Foreign Relations of the United States, 1951, Korea and China, Volume VII, Part 1

795.00/6–451

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Rusk)

secret

[Washington,] June 4, 1951.

Subject: Korea

Participants:	Sir Oliver Franks—The British Ambassador
	Mr. Matthews—G
	Mr. Nitze—S/P
	Mr. Perkins—EUR
	Mr. Rusk—FE

The British Ambassador came in today to talk about Korea. He referred to the United States armistice terms which Mr. Rusk had furnished the British Ambassador, Mr. Acheson’s message to Mr. Morrison of May 1,¹ a current study being made in London of our armistice terms, and Mr. Morrison’s suggestion for a review of a possible political declaration. The Ambassador stated that it was important to sort out our minds on the inter-relationships among these several matters.

The Ambassador said that the United Kingdom had been discussing the desirability of an agreed declaration setting forth the broad aims of policy regarding Korea. Although the question might arise as to whether the United Kingdom was merely reviewing an earlier thought, he thought there were a number of considerations in favor of such a declaration. He mentioned briefly Mr. Morrison’s statement to the House of Commons that such a declaration was under consideration² and that, although Mr. Morrison had not been pressed by the House on the matter, the question would undoubtedly reoccur. The Ambassador said that he thought public opinion, in any event British public opinion, was somewhat confused as to what Korea is now about. From this point of view, there would be considerable gain in a general statement made by the proper authorities. He also said that, looking at Asia generally, the legitimacy of our aims in Korea should be periodically affirmed and re-affirmed. He said that the rest of the free world would probably remain free over the period of the next three years but that we could not be so sure of India and Asia. There had been Communist successes in Asia and our effort should be to set back these successes and incline Asia toward the West. This would require confidence by them in us, and such confidence might be engendered by a proper declaration. Further, the Ambassador said that, from the point of view of the United Nations, some things had been said in the past which might not be said today. Solidarity in the United Nations needed to be maintained and this solidarity would be strengthened by a declaration on what United Nations policy actually is. Mr. Morrison and the Foreign Office were anxious that the two “arms” of the United Nations be kept in being: (a) the arm of collective security, by which “the good people require the bad people” to act properly, and (b) the mediation and conciliation roles of the United Nations through which “the good people” try to get “the bad people” to be better.

The Ambassador then spoke on a personal basis and said he thought that the real arguments in favor of a declaration of aims lay outside of the question of a possible Chinese Communist response, the chances for which he considered are zero.

Still “talking aloud”, the Ambassador commented further upon the British domestic aspects of a declaration. He alluded to the commitment made by Mr. Morrison to the House of Commons and then stated that there had been a considerable firming up of British policy regarding Russia. This firming up was reflected in the British budget, in the way in which the political controversy surrounding Mr. Bevan was resolved³ and in the British attitude in the Paris talks. He said that this development in British policy had been “knocking back” the Left Wing of the Labor Party. One purpose of a public declaration regarding Korea was to show the Left Wing of the Party and the British public that everything that can be done has been done to establish peace. Such a declaration would therefore have an important unifying force in Britain.

Mr. Matthews asked whether the British had any evidence of any change in attitude on the part of the Chinese Communists which might lead them to believe that the Chinese would accept a settlement. The Ambassador stated that so far as he knew they had none.

Mr. Rusk stated certain problems which we saw in a public statement. First, a public statement which contained any objectives in excess of our bare minimum (bargaining points) might repel the adversary and make a settlement more difficult. On the other hand, a statement which contained the minimum possible basis for settlement would not appear very attractive to the American people and the American Congress and would not be counter-balanced by the fact that at least peace had resulted. A unilateral declaration of our minimum position would therefore have disadvantages not balanced off by the advantage of peace.

Mr. Rusk then said that it was his impression that we and the British have now rolled up our sleeves and moved to the next steps on the Korean matter but that we had thought that the first job would be to get an agreement (which he did not think would be difficult) on the actual result we hoped to bring about in Korea; subsequently, we and they might consider what should be said about that result and what steps should be taken to accomplish it. Mr. Rusk said that it was his impression that the British view was that we should consider promptly a public statement and that such a statement would be useful so long as it did not interfere with the negotiating position or the development of a final position on Korea. The Ambassador affirmed that this was the case. Mr. Rusk then stated that we had not ourselves come to any final views on the matter of a statement and that we were in fact considering a draft in the event a decision was made that such a statement would be useful.

Mr. Matthews and Mr. Rusk indicated to the Ambassador that it might be helpful if we had any views which London might have on the problem of a possible approach to Peiping. The United States had no useful contact, we understand that the British channels are not entirely open and that Mr. Pannikar had not been an entirely satisfactory instrument.

The Ambassador asked if what had been said represented the views of the Secretary and was informed that there had not been an opportunity to discuss the matter with the Secretary and we would like to leave the Secretary’s position open.

1. See telegram 4969, April 30, to London, p. 390.
2. Reference is to Mr. Morrison’s statement of April 11; see Parliamentary Debates, House of Commons, 5th series, vol. 486, col. 1025.
3. Aneurin Bevan had resigned as British Minister of Labour on April 21 in disagreement with the Labour Government’s policy of increased defense expenditures; for related documentation, see the compilation on the United Kingdom in volume iv.