Foreign Relations of the United States, 1951, Korea and China, Volume VII, Part 1

Department of Defense Files: Telegram

The Joint Chiefs of Staff to the Commander in Chief, Far East (Ridgway)

top secret
priority

Washington, May 31, 1951—7:24 p. m.

JCS 92831. From JCS. The following directives, which are a compilation and condensation of existing directives, with minor modifications, have been prepared after consultation with mbrs your staff. They are now being cleared with Sec Def and the President. You will be informed when final clearance has been obtained.¹

Part I—Directive to CINCFE

mission

1. In addition to the missions outlined in the Unified Command Plan (JCS 1259/27),² CINCFE will:

a. Support UN operations in Korea.

b. By air and naval action defend Formosa and the Pescadores against invasion or attack by Chinese Communist forces and insure that Formosa and the Pescadores will not be used as bases of operations against the Chinese mainland by the Chinese nationalists.

2. In the event of Soviet attack on FECOM, the defense of Japan becomes your basic and overriding mission.

operations

3. In the event of Chinese Communist air or sea attack against Formosa and the Pescadores:

a. Action by United States forces will be confined to air and naval action.

b. The immediate staging of United States aircraft through Formosan bases is authorized. However, this does not constitute authority to base forces in Formosa without specific authority of JCS and no commitment to the Chinese Nat Govt should be made. Limited prestockage of petroleum, oil, lubricants, and ammunition is authorized.

c. You will interpose no objection to the Chinese Nat Govt retaliating immediately against targets on the Chinese mainland. (This position has been conveyed to the Chinese Nat Govt through diplomatic channels.)

4. In event of air or sea attacks against United States forces outside Korea such forces will take immediate and aggressive measures in self-defense, but retaliatory action against targets on the Chinese mainland, or in Manchuria, or in the USSR will be taken only with the approval of the JCS. The facts concerning such attack and CINCFE recommended retaliatory action, if any, will be reported by CINCFE to JCS.

5. You are authorized to conduct aerial reconnaissance over the coastal area of China to determine the imminence of attack upon For mosa but such reconnaissance will be limited to areas south of the 32nd parallel and north of Hong Kong.

6. Anchorages in Formosa and the Pescadores are authorized.

forces

7. All United States forces currently under your control are available to you for the conduct of your mission as stated herein axcept that no United States ground forces will be used in the conduct of your mission relating to Formosa and the Pescadores. The 40th and 45th Inf Divs will be employed only in the conduct of your mission relating to the Japanese islands except on authority from JCS.

8. There is no restriction on your employment of United States air and naval forces as between the support of Korean operations and the defense of Formosa.

9. Of those forces under your command, United States forces only will participate in operations relating to Formosa except with prior approval of JCS.

10. Your relationship to and your responsibility for MAAG Formosa are contained in DA 89170, Apr 51.³

operational restrictions

11. Only the President of the United States, as CINC of the armed forces, has authority to order or authorize preventive action against concentrations on the Chinese mainland.

12. Your mission in the event of Chinese Communist attack does not include participation in the defense of the islands now under Chinese Nat Govt control, other than Formosa and the Pescadores. You will not, however, stand in the way of Chinese Nat Govt support of defensive operations on or from these islands.

13. Without approval of JCS, and except as specified in para 5 herein, air and surface patrols will not operate within 12 miles to seaward of Manchuria, the USSR or USSR-held territory.

planning

14. In order to be prepared for Chinese aggression outside Korea, to protect the security of UN and United States forces, and to provide for appropriate mil action in the event that UN forces are forced to evacuate Korea, you will expedite the development of plans for foll courses of action, if such action should later be deemed necessary. The development of such plans will not be disclosed to any non-United States personnel and the implementation of such plans will be undertaken only upon prior approval of JCS.

a. Mil action against selected targets held by Communist China outside Korea.

b. Participating defensively or offensively of Chinese Nat forces and the necessary operational assistance to make them effective.

