Foreign Relations of the United States, 1951, Asia and the Pacific, Volume VI, Part 1

611.94/9–3051

The United States Political Adviser to SCAP (Sebald) to the Planning Adviser of the Bureau of Far Eastern Affairs (Emmerson)

top secret
official informal

Tokyo, September 30, 1951.

Dear John: I regret that time and the rapid movement of events in these past weeks has to a large extent overtaken our reply to your letter of June 16, 1951.¹ Nevertheless, I strongly concur in the desirability of thinking now of our long-range policies toward Japan and the necessity of coordinating these plans here and in Washington. I note that your draft paper¹ dealt chiefly with the security aspects of our policy toward Japan. I suggest that it is as important to plan now our long-term political, economic and cultural objectives toward Japan in order to guarantee the accomplishment of our security objectives. It is not adequate to say that Japan should be aligned with the free world, that we shall assist the development of her armed forces, and that we shall aid the development of Japan’s economy and industrial production. Japan is a country, as you know only too well, possessing great industrial capacity, military potential, and political initiative. It looks forward to a role of leadership in the Far East. It has the capacity to make its own decisions, plan its own policies and achieve its own objectives. It also will have its own problems—the solution of many of which may be in direct variance with United States policy objectives. The basic problem is not the mere statement of our security objectives but a determination of how we shall retain Japan in the orbit of the free world when, as a sovereign nation, it is determining its own policies and is subject to various types of economic, political and ideological pressures. Our security objectives can only be attained if Japan is convinced that it has a stake in the free world and that it is to its own self-interest to cooperate with the West.

Perhaps it might be helpful for you if I were to note down some of the problems as we envisage them and then suggest possible approaches toward their solution. The following is, of course, premised on the conclusions of NSC 48/5.²

I. Political

a. problem

1. The United States, through Ambassador Dulles, has premised its post-treaty policy toward Japan on a “peace of reconciliation”, The treaty recognizes the sovereignty of Japan. The Japanese people expect after the treaty to be accorded full equality by the United States. It is to the long-run interest of the United States that Japan be an independent, economically stable, and thus reliable ally rather than a colonial, resentful appendage of the United States. In view of the planning as to the size, location and special facilities of the garrison forces, and the Economic and Scientific Section proposal for continued stringent control of the Japanese economy, it is becoming increasingly evident that the Japanese may be unable to see any major distinction between the occupation and post-occupation garrison force. Should the good faith of the United States be put in question at this stage, it is possible that any post-treaty plans for Japanese participation in the free world might be seriously undermined.

2. It is generally recognized that the Japanese Government is anxious to make not only administrative modifications in the reform program but also substantive changes in the basic reforms, relating to labor, agriculture, and the family system. The return of depurgees to positions of importance in Japanese political and economic life will no doubt accelerate this movement. While there is little question that in many instances the reforms went too far, it is also recognized that continuation of such basic democratic concepts as established through the land reform program, civil code, labor laws, etcetera, is a fundamental bulwark against Communism and will thus strengthen Japan as a responsible and reliable partner in the free world.

b. approach

A delicate balance will have to be drawn in United States relations with the Japanese Government between what the United States considers basic and what it considers expendable. In some instances we may need to bend over backwards in limiting for psychological reasons overt evidences of United States control. Oil the other hand we may have to exert what pressures we possess to fortify those reforms we consider basic. It is my feeling that we should, in particular:

1. Restrict the garrison force in Japan to the minimum number of combat troops required to assure Japan from attack, and keep them away from the urban centers, particularly Tokyo. No dependents should be permitted to accompany the armed forces, thus reducing the housekeeping units, PX’s, commissaries, special service hotels and other vestiges of “colonialism”. The civilian component of the garrison force should be stringently limited.

2. Restrict the jurisdiction of United States authorities over US personnel in Japan to levels consistent with the NATO pattern.

3. Oppose the establishment of any such organization as the National Procurement Authority envisaged by General Marquat. Use the Embassy as the means for exerting influence over the Japanese Government so far as the question of procurement is concerned.

