795.00/6–2851: Telegram
The United States Deputy Representative at the United Nations (Gross) to the Secretary of State
1737. Re Korea: Ross gave Lie orally at noon today close paraphrase of Moscow’s 2181, June 27, stressing that we wanted him to have this information personally. Lie had no comment except to express the hope that we could “keep this simple”. Referring to Gromyko’s reference that political and territorial matters were not involved, Lie observed that this was a victory for the UN reflecting the objective he had worked for for so long. He said obviously the thing to do now was to leave matters to Ridgway in the field. He interpreted general tenor of Gromyko’s responses as indication Russians are very sensitive about offending Chinese Communists by appearing to interfere in Chinese Communist independence. He said he had questioned Zinchenko very closely about precise English translation of Russian text of Malik’s speech and that with particular reference to term “belligerents”, Zinchenko had made clear this meant the forces in the field. Lie, apparently [Page 574] expressing his own thought, said it was clear that the UC was the US Govt and that the UC commander in the field wld head the “delegation” on the UN side with full authority to act for the UN. On the other side, he said obviously the North Korean commander wld head the Communist “delegation” and that there wld be Chinese Communist “advisers” attached to him.
Lie also expressed conviction that this move was sincere, because Russians have lost great deal of prestige in Asia and cld not successfully cope at one and same time with problems of Asia, Atlantic Treaty, etc. He said he had studied Malik statement very closely and felt certain it had been prepared line by line with utmost care by highest level Soviet authorities and reflected Stalin’s own view and participation.
Lacoste heard substantially the same views from Lie yesterday. On subject of Chinese Communist participation in negotiations, Lie told Lacoste that he had sent Zinchenko to clarify this precise point with Malik and that later Zinchenko reported apparently reflecting Malik’s view that it shld be two negotiators mentioned and the North Korean commander wld probably have several Chinese Communist advisers.
Lie further expressed opinion to Lacoste that USSR wld not want direct overtures to PRC for reasons stated. Lacoste added as his own comment that after the weeks of negotiation among Paris deputies, Soviets may well have felt it desirable for political reasons to have discussion re clarification Malik statement held in Moscow.