In conjunction with the above and by separate directive, CINCPAC is being directed to develop plans for imposing a blockade of the China coast by naval forces.

Part II—Directive to CINCUNC

1. Foll instructions, which are a compilation and condensation with minor modification, of existing directives, constitute your authority as CINCUNC for conduct of mil operations in Korea. All previous directives or portions of directives in conflict herewith are rescinded.

2. UN Security Council in its resolution of 7 Jul 50 recommended that all mbrs providing mil forces and other assistance to ROK, pursuant to SC resolutions of 25 and 27 Jun 50, make such forces and other assistance available to a unified command under the United States.

3. In acc therewith you have been designated as the cdr of those mil forces. Your title in this capacity will be CINCUNC.

4. In acc with appropriate UN resolutions, over-all mission of UN is to assist ROK in repelling the aggression and to restore peace and security in Korea.

mission

5. As CINCUNC you will, consistent with the security of forces under your command, inflict the maximum personnel and matériel losses on the forces of North Korea and Communist China operating within the geographic boundaries of Korea and waters adjacent thereto, in order to create conditions favorable to a settlement of the Korean conflict which would, as a minimum,

a. Terminate hostilities under appropriate armistice arrangements;

b. Establish the authority of ROK over all Korea south of a northern boundary so located as to facilitate, to the maximum extent possible, both administration and mil defense, and in no case south of 38th parallel;

c. Provide for the withdrawal by appropriate stages of non-Korean armed forces from Korea;

d. Permit the building of sufficient ROK mil power to deter or repel a renewed North Korean aggression.

operations

6. In pursuit of your mission in Korea, you are authorized to conduct air and naval operations within geographic boundaries of Korea and waters adjacent thereto as deemed by you to be necessary or advantageous to successful attainment of your mission. This specifically does not include authority to conduct air and naval action against Manchuria, against USSR territory, or against hydroelectric installations on the Yalu River, except with the approval of JCS, and as a matter of policy no air operations or naval surface operations will be conducted within 12 miles of USSR territory on the Asiatic mainland.

7. With regard to ground operations, you will obtain approval of JCS prior to undertaking any general advance beyond some line passing approximately through the Hwachon reservoir area. You are, however, authorized to conduct such tactical operations as may be necessary or desirable to insure safety of your cmd, to maintain contact, and to continue to harass the enemy. This includes authority to conduct guerrilla operations and limited amphib and airborne operations in enemy rear areas.

forces

8. As CINCUNC the foll forces are available to you:

a. All United States forces currently deployed in FECOM except 40th and 45th Divs. For planning purposes you may assume that in event implementation of jt outline emerg war plan is directed while UN forces are in conflict with Communist forces in Far East, all SAC units operating in Far East theater will be redeployed as required to support strategic air offensive. This does not include the 19th Bomb Wing.

b. Such ROK forces as are made available by ROK. You will not provide logistic support to any ROK units larger than bn strength other than those already being provided for except on prior approval of JCS. For your info, it is the policy of the United States to develop dependable ROK mil units as rapidly as possible and in sufficient strength eventually to assume the major part of the burden of UN forces in Korea. Consequently, you will keep this matter under review and submit recommendations thereon to JCS. At your discretion, the attachment of ROK personnel to UN units is authorized.

operational restrictions

9. Except with approval of JCS your forces will not cross Manchurian or USSR borders of Korea.

10. Air and naval offensive surface operations should not be conducted within 12 miles to seaward of the coasts of Manchuria or of USSR on the Asiatic mainland.

11. Aerial reconnaissance over all Korean terr, including coastal waters, is authorized, up to Yalu River on west coast but short of Korean-Soviet international boundary on east coast.

12. There is no restriction on your employment of United States naval and air forces as between support of Korean operations and def of Formosa.

