310.361/6–2851
Memorandum by the Officer in Charge of Korean Affairs (Emmons) to the Director of the Office of Northeast Asian Affairs (Johnson)
Subject: Moscow’s Telegram 2181, June 27, 1951
The information contained in the above-mentioned telegram as to the Soviet concept of arrangements for bringing an end to hostilities in Korea raises, in my opinion, certain very serious factors which I believe must be carefully considered in any course of action which we may adopt. It seems to me obvious from the content of the telegram under reference, that the Soviet proposal would deal with a settlement in Korea in two basic and unrelated phases and that the points raised by Mr. Gromyko concern only the first phase.
The two phases to which I have reference are: (1) a purely [Page 572] military arrangement at a local level in Korea to bring about a cease-fire, and (2) leaving for the vague future any steps for an ultimate political settlement for Korea and possibly for other areas in the Far East. Paragraph three of the telegram under reference very clearly brings out this feature of the Soviet proposals. I would stress that the United Nations must be extremely careful to avoid to the maximum possible extent allowing itself to be placed in the position of agreeing merely to a cease-fire in Korea, leaving aside for subsequent discussions of an ultimate settlement for some time in the future. The repeated experience which the Western world has had with Soviet intransigence and its complete and cynical refusal to accept a just and reasonable settlement for world problems and, specifically, the difficulties which we have had in attaining any political solution to the Korean problem in the past, should make us fully aware of the virtually complete futility of relying upon discussions or efforts at political understandings or agreements on any major issue with the Communists. At this late date, we would be naive in the extreme if we were to allow ourselves to be persuaded, short of the most concrete proof of their sincerity, that the Soviets or the Chinese Communists would sincerely seek or accept an equitable and honorable solution in Korea by peaceful means. Certainly the North Koreans will not.
It would therefore, in my opinion, be a most serious mistake if we were maneuvered by Communist blandishments and the impulsive desire for peace on the part of Western Nations to accept a cease-fire or other military arrangements in Korea under conditions which would weaken our basic military position and strength in that country and yet would not provide as clear and firm an understanding as can be derived from our present position that the Soviet Union, the Chinese Communists and the North Koreans will accept the principles for the ultimate establishment for a unified, independent and democratic Korea; also, and perhaps even more important, would be their acceptance of long-range guarantees which would prevent further military aggression in the area. In my opinion, every possible advantage must be exacted from our acceptance of a cease-fire or before we, in any manner, relax the intensity of our military pressure upon the Communist forces.
There is also the danger that if such undertakings and guarantees are not exacted as a price for a cease-fire we may ultimately find ourselves in a position of having to take the initiative in resuming hostilities in order to defend the security of Korea and to carry out the military objectives of the United Nations to which we are committed. If the United Nations were forced under such circumstances to take this initiative, the results from the propaganda and psychological point of view throughout the world would inevitably do us tremendous [Page 573] harm; Communist propaganda could with some logic make it appear that it was the United Nations and specifically the United States which was responsible for the consequences of such a renewal of hostilities in terms of the further devastation and destruction which would inevitably result.
In summary, therefore, I think it essential that, despite assurances from the Communist side, we should be most reluctant to break off hostilities until as sound a basis as possible has been laid for the negotiation of a political settlement in Korea which will not prove a duplication of the fruitless efforts we have made in the past to accomplish our political objectives in Korea. Furthermore, it seems to me that the United States, together with the United Nations, has an inescapable and grave moral responsibility to the people of Korea that from the tremendous sacrifices and destruction which has been occasioned to them by this war we will, to the best of our ability, provide for the realization of those aspirations for unification and independence which are, for them of such overwhelming importance. In this we cannot afford to go too far in compromising with expediency nor relax our efforts in their behalf, unless it is clear that no other course is open to us. In the words of Ambassador Muccio (Telegram 1006, June 1) “It would be tragic if pressures for peace settlement resulted in premature discussions as it is apparent our bargaining position improves daily.”