Foreign Relations of the United States, 1951, Korea and China, Volume VII, Part 1

795.00/5–3151

Memorandum by the Director of the Office of United Nations Political and Security Affairs (Wainhouse) to the Assistant Secretaries of State for United Nations Affairs (Hickerson) and Far Eastern Affairs (Rusk)

top secret

[Washington,] May 31, 1951.

Revised British Draft of Proposed Declaration.¹

Our preliminary comments, Mr. Johnson’s² and mine, on the British text of the revised draft of the proposed declaration which you handed to me this afternoon are as follows:

1. The revised text is a considerable improvement over the initial British text³ in that:

a) it confines the declaration to the Korean problem itself. It does not include the other Far Eastern problems which was one of the difficulties of the original draft;

b) the United Nations is mentioned and the President of the General Assembly is included as a member of the Committee to set up and arrange details for a cease-fire.

2. One of the basic difficulties is paragraph (b):

a) it isn’t clear what the composition of the international conference is to be. While the principal powers are included, no reference is made to others who might participate;

b) it isn’t clear whether the creation of a unified and independent Korean state is to precede a government based on free popular elections by secret ballot.

3. Another basic difficulty is whether the declaration responds to United States objectives in Korea. A peaceful solution leading to a unified, independent and democratic Korea will ultimately be oriented towards the Communists or to the West. It is not conceivable that the Soviets and Chinese Communists will accept a Korea oriented toward the West. We ourselves cannot accept a Korea oriented toward Communist China and/or the Soviet Union. It seems to us, therefore, that an international conference of the nature contemplated in the revised draft is doomed to failure. The question, therefore, arises whether under the circumstances it would not be advisable at this juncture to omit any reference to an international conference, and confine the declaration to a cease-fire and a desire for a peaceful settlement with the United Nations objectives of a unified, independent and democratic Korea to be pursued through the existing United Nations instrumentalities.

4. No details are set forth regarding a cease-fire. We could not accept a cease-fire that did not provide for a form of observation throughout all of Korea which would ensure against a recrudescence of aggression. In addition, we desire a twenty mile demilitarized belt between the North and South Koreans along the 38th parallel or further north. A cease-fire without observation machinery would be unacceptable to us and presumably not acceptable to the Chinese Communists.

5. It seems to us that we ought to tell the British quite frankly what, in our view, a declaration of this nature can accomplish within the limits of our objectives.⁴

[Annex]

British Revised Draft of a Proposed Declaration on Korea⁵

Following is text of revised draft of proposed declaration:

Begins:

“We Members of the United Nations who have furnished aid in the field to the Republic of Korea desire to reaffirm our objectives in Korea.

“The purpose of the present campaign is to resist aggression against a government recognised by the United Nations. We covet no territorial or other advantages for ourselves and our only aim is to bring about a free and independent Korea as set out in the Cairo and Potsdam Declarations and subsequently endorsed by the United Nations.

“We proclaim our continued adherence to this policy and our readiness to pursue this objective by peaceful means through negotiations. We affirm our intention to prevent, so far as it lies within our power, the spread of hostilities beyond Korea.

“In our earnest desire to remove this threat to world peace, to relieve the sufferings of the war ravaged Korean people and to achieve the early withdrawal of all foreign forces in Korea so that the Korean people may work out their own destiny free from all foreign interference, we ask for the immediate cessation of hostilities in Korea so that a way may be found to achieve a peaceful settlement of the problems of that unfortunate country.

“We make the following proposals:

• “(a) That a cease-fire in Korea should be agreed upon at once and a committee, including the President of the General Assembly and representatives of the United Nations Unified Command, the South Koreans, the Chinese and North Koreans, be set up to arrange details.
• “(b) That, as soon as a cease-fire has been agreed upon and brought into force, an international conference should be summoned to include representatives of the principal powers concerned to consider a peaceful solution of the Korean problem leading to the creation of a unified independent and democratic Korean state with a constitution and a government based on free popular elections by secret ballot in which the will of the Korean people can be freely asserted.
• “(c) That the conference should also consider arrangements for the withdrawal by appropriate stages of non-Korean armed forces from Korea and means of alleviating the sufferings and hardships of the Korean people and of restoring Korea’s economy.
• “(d) That the agreements reached at the conference should be reported immediately to the United Nations.

“It is our belief that these proposals offer a way of bringing about peace in Korea and of relieving the present tension in the Far East. It is our hope that they will be considered in the same spirit of sincerity in which they are offered and that a settlement in Korea will promote world peace and lead to a settlement of other disputes in the Far East by the same peaceful process of negotiation.”

Ends.

1. See the annex to this document.
2. U. Alexis Johnson, Director of the Office of Northeast Asian Affairs.
3. See the note from the British Embassy dated April 10, p. 328.

4. This memorandum was transmitted first to Mr. Hickerson for his comments. On the following day, June 1, it was sent to Mr. Rusk under cover of the following note from Mr. Lincoln P. Bloomfield, an assistant to Mr. Hickerson:

   “We thought it might be helpful for you to have Jack Hickerson’s comments on Dave Wainhouse’s memorandum of May 31, addressed to both of you, on the revised British draft of the proposed declaration.

   “Jack concurs generally in Dave’s memo. He feels that any public statement will probably be self-defeating as regards the Chinese Communists, although of value to the free world. Jack feels that if we want to make progress with the Chinese Communists, Entezam should approach them secretly and ask if they are now ready for a cease-fire.”

5. The source text is an unsigned, undated copy of the original which was presumably delivered to the Department on May 31, but which has not been found in the Department of State files.