13. You are prohibited from attacking Rashin with air and naval forces.

soviet intervention

14. In event of open or covert employment of major Soviet units in Korea (including “volunteers”) you will, subj to security of your forces, assume the defensive, make no move to aggravate the situation, and report to JCS. This is not to be interpreted as a restriction on conduct of air and naval operations in Korea.

15. If USSR announces in advance its intention to reoccupy North Korea and gives warning either explicitly or implicitly that their forces should not be attacked, you will refer the matter immediately to JCS.

16. In event of an attempt to employ small Soviet units covertly in Korea you should continue your current action.

17. It is agreed in principle that, in event of Soviet attack against FECOM, United States and other UN forces will be withdrawn from Korea and you should plan accordingly. Sit may require some immediate movements of your forces by air. Subj to this, however, and to immediate security of your forces both in Korea and in Japan you will initiate major withdrawal from Korea only upon instructions furnished you after receipt of info from you as to conditions obtaining. Pending further instructions, you should not count on the use of any UN forces other than those of United States, in defense of FECOM outside Korea.

psychological warfare

18. You should make an intensive effort using all info media available to you to initiate and maintain a psychological offensive designed to support your mil mission.

civil affairs

19. In South Korea the provisions of W 85117 Jul 50,⁴ as currently implemented in field, remain applicable.

20. In North Korea provisions of JCS 95328 [29] Oct 50, as interpreted in W 95715 [2] Nov 50,⁵ remain applicable. The changing sit requires reexamination of this directive by Depts of State and Defense and UN, and certain revisions may hereafter be necessary.

logistic support

21. Except as prescribed in para 8 b, foregoing, (Part II) you are authorized to send to Korea any munitions and supplies from sources at your disposal which you deem necessary. You will report your estimates of amounts and types of aid required from sources outside your control.

22. With respect to logistic support of foreign forces under your cmd, W 90576 Sep 50⁶ will serve as your guidance.

captured matériel

23. You will be guided with respect to the acquisition, use, and ultimate disposal of enemy matériel captured in Korea by instructions by JCS contained in JCS 99193 [19] Dec 50, as amplified by [JCS] 2171/2, dated 6 Apr 51,⁶ fwdd to you by CSA on 24 Apr 51.

prisoners of war

24. Handling of POWs will be in accordance with pertinent United States Army regs and international conventions.

25. Consistent with provisions of Geneva conv and other applicable regs, you should initiate and maintain a comprehensive program for interrogation, indoctrination, and reorientation of POWs with a view toward their eventual utilization as avowed anti-Communists.

censorship

26. While it is recognized that you do not have the facilities to impose complete censorship within your command, you are in a position to impose delays and news blackouts from time to time. Therefore you are directed to impose a news blackout and impound pertinent communications immediately under your control in appropriate Korean areas whenever in your judgment necessity requires such action.

armistice

27. In event Communist mil leaders request an armistice in the field, you will immediately report that fact to JCS for instructions.

28. For your background info, views of JCS with respect to an armistice are contained in a memo for Sec Def dated 27 Mar 51 (encl to JCS 1776/201) fwdd to you by CSA 4 Apr 51.⁷

channels of communication

29. Directives from unified command (United States Govt) will be transmitted to you through JCS. CSA will act as exec agent for JCS in these matters.

30. Requirement for rendering reports to the UN or operations of UN forces in Korea is contained in JCS 87422 Jul 50.⁸

31. With regard to public policy statements your attention is invited to JCS 98134 Dec 50.⁹

1. For information on the background of this directive, see Schnabel, Policy and Direction, p. 395.
2. Dated December 14, 1946; see ibid., p. 47, footnote 18.
3. Not printed.
4. Not printed.
5. See footnote 4, p. 397.
6. Not printed.
6. Not printed.
7. For the text of the March 27 memorandum, see the enclosure to the letter from Lovett to Acheson, March 31, p. 285.
8. Not printed.
9. Text in Hearings, p. 3536.