:
Gromyko remarks indicate Commies clearly supporting Malik proposal, this pointed up by Gromyko’s relatively specific on the spot answers to important questions. As noted Embtel 2166 June 25, Commies have nothing to lose by sponsoring peace move at this time, if played adroitly, they can gain propaganda-wise regardless of outcome. Now clear that Chi Commies are also behind move (as was to be anticipated [Page 580] ) with Pravda today quoting from Jen Min Jih Pao, official organ CC of CCP (Embtel 2182, June 28).1
Also clear that Sovs are playing careful game of official non-involvement, thus retaining freedom of action, and that Commies are holding cards close to chest, enabling full exploitation situation as it develops. Latter shown by Gromyko insistence that political and territorial questions are specifically excluded from negots for cease-fire and armistice. Obvious implication is that such questions reserved for further negots, concerning which Gromyko refused to make suggestions. Emb has no evidence that Commie terms for settlement polit and territorial questions will not include everything Commies have sought in past, i.e. seating CPR in UN, Commie control Formosa, CPR and KPDR participation Jap peace treaty, removal all fon troops from Korea.
There undoubtedly is great significance to Commie proposal at this time, ignoring as it does the prerequisites of a cease-fire specified by Commies in past. Appears likely that Commie move is at least in part dictated by UN strength in field. Emb inclined to suspect that proposal may reflect CPR unwillingness to carry on bloody and expensive campaign endlessly if possible Commies retain NK, without further hostilities. Sacrifices required of CPR to carry on war cannot be matched by Sov material assistance, no matter how generous, and Chi Commies may well have discovered that urgent requirements their over-all program necessitate abandonment Korean venture, at least for present. In speculating this vein, Emb not minimizing Chi Commie wholehearted cooperation with Kremlin, but we believe status CCP with Kremlin, and long-range importance to latter of careful handling most important Sov satellite, constrain Kremlin to react with greater flexibility to CPR views than is usual in relations with satellites. Obvious that considerations of face wld make Chi Commies prefer peace approach being advanced by Sov, particularly as CPR not officially involved in Korean war; move also fits in nicely with Sov propaganda role peacemaker.
Importance attached by Commies to CPR role in Korea shown by Gromyko’s forthright declaration that Rep of Chi volunteer units is to participate in initial negots. Not only wld Peiping regime find itself in embarrassing posture before Chi people if it did not assume important role in negots, but it undoubtedly expects to utilize this opportunity as precedent for continuing participate in internatl negots affecting FE.
Sent Dept 2186; rptd info USUN 372.