Foreign Relations of the United States, 1951, Korea and China, Volume VII, Part 1

795B.55/5–2651: Telegram

The Ambassador in Korea (Muccio) to the Secretary of State

top secret

Pusan, May 26, 1951—4 p. m.

986. Rptd info Tokyo 171. Re Deptel 889, May 22.¹ Question of steps to strengthen and improve performance of ROK army considered to be one of utmost urgency. Details and circumstances of rout of entire Third Corps last week are much worse than reported in press. There is no doubt individual Korean is good soldier but main weakness ROK army is leadership all officer levels. Most of trained junior officers lost last July–August and competent replacements not yet caught up with losses. Without leadership, Korean characteristic to distrust fellow Koreans enhances tendency under pressure for all to run when few start running. Also must not overlook fact Koreans including army are tired. Troops conscripted often by Shanghai methods and lack real patriotism or ideological convictions. Problem leadership all more difficult when involves using apathetic, weary, uninspired men. Solution of problem obviously primarily in technical military field. EUSAK fully alive to situation and urgently considering corrective measures for Armed Forces.

Corrective measures outside purely technical military field difficult to specify as problem involves whole range of national life, including economic and social conditions, education and govt administration. Korean national life approached complete disintegration last January (see mytel 659, Jan 9) and improvement has been slow and uncertain. Leadership needed at all levels in departments of govt as well as in army. Hence, I have continued stress that Korean leaders sent to US for specialized training should return to Korea to help country in present crisis. In order bring much needed outside help in technical assistance and rehabilitation, I have also stressed urgency of activating UNKRA without delay.

As for specific questions raised by Dept, political interference in army operations not considered of prime import. It is true former Min Defense had tendency by-pass ROK Chief of Staff in chain of command leading to certain amount of confusion to say the least. Next Min Defense² has not as yet really taken hold and has spent little time in ROK Army headquarters, hence too early to decide how he will conduct himself. Disgruntled, by-passed older Chinese and Japanese trained officers have also had adverse influence.

With respect to discipline, I hear we are at a low point where Amer concepts and practices have not yet quite taken hold and Japanese or Korean practices not yet abandoned. The latter, of course, are very drastic and ignore rights of individual and legal processes. Trouble is average soldier does not understand lenient treatment. He understands brutal treatment, which, therefore, gets results. Several KMAG officers feel under circumstances present American policy hinders development of effective fighting force. Foregoing pointed out merely to describe problem. Incidentally, in regard debacle sixth ROK Division last month, disciplinary steps were handled in accordance approved American standards. Board of inquiry was invoked and court martial was held resulting in sentences against regimental and battalion commanders.

Regarding Department’s suggestion as to advisability appointing senior adviser to Min Defense, I have already pointed out Koreans need advice and assistance throughout entire field of government. There is no greater need in Defense Ministry than elsewhere. I doubt, however, that problem under discussion would be eased by having special adviser that Ministry for matters outside purely technical military field. In fact this would only complicate matters as basic difficulties there are purely military. Another adviser would pose problem his relations with Chief of KMAG and have tendency reduce latter’s influence.

As Dept is aware, Korean security forces were placed under operational control of CINCUNC, this control being effected primarily through Chief of KMAG to Korean Chief of Staff. Chief of KMAG and specialized staff officers, however, also available as advisers to Min Defense and his staff who are located in same building as ROK Chief of Staff. Effective functioning of KMAG at headquarters and in field is, of course, vital. These officers must not only be technically proficient but must have ability transmit knowledge to orientals. If they distrusted or disliked by Koreans their “advice” will be ignored. KMAG record on whole has been outstanding. EUSAK aware that recently invoked rotating policy emphasizes continuing need supply officers of high-calibre.

Muccio

1. The text of this message read as follows:

   “Renewed consideration is being given here to more effective and long-range measures which could be taken to strengthen and improve the performance of ROK armed forces. While it is obvious that ROK’s lack trained mil leadership which can only be developed by effective long-range mil program, wld appreciate your preliminary analysis of situation, particularly with respect to such factors as (1) extent to which Polit factors in Govt and Ministry Defense interfere with or prevent most effective utilization of already available leadership and salutary disciplinary action in cases of obviously unsatisfactory conduct; (2) what additional steps can and shld be taken by US Govt to bring about correction outside purely technical military field, for example should any consideration be given to assignment of senior adviser to Ministry of Defense.

   “Dept wld appreciate any suggestions you may have re this urgent and vital problem.” (795B.55/5–2251)

2. Lee Kee Poong had been appointed Minister of National Defense on May 7, succeeding Sihn Sung Mo.