795.00/5–3151
Memorandum of Conversation, by the Assistant Secretary of State for United Nations Affairs (Hickerson)
Subject: New Effort to Bring About Cease-Fire in Korea
| Participants: | Dr. Ales Bebler, Ambassador, Yugoslavian Permanent Representative to the United Nations |
| Mr. John D. Hickerson, Assistant Secretary, UNA | |
| Mr. David H. Popper, UNP1 |
Mr. Bebler indicated that he thought that a propitious moment had now arrived for taking new steps to stop the fighting in Korea. He [Page 482] proposed that a public appeal be made to the Chinese Communists, indicating that a cease-fire could be based on the five principles accepted by the First Committee of the General Assembly on January 13. This would be coupled with an announcement in advance of a willingness to have the United Nations forces cease hostilities at a given date and time, if the aggressors would announce in advance their agreement to have their forces cease-fire at the same moment.
Mr. Bebler said that he thought there were real prospects that such a public appeal for peace would be successful. In his view the continuation of the hostilities in Korea was now proving on balance to be harmful to both the Chinese and to the Soviets. The Chinese were clearly not getting the Soviet assistance needed to attain their announced objective of driving United Nations forces out of Korea. The Soviets were not attaining their objective of getting the United States out of Asia and were losing prestige as a result. Moreover, continuation of the conflict would increasingly strain the relations between the Chinese and the Soviets. Thus, if the other side could be allowed to save some face through inclusion of reference to the five principles in a new United Nations peace proposal, Mr. Bebler thought a new step would be worthwhile.
In the course of discussion Mr. Bebler drew upon the experience of Yugoslavia to emphasize his conviction that the Chinese Communists are not subservient to the Russians. He recalled that in the period of Yugoslav-Soviet collaboration, the Soviets made suggestions and attempted to persuade the Yugoslavs but did not issue orders to them. He noted particularly that in 1943 the Yugoslav National Movement had gone counter to strong Soviet representations in convoking their Provisional Parliament.2 In his opinion, backed by his knowledge of Cominform operations, the Soviets would be even more restrained and cautious in their dealings with the Chinese Communists, who of course were stronger than the Yugoslavs.
Mr. Hickerson informed Mr. Bebler that we were giving constant consideration to the prospects for new efforts to make peace in Korea. As Mr. Bebler knew, the successive steps taken by the United Nations had yielded no results, and the Chinese viewpoint had remained absolutely inflexible. Now the plans we had made in March for a statement by the Unified Command had become known publicly, and the Communists if they wished could of course pick up our proposals. Meanwhile, Mr. Hickerson wondered if it was not better to take private soundings before any public appeals were issued. Mr. Bebler said he was not sure his method was the only good method but that he felt it would be useful to make a new appeal for peace.
[Page 483]Mr. Hickerson said he would inform Mr. Bebler through Ambassador Gross of the Department’s reaction to the Yugoslav proposal.
- Deputy Director of the Office of United Nations Political and Security Affairs.↩
- See Foreign Relations, 1943, vol. ii, p. 973.↩