611.94/10–351
Memorandum by the Consultant to the Secretary (Dulles) to the Secretary of State
I talked with the President today along the lines which you and I had previously discussed. In the course of that conversation, I said to the President that there were, of course, many serious problems remaining to be solved in relation to Japan and that unless they were solved right, the situation could turn sour. I said that a particular problem was the relationship between the U.S. security forces which would remain and the Japanese people. It would be very difficult to alter the relationship from that of a victor who ruled the people they had conquered to a relationship of equals. I thought it particularly important that some concrete steps be taken to indicate the changeover of Japan from an occupied country to a sovereign equal. I mentioned to the President that when talking with General MacArthur in Tokyo last February, I had laughingly said to him that he had won many victories, but the greatest victory of all would be if he succeeded in getting the colonels out of the Japanese villas. The President said he was fully aware of the problem that there would be need of a strong civilian in Japan who could stand up to the military and the President said with obvious feeling, “I’ll back him up.”
Following my talk with the President I had lunch with Secretary Lovett and we talked informally about the situation. I think he appreciates the difficulty of the problem and is sympathetic to our point of view. It is obvious that the threatened intensification of military operations in Korea makes the problem more difficult from a purely military standpoint. I said to Secretary Lovett that I felt the Japanese would understand that, but I did not think that we could make extraordinary demands based upon the possibility that hostilities might involve Japan and at the same time bring in increasing numbers of wives and children and make increasing demands upon the luxury facilities of Japanese hotels, houses, etc.