693.94/11–3051: Telegram
The United States Political Adviser for Japan (Sebald) to the Secretary of State
Topad 1167. ReDeptels 1058, November 21; 1147 November 23 and related messages. As indicated in previous tels, Yoshida has appeared to be giving serious consideration to reestablishing relations with Chinese Nationalist Govt, presumably on grounds:
- (1)
- It is to Japan’s advantage politically support Chinese Nationalists in return latter’s support in UN and related organization;
- (2)
- Parallelism with assumed US policy;
- (3)
- Incongruity of establishing relations of any kind with Commie China which has been denounced as aggressor by UN and is actively engaged as opponent UN in Korea;
- (4)
- Fear of prejudicing pending US Senate ratification peace treaty;
- (5)
- Opportunity increase trade with Formosa even though limited scale; and
- (6)
- Former close political, commercial and cultural ties with Formosa.
On other hand it is apparent UK mission, particularly since arrival Dening, has exerted considerable pressure restrain Japan from going too far in establishing relations with Taipei in view long term consequences. It may be assumed Dening has explored with Japanese their historical and realistic interest in close relationship with China [Page 1420] proper, influences which Japan might exercise on Peiping, and counter to Soviet Russia which working relationship between Japan and Commie China might bring about.
There is further element of Eden’s implied insistence upon literal interpretation Dulles-Morrison agreement with result that British have apparently maneuvered US into position where we are charged with bad faith shld we urge Japan establish even limited diplomatic relations with Taipei and, conversely, where British are free to urge Japanese not establish such relations but at same time can dangle before Japanese eyes, mirage of benefits to be derived from closer affiliation with continental China.
Above considerations have without doubt caused Japanese to reassess their China policy as indicated by series of ambiguous and evasive Yoshida statements, including “Shanghai” remark in Diet interpellation, suggestion that Allies make-choice of which China, Japan shld choose, etc. We believe present attitude Japanese Govt toward relations with China to be governed by series of negative precepts, of which fol most important:
- (1)
- Japan shld not at this time recognize or otherwise enter into political relations with Commie China;
- (2)
- Japan shld not on other hand undertake political commitments vis-à-vis Nationalist China of such nature as to preclude future de facto relations with Commie China, particularly in field of trade;
- (3)
- In view of evident Anglo-American differences on this subj, any affirmative actions taken by Japan re either regime in China will be apt to offend either US or UK; therefore most prudent course for Japan is to eschew such actions pending return full sovereignty and possibility of further developments which might place Japan in more advantageous position.
Japanese Govt is actually in position of having agreed in writing not “to conclude a bilateral treaty”1 with Commie China and simultaneously of not having agreed to establish diplomatic relations with Chinese Nationalists. Yoshida has made latter clear in his Diet explanation regarding meaning of establishing JGOA in Taipei which he said does not exclude possibility at appropriate time of opening similar agency for “trade purposes” in Commie China. Japanese Govt, with British encouragement, therefore finds itself free play both horses without incurring charge of bad faith toward either US or UK. By exploiting US–UK disagreement Japanese Govt is in good position to stall, a situation which may be expected work more to UK than to US advantage inasmuch as their desiderata, to a greater extent than ours, can at this stage be satisfied by Japanese inaction.
[Page 1421]Unless Chinese Nationalists themselves take initiative for opening treaty talks with Japanese, we believe latter have now gone about as far as they will go at this time toward rapprochement with that regime. Shld Chinese Nationalists take such initiative, we believe Japanese wld agree to informal discussion possible terms bilateral treaty, but wld temporize to point of preventing such talks from being finalized before multilateral treaty comes into effect. We agree with Dening that strong arm tactics on our part wld be counter-productive, especially so long as Japanese cld obtain at least tacit support of UK in resisting such tactics.
While persistence this equivocal Japanese attitude toward Taipei Govt wld appear entail grave risks in terms our overall security planning in Western Pacific, it appears to us that unless and until a coordinated parallel US–UK Far Eastern policy is formulated and agreed upon, it is asking for the impossible to expect Japan not to play one off against the other. In other words, it appears amply evident to us that Japanese Govt will not be responsive to any pressure on our part to reach settlement with Chinese Nationalists so long as US–UK differences persist, and that only if and when Japanese Govt can be confronted with united Anglo-Amer position on China problem can be [we] expect to exert and [any] decisive influence on Japan’s future relations with China.
Of interest in endeavoring evaluate Japanese attitude this regard is fact that in recent conversation with Rusk,2 Yoshida for first time indicated Japanese Govt toying with possibility entering into direct negots with Chinese Commies, for avowed purpose “being helpful” to US in finding solution to China problem. Although this suggests new line of thinking on Yoshida’s part concerning Japanese relations with Commie China, it may on other hand represent calculated effort to have US pressure Chinese Nationalists into settlement with Japan on latter’s terms.
In absence of clear instructions I have generally refrained from discussions with Dening on these matters. It is my impression, however, that he strongly shares belief increased Japanese trade with South East Asia must necessarily be at British expense, from which he may deduce that any diversion of Japanese economic pressure toward continental China wld be to UK’s advantage, even though to detriment US political objectives.
Sent Dept 1167 rptd info Taipei 59, London unnumbered.