795B.5/5–1151
The British Embassy to the Department of State
Text of a Message From Mr. Morrison to Mr. Acheson Dated 10th May, 1951
I have given careful thought to the frank and friendly message you conveyed to me through Mr. Gifford.1 We start, as you say, from the common ground of desiring peace and security in the Pacific, the earliest conclusion of the Korean conflict, and the limitation of the fighting to that country. I share also your determination that the attack in Korea must be repelled. We too have heavy responsibilities in the Pacific and South East Asia area.
I agree that it is difficult to see how the campaign in Korea can be ended short of a change in the aggressive purpose of the Communists. Aggression must be opposed, and must be shown to be not worthwhile. There can be no compromise on this. So long as the Chinese continue their aggression in Korea they must be made to realise that they will meet with steady and collective resistance and that the fighting will stop only if they put an end to their aggression. It must be unmistakably shown that the responsibility for any extension of hostilities is theirs. Meeting aggression is the immediate problem in Korea. The long-term problem is the future of the country, and I do not think we should seek to impose a political settlement on North Korea by force if we can possibly solve the problem by negotiation and agreement. I believe therefore that we must lose no opportunity to reach a pacific settlement should the Chinese and North Koreans show any willingness to negotiate, or if we can lead them that way.
This brings me to the possibility of bombing Chinese bases in the event of heavy air attacks on United Nations forces. I agree with you that if such raids occur there will be no alternative but to meet this new threat by the most effective military means at our disposal, namely by bombing the bases in China from which the attacks have been launched. This will involve serious risks of an extension of the [Page 428] war, perhaps even into global conflict; but the consequences will have to be faced and shared by all of us.
In these circumstances His Majesty’s Government have decided that in the event of heavy (repeat heavy) air attacks from bases in China on United Nations forces in Korea, they will associate themselves with the policy of retaliatory action against these bases in order to prevent further attacks and to minimise casualties to United Nations forces in Korea.
This is a decision in principle. The consequences (which may be general war) are so grave that the decision to authorise retaliatory action must be subject to concurrence by us at the time. We have full confidence in the President and the Administration, and are sure that the decision would (as you say) be taken “soberly and wisely”. It is however not a question of confidence, but of responsibility for a major act of policy, and we cannot divest ourselves of it.
May I at the same time put to you the suggestion that, just as on our side the decision will be subject to confirmation at the time by the Prime Minister, the existing authorisation by the President should on your side be confirmed by him?
It is important that no military risks should be incurred through delay, and to avoid these we have made arrangements whereby we can make our decision at very short notice. To enable us to do so it is essential that the fullest factual information should be supplied to us regarding the scale and nature of the attacks upon United Nations forces immediately they take place. Can you arrange for this to be done through the British Joint Services Mission in Washington or by any other means which will ensure that we have at our disposal the necessary data on which to confirm our present decision in principle? Meanwhile it would be useful to have the evidence which makes you expect such attacks. Our advisers, on the basis of such information as they have at present, are by no means convinced that it is in the power of the Chinese to launch heavy and repeated air attacks.
I understand that at the “Briefing Meetings” in the State Department your views on the necessity for retaliatory air action have been made known to certain Governments. In view of our special relations with the Governments of Canada, Australia, New Zealand and South Africa and the military contributions which they have made to the Korean campaign we are now informing those Governments of our decision explaining that it has been raised with us by you. If you would be so good as to let us know with which Governments, apart from these Commonwealth Governments, this question has been discussed, I shall consider what we should do.
Air attacks from bases in Soviet territory would raise separate and even graver problems, and our present decision does not cover this contingency.
[Page 429]It would be helpful to us to have your assessment of the military and political consequences which you consider might follow any attack on Chinese bases, and in particular, your estimate of the Soviet attitude to such an attack.
You refer to sanctions against China. As you know, we are opposed to political sanctions. They would not influence the course of the campaign in Korea and indeed would have little effect on China except to strengthen the hands of the Chinese Government against those sections of Chinese opinion who still look to the west. These sections of opinion are not politically important in China today, but there is nothing to gain by allowing the Russians to point to futile political sanctions as further evidence of the implacable hostility of the west to the new China.
Economic sanctions I view differently. For a long time we have kept an eye on trade with China to ensure that no goods of direct military value reached her from British sources. The system has worked well so far as concerns most of the goods that could directly assist the Chinese war effort in Korea, except in the case of rubber, and there we had to take steps last month to check the increasing exports of rubber from Malaya and Singapore to China even though the restrictions cannot be fully effective without the co-operation of other producers and purchasers. There has been so much misunderstanding of our policy in the matter of trade with China that we have considered it necessary to make public what the policy has been. We have also been considering again the question of rubber and have come to the conclusion that Chinese civilian needs can be regarded as having been fully satisfied for 1951. We have therefore asked the Colonial Governments concerned to take steps to see that no further rubber is exported to China this year.
