Foreign Relations of the United States, 1951, Asia and the Pacific, Volume VI, Part 1

894.501/12–1551

Memorandum by the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the Secretary of Defense (Lovett)

top secret

Washington, 12 December 1951.

Subject: High-Level State–Defense Mission on Japanese Defense Forces

1. The Joint Chiefs of Staff have considered your memorandum of 8 November 1951,¹ subject as above, and submit herewith their views regarding the problems outlined in subparagraphs (a) and (c) of the third paragraph thereof, with respect to the United States planning assumptions that should be used by a High-Level Mission to Japan to discuss Japanese rearmament and related problems. The views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff concerning the other matters raised in your above-mentioned memorandum will be forwarded separately at an early date.

2. United States Planning Assumptions

a. That world conditions during the period of the next several years will continue to be extremely critical and any attack on Japan by the Communist forces will occur with little warning.

b. That alignment of Japan with the free world is of vital importance to the United States and the United States will continue to participate in the defense of Japan.

c. That the Peace Treaty with Japan, the Security Treaty between the United States and Japan, and a satisfactory Administrative Agreement for implementation of the Security Treaty will go into effect simultaneously.

d. That the Japanese Constitution will be amended to authorize armed forces for the protection of Japan.

e. That, for the next several years, there will be United States and Japanese military forces in the Far East, the one assisting the other in the preservation of peace and security in the Japan area.

f. That the size, composition and time phasing of both the Japanese defense forces and the United States armed forces in Japan will be mutually supporting and of sufficient flexibility to permit adjustments to either peace or war.

g. That the United States will provide, subject to its world-wide commitments, priorities established by appropriate United States authority, and availability of equipment and appropriated funds, the bulk of the essential equipment required by the initial increments of the Japanese armed forces, and will foster and encourage the establishment of the means for production of appropriate equipment by Japan. Such aid as the United States may furnish will be based on the principle that Japan will provide maximum self-help in procuring needed equipment and supplies to support her armed forces.

h. That the forces to be designated for the defense of Japan by either the United States or Japan will be revised from time to time, based upon a reasonable estimate of the world situation, the state of readiness of the forces concerned, and enemy capabilities.

i. That Japan, after the Treaty of Peace comes into force, will continue to lend assistance to the United Nations actions in and about Japan, and will abide by the United Nations Resolution of 1 February 1951, to refrain from the giving of assistance to aggressor nations, in accordance with the terms of the United States-Japanese exchange of notes of 8 September 1951.

3. United States Forces in Japan

a. Mission

(1) To contribute to the maintenance of international peace and security and support United States policies in the Far East.

(2) To support the United Nations operations in Korea.

(3) Prior to ratification of the Security Treaty and in cooperation with the Japanese, to maintain the security of Japan against armed attack from without and/or from internal riots and disturbances.

(4) Discharge United States occupation responsibilities in Japan pending ratification of the Peace Treaty.

(5) Upon ratification of the Security Treaty by both governments, to contribute to the maintenance of the security of Japan in accordance with the terms of the Treaty.

(6) To support other Unified Commanders in accordance with the Unified Command Plan.

(7) To maintain the security of Japan as an over-riding mission.

b. Size

In the event that an armistice in Korea is concluded, certain of the forces now in Korea may be redeployed to Japan. The Joint Chiefs of Staff will determine in light of then existing conditions the U.S. force levels to be retained in the Far East.

c. Time Phasing

U.S. forces in Japan will be maintained at a level so that their strength, combined with Japanese forces, is reasonably adequate for the defense of Japan. While the growth of Japanese security forces will not determine the strength of U.S. forces in the Japan area, it is likely that as Japanese forces continue to gain strength, U.S. forces may be redeployed. No time table for redeployment, however, can be safely established now.

4. Japanese Defense Forces

a. Mission

(1) In cooperation with the United States, to contribute to and support United Nations action and policies in furtherance of world peace and security and the deterrence of aggression in the Japan area.

(2) In collaboration and cooperation with United States forces to maintain the security of Japan from external aggression.

(3) To maintain the internal security of Japan against riots and disturbances, with United States assistance as provided for by the terms of paragraph 1 of the Security Treaty between the United States and Japan.

