USUN Files: Telegram

The United States Deputy Representative at the United Nations (Gross) to the Secretary of State

secret   priority

Unmis 43. Re Korea—For Hickerson UNA from Gross. In giving consideration to possible steps which might take advantage of present situation in Korea from point of view of furthering efforts for honorable and appropriate peaceful solution in Korea, following is outline of a course which occurs to me as combining elements of effectiveness and simplicity. It would appear also to be “manageable” in that unlike suggestions which have been made for a GA res, it [Page 499] would avoid unpredictable and divisive debates or amendments. Furthermore, it would, I think, have the advantage of precision and would be within a military context, thereby avoiding diversionary questions such as the status of the “Five Principles” embodied in the Supplementary Report of the Cease-Fire Group.

(1) The GOC might confidentially advise the UC of its intention to submit an Interim Report to the GA, recounting the history of its efforts. The GOC might request a mtg with reps of the UC to ascertain what they consider to be a satisfactory basis for a cease-fire under present circumstances.

(2) Reps of the UC might meet in confidence with the GOC and advise latter that the eight points discussed with the Cease-Fire Group on Dec 15, 1950 still constitute a reasonable basis for discusssion. (You will recall that these points are set forth in the 1st Report of the Cease-Fire Group, Doc. A/C.1/643, 2 Jan 1951.)1

(3) The Pres of the GA might then secretly (probably through the Swed Min at Peiping) send a message similar in form to his message of Feb 14. That is to say, while not scuttling the GOC, he would leave the way open for Peiping to respond to him as GA Pres without implication of recognizing the “legality” of the GOC. The communication might advise Peiping of the intention of the GOC to file an Interim Report by a certain date. The communication would advise Peiping that the GOC felt that the eight points set forth in the Cease-Fire Group Rept of Jan 1, 1951 still “constitute a reasonable basis for discussion”. (This is the language in which the Cease-Fire Group itself characterized the eight points.) The communication from the GA Pres would request the Peiping regime to comment, so that the GOC could complete its Interim Rept to the GA.

(4) If Peiping failed to reply to the GA Pres within a reasonable time, or by a fixed date, the GOC would then file its Report, bringing the whole matter up to date, including the confidential discussions held with the UC, as outlined in para (1) above, and its unanswered communication to Peiping.

(5) If the Peiping Govt should reply, the situation then arising would be examined in the light of the reply and the circumstances then existing.

One or two additional comments on the foregoing suggestion may be in order. In the first place, it would go a long way toward meeting the strong and growing sentiment here that “something should be done”, a sentiment which is fully shared by the 3 members of the GOC (mytel No. 1433, Apr 21). Secondly, it would have the advantage referred to in Deptel 953 (TopSec) May 29, as being an effort to open negotiations “discreetly through the GOC or available diplomatic channels.” Thirdly, it could be done consistently and simultaneously [Page 500] with a public move such as I understand the Dept has under consideration in terms of a declaration. I have studied Misun 49, June 2 transmitting UK text of revised draft of such a declaration.2 I think the course outlined above would not only be wholly consistent with it, but would lay the basis for concrete implementation of Para (a) of the UK text. It would thus not only round out the record of our attempts to reach a satisfactory peaceful solution, but also would, I think, introduce an element of precaution into the situation.

The foregoing is, of course, entirely subject to the assumption (which I realize may or may not be a valid one) that the UC would be prepared under conditions existing today to reaffirm the eight points which I was authorized to give to the Cease-Fire Group on Dec 15, 1950. I stress also that the foregoing are entirely my personal ideas and have not been discussed with anyone outside the Mission nor have they been discussed with Austin who is out of town. I feel it important to comply with your request to send you the outline of the suggestion for your study in connection with the consideration you are urgently giving to the whole matter.

[Gross]
  1. Not printed.
  2. Telegram Misun 49, June 2, to New York, not printed; for the text of the revised U.K. draft, see the annex to the memorandum by Wainhouse to Hickerson and Rusk, dated May 31, p. 480.