Foreign Relations of the United States, 1951, Korea and China, Volume VII, Part 1

S/S Files: NSC 48 Series

Memorandum by the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the Secretary of Defense (Marshall)¹

top secret

Washington, May 11, 1951.

Subject: United States Objectives, Policies and Courses of Action in Asia

1. This memorandum is in response to your memorandum, dated 4 May 1951,² in which you requested on or before 1200, 8 May 1951, the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on NSC 48/4, a draft statement of policy on Asia.

2. The Joint Chiefs of Staff realize that the policies set forth in paragraph 6 e of NSC 48/4³ are primarily a political matter and that political and diplomatic considerations must govern. However, from the military point of view the Joint Chiefs of Staff consider that a more desirable wording, it being assumed that it would be politically inexpedient to settle for a line below the 38th parallel, would be as follows:

“e. Continue as an ultimate objective to seek by political, as distinguished from military means, a solution of the Korean problem which would provide for a united, independent and democratic Korea. Seek, through appropriate UN machinery, as a current objective a settlement acceptable to the United States, of the Korean conflict which would, as a minimum (1) terminate hostilities under appropriate armistice arrangements; (2) establish a unified, independent and democratic Republic of Korea with a northern boundary so located as to facilitate both administration and military defense, and in no case south of the 38th Parallel; (3) provide for the withdrawal by appropriate stages of non-Korean armed forces from Korea; (4) permit the building of sufficient ROK military power to deter or repel a renewed North Korean aggression. Until the above current objective is attainable, continue to oppose and penalize the aggressor.”

3. The basic objective of seeking to avoid a general war with the USSR, as stated in paragraph 3 of the subject paper,⁴ may require a course of action designed to avoid extension of hostilities against Communist China, but such course of action does not thereby become a separate and equally important objective of United States policy. In view of the above, it is recommended that the objective stated in subparagraph 6f be modified to read as follows:

“f. Consistent with e above and the protection of the security of UN forces, seek to avoid the extension of the hostilities in Korea into a general war with the Soviet Union or an unlimited war between Communist China and the United States alone.”⁵

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

Omar N. Bradley

Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff

1. This document was transmitted on May 14 to the National Security Council by the Acting Executive Secretary (Gleason) for information and consideration in connection with Council action on NSC 48/4 at its meeting on May 16.
2. Not printed.
3. See footnote 2, p. 421.

4. Paragraph 3 of NSC 48/4 read as follows:

   “The United States should, without sacrificing vital security interests, seek to avoid precipitating a general war with the USSR, particularly during the current build-up of the military and supporting strength of the United States and its allies to a level of military readiness adequate to support United States foreign policy, to deter further Soviet aggression, and to form the basis for fighting a global war should this prove unavoidable. This should not preclude undertaking calculated risks in specific areas in the over-all interest of the defense of the United States.”

5. Paragraph 6-f of NSC 48/4 read as follows:

   “Consistent with e above and the protection of the security of UN forces, seek to avoid the extension of the hostilities in area into general war with Communist China or with the Soviet Union.”