(4) To assume an ever-increasing responsibility for the defense of Japan against direct or indirect aggression.

b. Size

The Japanese National Police Reserve will be expanded to a balanced ten-division Japanese national ground force. Initially the United States will provide the necessary air and naval forces for the accomplishment of the mission of both the United States and Japanese forces in the area and will be assisted by the Japanese defense forces, subject to the limitations specified in the Japanese Security Treaty. It is assumed that the Japanese will accept an ever-increasing responsibility for the defense of Japan, to include defensive air and naval arms.

c. Composition (Major Units)

(1) First Phase

Army (Personnel Strength—300,000)

• 10 Divisions
• 3 Armored Cavalry Regiments
• 12 AAA (AW) Battalions (SP)
• 7 AAA (AW) Battalions
• 21 AAA Gun Battalions
  Other combat field artillery, chemical, tank, and engineer battalions as required for support.

Navy

• 10 Patrol Frigates
• 50 Landing Ships Support (large)
  Ships made available from the Japanese Maritime Safety Agency.

Air Force

• One squadron of fighter-bomber aircraft, one tactical reconnaissance squadron, and other units as required for support.

(2) Later Phases

Army

• No major increase over the forces listed in subparagraph 4c (1) above.

Navy

Indeterminate. (Should include a minimum of 15 AM/AMS and 1 Patrol Squadron (ASW) (U.E. 12 a/c) in addition to the 10 PF’s, 50 LSSL’s and Maritime Safety Agency ships listed in subparagraph 4 c (1) above. These forces constitute only the nucleus of a Japanese defensive naval force.)

Air Force

• 6 Fighter Interceptor Squadrons
• 12 Fighter-Bomber Squadrons
• 3 Tactical Reconnaissance Squadrons
• 6 Transport Squadrons

5. Mutual Aid and Self-help

The industrial capacity of Japan is potentially capable of producing a large portion of the weapons and equipment required for the Japanese armed forces as well as numerous items for the United States military assistance programs in Southeast Asia and the United States armed forces in the Far East. Japan’s large military industrial potential must be denied to the Communists. In order to harness this potential to the benefit of the free world the United States should exert strong influence to the end that Japanese military production will be complementary to that of the United States. The United States, through allocation of materials, appropriate trade agreements, financial aid and collaboration with the Japanese, could and should exercise strong influence toward determining the type, quantity, and design of items produced. This would permit the development and standardization of equipment most suitable for the forces operating in Asia and capable of being produced in the area. At the same time, determination of items to be produced can be made to serve as a control to prevent Japanese military expansion from getting out of hand. Desired realization of this Japanese potential will require the fullest possible economic, political, and military coordination between the two nations. The formation of a special agency to influence and coordinate this effort may be necessary.

6. Implementation of United States-Japanese Notes of 8 September 1951²

a. The Note of 8 September 1951 by the Prime Minister of Japan provides that “if and when the forces of a Member or Members of the United Nations are engaged in any United Nations action in the Far East after the Treaty of Peace comes into force, Japan will permit and facilitate the support in and about Japan, by the Member or Members of the forces engaged in such United Nations action.” Article II of the Security Treaty provides that, without the prior consent of the United States, Japan will not grant “… any bases or any rights, powers or authority whatsoever, in or relating to bases or the right of garrison or of maneuver, or transit of ground, air, or naval forces to any third power.” Consequently, implementation of the United States-Japanese Notes will require prior United States approval for any assistance Japan may render to other United Nations forces operating within the purview of Article II cited above.

b. It would be advisable for the Commander in Chief Far East to arrange with the Japanese Government that the procurement of supplies desired by military forces of the United Nations member nations be placed under his central direction in order to ensure orderly procurement processes.

c. Although the United Nations General Assembly Resolution of 1 February 1951 calls upon all states to lend every assistance to the United Nations action in Korea, and Japan has agreed to permit and facilitate the support in and about Japan by United Nations forces engaged in this action, the question regarding the active use of Japanese military forces should be held in abeyance pending future political and military developments.

7. Post-Treaty Military Assistance Subsequent to Fiscal Tear 1953

In view of the anticipated international situation, the strategic importance of the area to the United States, and the inability of Japan by Fiscal Year 1954 to mobilize and equip military forces for an adequate defense of Japan, the following planning assumptions appear valid:

a. The general assumptions stated in paragraph 2 above.

b. During Fiscal Year 1954 the United States, by means of the Mutual Security Program, will assist in the development of the Japanese armed forces.

c. Should further assistance be deemed necessary, consistent with our national interests and security, upon termination of the Mutual Security Act of 1951 (30 June 1954),³ such assistance will be authorized by additional legislation.

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

Hoyt S. Vandenberg

Chief of Staff, United States Air Force

1. Not found in Department of State files.
2. See editorial note, p. 1339.
3. Approved October 10. For text, see 65 Stat. 373.