791.00/9–1751: Telegram
The Ambassador in India (Henderson) to the Secretary of State
1026. 1. Following farewell family luncheon given by Nehru and daughter for wife and self he drew me aside for farewell talk. He said some rather kind things of personal character: He and I not agree on world outlook but he did not respect Ambassador who did not loyally stand up for views his govt; never any Amb New Delhi for whom he had higher regard and more respect; he doubted any American as Ambassador could have done more strengthen relations between our countries during last three years; US and India, however, both in deep foreign policy ruts legacy experiences and environment each country and would take long time find themselves on common road. Nevertheless he always and still believed we going same general direction and possessed similar objectives.
2. I expressed deep appreciation. Said I had never yet left any post without sense not having been able accomplish all I should; in leaving India I had feeling I should have been able do more strengthen relations between our two countries. I came here with conviction which had been strengthened during stay close cooperation US and India imperative for peaceful, stable world not only of future but of present. International situation precarious two great free countries like US and India could not afford luxury squabbling over superficial differences. My government, I had reason know, shared his view both countries going in same direction with similar objectives. Recent Indian attitude, however, had caused it and American people considerable concern. Decision GOI reject Japanese treaty, particularly [Page 2183] manner carrying out decision, had added this concern. Impression strengthened that India in its desire bring about Asian cooperation was opposed close development relations between US and Japan and might even pursue quiet policy endeavoring draw Japan away from US just as it was hoping draw Communist China away from its close relationship with Russia. My government in general favored regional understandings and cooperation provided they in spirit and framework UN. It believed, however, regional associations which aimed to isolate members from close relations with friendly countries outside particular region not healthy or conducive world peace. Japan and India for instance had community interests as Asian nations. US and Japan however, also had strong community interest as Pacific neighbors. If India in mistaken belief it was promoting peace in Asia by pursuing policy of endeavoring pull any Asian nation, particularly Japan, away from close friendly relations with US it would be fallacious for either US or India believe our differences were merely superficial. We consider, for instance, close relations between Japan arid US this particular period vital both countries and necessary if world peace to be maintained.
3. Nehru replied it true India hoped contribute draw Communist China away from Russia but idea drawing Japan away from US was “novel” to him. Idea had not occurred to him and he wondered how anyone might have obtained impression he might have such policy in mind. I suggested he re-read GOI reply to US invitation to San Francisco in light what I had just said. To US reader it wld seem that in making this document public GOI was encouraging such isolated elements in Jap as might be opposed closer relationship with US. Ind press thus far seemed believe GOI wld like for Jap to extricate itself from what Times of India recently described in editorial as “Anglo-Amer net”. If in public thus interpreted GOI pol he cld understand why there was this concern in US.
4. Nehru said if such impression existed, it erroneous. GOI not desire interfere US-Jap relations. It realized community of interests. It believed however, geography close relations between Japan and China and any efforts block development such relations would eventually prove in vain. It was only natural for instance Japan and China should be each other’s best customers. I said US had no intention try prevent development normal relations between Japan and China; in any event Japan would soon be sovereign state free to develop its own foreign relations. US would not be so foolish as to endeavor use its treaty relations Japan as lever exert pressure on Japanese foreign or internal policies. US had had enough experience know that best way earn hostility Japanese people would be for it try act as mentor sovereign Japan. Would of course be difficult for Japan as well as [Page 2184] for any other free nation maintain normal trade or political relations with China so long as that country dominated by regime conducting hostilities against UN.
5. Nehru said Communist China certainly was problematical neighbor. It too enormous however to be digested by Russia. He sure it would eventually disentangle itself from Russia although process might be many years’ duration. He thought spirit of aggressiveness to be found both in China and Russia not mere expression communism; it also partly due to desire virile peoples stimulated by strong wine nationalism flex their muscles. This tendency disquieting their neighbors. Thus far Communist China had not tried use its newly found strength against its neighbors and he was hoping it would not do so. (He apparently overlooked Korea.) It would be unfortunate if China should move against Thailand, Burma or Indochina. Although mountain barriers protected India from real danger Chinese military aggression there was, however, problem infiltration. Fact of two thousand mile frontier between India and Communist country could not be ignored. India must now develop these neglected frontier regions for its own security; communications must be improved and inhabitants woven into Indian political and economic life. He was more concerned about Burma than India. Careful research had convinced him Burma’s legal claim to extensive territories now within its borders not strong. In old days British had gradually pushed into lands belonging to China and had added them to Burma. British rights these lands inherited by Burma had never been confirmed by treaty. Although Communist Chinese Government had assured GOB borders would be rectified only by diplomatic negotiation nevertheless Burma presented vulnerable flank to China.
6. I thanked Nehru for courtesy and consideration he had always shown me and said I left India with regret and an even warmer friend than when I came. I expressed hope he would endeavor take time from his busy life cultivate close relations my successor who was distinguished American possessed of complete integrity and progressive outlook. He would find Mr. Bowles understanding and sympathetic person in whom great ability was combined with sincere humility. Nehru said he would be glad work closely with Mr. Bowles about whom he had already received many good reports.
7. During our talk Nehru exerted his great charm and gave every evidence complete sincerity. Although the idea of drawing Japan from US could not possibly have been so “novel” to him, nevertheless I could not but feel that for moment at least he somewhat contrite at condition US-Indian relations for which he knew himself be chiefly responsible and that he wanted make some kind amends before my departure. Whether he completely sincere or not fact he went out [Page 2185] his way deny he had any intentions to endeavor weaken US relations with Japan and to admit certain distrust of Communist China encouraging. It may be he beginning believe his dreams formation Asian bloc not likely realization in foreseeable future with China under Communist control. I understand also it had been something shock to him that his attitude re Japanese treaty had received little sympathy except behind Iron Curtain and that no Asian power except Burma had followed his lead. We cannot ignore possibility he may be beginning have doubts as to where his present Japanese policies are leading him, particularly re his relations US. Only time will tell whether his assurances were merely reflections generous momentary impulse or indicated possibility modification in policy. This not first time he has given assurances basic similarity US and India foreign policies. Unfortunately these assurances have not been followed, by concrete evidence real desire cooperate more closely with US.