611.94/10–951: Telegram
The United States Political Adviser to SCAP (Sebald) to the Secretary of State
Topad 721. Re Deptel 534, Oct. 3.1 I recd yesterday from Prime Minister Yoshida ltr dated Oct 7 full text of which as fols:
Begin text: “My dear Ambassador, signing of peace treaty and Japanese-American security pact is source of profound gratification to Japanese people. It is with great expectations that our nation is looking forward to their effectuation.
“It means that Allied occupation of Japan comes to an end and American forces in Japan will remain as security forces in accordance with terms of security pact. All Japanese are counting on visible and substantial changes in their immediate surroundings, which sentiment is quite understandable, they having been placed under occupation in last six years.
“These universal expectations among Japanese must not be ignored by the govts or leaders of either Japan or America. To meet the expectations of Japanese man in street to maximum is to consolidate [Page 1375] foundation for permanent friendship between two countries. And it is, indeed, a prerequisite to achievement of objectives of Japanese-American security pact.
“How then are these Japanese expectations to be met? It is presumed that question is being carefully studied by American auths in Tokyo and Washington. I am addressing this ltr to you believing that a few suggestions may not be out of place, my govt being in position to know sentiments and aspirations of Japanese people in this respect.
“In order to furnish tangible evidence of transformation of occupation forces into security forces, it is suggested that fol measures wld prove most effective:
- “(a)
- To transfer hdqtrs of American forces to an appropriate place outside centers of a large city.
- “(b)
- To release wharf and warehouse facilities at such trading ports as Yokohama and Kobe, which are now under requisition, and to release also business and industrial buildings in urban areas, so as to help Japan achieve economic self support. (Table one2 lists those buildings for release of which repeated petitions have been submitted to Japanese Govt auths concerned.)
- “(c)
- To release school buildings now under requisition, so as to alleviate acute housing shortage for public education. (Refer table two.)
- “(d)
- To release hospitals and hotels which are now under requisition, with exception of those absolutely necessary for security forces, it being considered that current extensive and exclusive use will no longer be necessary in future. (Refer tables three and four.)
- “(e)
- To release private residences (over 2,000) now in occupation use, provided that they may be continued to be used by security forces on commercial basis when owners so desire.
“Above-mentioned measures may be under consideration of American Govt. But at this time of transition, I would like to ask you to extend good offices so that American auths wld give favourable and sympathetic consideration to these matters insofar as circumstances may permit. My govt officials concerned will be available at anytime you wish for consultation various matters which will no doubt accrue in implementation of these measures. Yours sincerely, Shigeru Yoshida.” End text.
Tables referred to above will be delivered to Mission later. I have given General Ridgway copy of this msg.3
- Not printed.↩
- Tables mentioned not printed.↩
- In a letter of October 26 to U. Alexis Johnson, Mr. Sebald stated in part that General Ridgway had told him “in rather strong language that in his opinion my Section was guilty of ‘poor staff work’ in not having first referred Yoshida’s letter to him, especially as that letter was at variance with his own policies and that he should have been consulted prior to the letter’s being forwarded, if at all, to Washington. What he feared more than anything else was that Washington might crystallize its views along the lines of Yoshida’s letter which would ‘make it impossible for the U.S. Army to maintain Japanese sovereignty’.” (611.94/10–2651)↩