May I say a word about Hong Kong? With its fine harbour Hong Kong, in wrong hands, would be a menace to the South China seas. I am sure you would not wish to give it to China. It is simply not possible to cut off Hong Kong from China without giving rise to the gravest internal problems of unemployment, starvation and unrest—in other words, without creating for Communism the ideal conditions in which it can flourish. What we have been trying to do is to ensure, with as little publicity as possible (in order to minimise repercussions in Hong Kong) that exports from Hong Kong do not contribute to the Chinese war effort. To go to the extreme limit of cutting off trade between Hong Kong and the mainland in ordinary consumer goods and foodstuffs would make no difference whatsoever to the fighting in Korea, and would on the other hand risk the loss of an important centre of free speech and western ideas. Everyone (Chinese included) who goes to Hong Kong from China breathes more freely and senses the contrast. Is this of no value in the world wide war of ideas?
[Page 430]In considering sanctions against China I would ask you to bear these things in mind. They explain why we would oppose general economic sanctions against China. There is another important reason why we would hesitate to follow your example: we believe that there would not be general support amongst European and Asian countries for such a policy, and that pressure to adopt it would weaken the United Nations.
As regards a selective embargo against war materials, however, we are with you and indeed this has been our policy for some time. But we desired to give the Good Offices Committee ample time to exhaust the possibilities of making contact with Peking. Delay by the Additional Measures Committee meant little in practice; the principal supplying countries were already applying restrictions which in the main exceeded what is now proposed for the United Nations.
It was not on the substance of the proposals, but on the timing, that you and we have hitherto not seen eye to eye. In view however of the time which has now elapsed and in deference to your request, His Majesty’s Government have now decided that there is no longer any reason to delay submission of a resolution from the Additional Measures Committee to the Assembly recommending the imposition of a selective embargo on the supply of war materials to China. I do not exclude the possibility of extending the list now under consideration at Lake Success to further specific items of strategic importance; but I would continue to oppose its extension into a general embargo.
You mentioned Chinese representation at the United Nations. Our views have been put on record. As I said to Mr. Gifford, they flowed naturally from our conception of the doctrine of recognition. To allow the effective Government of China to occupy the Chinese seat at the United Nations is in no way a measure of weakness, but is inherent in the constitution of the United Nations. I know that many people wonder why we should support a proposal which if accepted would seat a Government at the council tables of the United Nations when that Government is engaged in military operations against United Nations forces which are resisting aggression. I am interested in your suggestion of a “moratorium” but am not clear what you have in mind. Perhaps you could develop your thought on this a little further. Meanwhile, it seems to me that what matters is that we should both do what we can (the initiative in raising the issue does hot of course lie with either of us, but with Russia) to prevent our known differences of view on this point from developing into a source of misunderstanding between us. The legal arguments for seating them there are in our view conclusive, though I should certainly not wish to display any enthusiasm in championing the claims of the Central People’s Government of China at the United Nations so long [Page 431] as they are set on their present course. On the other hand, I could not act in such a way as might imply support for the fiction that Chiang Kai-shek’s representative in the United Nations speaks for China.
The present is, as you say, not the moment for a public declaration of our aims in Korea. Nevertheless, I believe that it is still of great importance to clarify our policy and state our aims (including constructive proposals for a settlement) as soon as ever it is practicable. Public opinion in this country, and I imagine in many others, is groping for guidance as to where we stand in Korea and what we are hoping to achieve. The opportunity may occur if the United Nations forces succeed in blunting the Chinese offensive. Perhaps the Chinese may by then be in a more chastened mood and less unwilling to negotiate, but whether they are so or not I believe that we owe it to our peoples and to our troops to define our policy. I therefore welcome your suggestion that further talks should be held with Sir Oliver Franks about the form which this declaration should take. I should like us to make suitable preparations for operation at the psychological moment.
Mr. Gifford said to me that he thought our differences on Far Eastern policy had been narrowing in recent months. I think that this is true, and I am glad. He went on to say however that he thought we might now be at a cross roads and our paths might begin to diverge again. I hope this is not so; at any rate, if the risk exists, the best way to guard against it is for us to exchange occasional messages. That is why I especially valued the candour and friendliness of your message, and I have tried to reply in the same spirit.