795.00/6–2851
Memorandum of Conversation, by the Secretary of State
Subject: Soviet Peace Proposals Korea
| Participants: | Ambassador Bonnet |
| The Secretary | |
| Mr. Merchant—FE | |
| Mr. Godley—WE |
Ambassador Bonnet called this afternoon at his request to discuss Mr. Malik’s recent proposal and particularly Ambassador Kirk’s conversation yesterday with Gromyko. As the Ambassador had evidently not yet seen our release on Ambassador Kirk’s report I showed it to him and he read it carefully.1
He then asked whether I could indicate our thinking on the question of the cease-fire and the armistice in that this point appeared to him to be a bit confusing. I said that we also had at first been confused, but upon further study were of the opinion that the cease-fire and the armistice were practically the same and that we envisaged discussions taking place between the military commanders to determine the time of the cease-fire and the conditions governing the armistice. The Ambassador then expressed the opinion that it would be essential for some sort of observation or inspection of the area not only between the troops but also behind both forces. I agreed fully with this view and the Ambassador then asked whether we were thinking of a military, civilian, UN, or neutral group providing this check. I replied that the actual form of this inspection remains to be seen and that it undoubtedly would require difficult negotiations. The Ambassador asked whether we agreed that after the cease-fire and an armistice were arranged we would then discuss the broader political questions which should be purely in the framework of the Korean problem, i.e., not including Formosa and related Chinese problems. I said this was [Page 579] our thinking and that we certainly agreed that the follow-up discussions should be limited to those pertaining to Korea.
The Ambassador inquired what we thought the next step would be and when General Ridgway would be told to discuss the armistice and cease-fire terms with the North Koreans and the representatives of the “Chinese Volunteers”. I answered that we were presently studying this problem with the military authorities and that we were pressing it actively. The Ambassador commented that his government felt that these conversations should be expedited, to which I fully agreed and reassured him that they were going on as rapidly as possible. I told him that this would entail not only discussions with our military authorities here but that they would undoubtedly want to consult with General Ridgway and we, of course, would want to confer with Ambassadors in Washington of countries involved in the Korean operations.
With regard to Mr. Gromyko’s discussion yesterday with Ambassador Kirk, Ambassador Bonnet remarked that he was rather amused in that Mr. Gromyko said the Soviet Government was not aware of the views of the Chinese Communist regime on Mr. Malik’s statement. He said that this might complicate the negotiations and cause additional difficulties. I answered that we shared this view and purposely refrained in our statement from making the obvious propaganda remark that this was one of the first times Mr. Gromyko has expressed ignorance of Chinese Communist policy. I continued that we would have to be extremely careful lest we fall into a trap. Accordingly, the armistice terms would have to be carefully prepared and some provision for inspection and control was all the more essential.
The Ambassador thanked me for these views, and said they were about the same as those held by his government.
- The text of the Department of State press release, dated June 28, which summarized the contents of telegram 2181, June 27, from Moscow, is printed in the Department of State Bulletin, July 9, 1951, p. 45.↩