4. Attempt to retain the spirit of the reforms in Japan through the influence of the Embassy and an effective USIE program.

II. Economic

a. problem

The basic condition of Japan’s willing alignment with the free world will be her ability to achieve a viable economy and satisfactory standard of living as a result of such alignment. With the prospect of an ever-increasing population, Japan will be forced continually to expand its international trade so that it will be able to import food for its people. It is believed that if agricultural production can be increased even by 5 per cent, the necessary food imports can be leveled off at about 20 per cent of Japan’s total food requirement. However, in order to pay for these continually rising food imports, exports must be increased, markets found, and a regular supply of raw materials assured. The expansion of Japanese shipping facilities is necessary for the reduction of the cost of this trade to Japan. While Southeast Asia is a potential source of raw materials and export markets, the sterling area will no doubt resist Japanese penetration there. The more natural and economical source of raw materials vital to Japan’s export trade—iron ore and coking coal—is on the Chinese mainland. It is specious to argue that dollar exchange obtained through the filling of US procurement orders will enable Japan to purchase these raw materials in the US or South America. The cost of both the raw material audits transportation becomes so great that both internal price levels and export levels become inordinately high. Moreover, these dollars are needed to purchase food. It would appear desirable to take another and more realistic look at the question of Japan’s trade with Communist China and come up with a solution that might permit the importation of iron ore and coking coal in exchange for non-strategic, consumer goods—i.e. “hard” goods in exchange for “soft”.

While Japan’s filling of US procurement orders will to some extent meet her dollar needs, Japan’s role as a sub-contractual agent of the United States, unless developed in the light of Japan’s long-term trade requirements, will prove a merely temporary expedient. The Japanese will be the first to recognize that such an economic arrangement subjects Japan to the political inconsistencies of Congressional appropriations and the economic cycles of American business. Moreover, such economic arrangements may tend to stimulate certain industries in Japan, disrupt others, make for unplanned-for movements of population, and create inflationary tendencies in certain areas of the Japanese economy to the detriment of others.

While Japan’s dependence on the US for economic assistance will to a large extent automatically assure her alignment with the free world, it is questionable if the continuation of stringent economic controls over the Japanese economy by the United States, such as that envisaged by General Marquat, would foster the psychological and political support needed for this purpose. While it is recognized that there is a need for close cooperation between the United States and Japanese authorities, it is believed that this can be achieved through less formidable means. An economic arrangement such as that proposed by General Marquat would undermine the “peace of reconciliation” approach. It would also provide ammunition to forces favoring neutrality in the East-West conflict and afford the Communists with an opportunity to attack the United States as “imperialistic”.

b. approach

A study should be undertaken as to how Japan in the long run can achieve economic stability, including:

(a) a realistic reappraisal of Japanese trade with China;

(b) development of Japanese shipping;

(c) potentialities of Southeast Asia for Japan;

(d) role of United States procurement in the creation of long-term economic stability for Japan.

III. Cultural

a. problem

If the United States adopts the policy of treating Japan as an equal partner in the family of nations on the assumption that Japan’s contribution to the free world will be on a voluntary basis, an effective USIE program will be a first prerequisite in order to sell to the Japanese the ideas and programs of the free world.

b. approach

A highly selected USIE staff should be organized which would not only provide information regarding the concepts of the free world to the Japanese press, radio and films, and develop the exchange of persons program, but also would maintain intimate contact with special groups such as labor, women, farm, university students and intellectuals.

IV. Military

a. problem

It is believed desirable as well as inevitable that for some time to come the United States assume naval and air responsibility for the defense of Japan. Thus decisions as to the establishment of a Japanese navy and air force would be reserved until the United States has had the opportunity to observe the extent of Japanese integration into the free world. However, it is assumed that Japan will establish ground forces and an effective coast guard with the assistance of the United States. Such progressive rearmament of Japan assisted technically and financially by the United States would reduce the impact of military expenditures on the Japanese economy, prevent any rapid resurgence of militarism, and eliminate fear on the part of other governments of Japanese offensive potentialities.

So far as the effect of rearmament on the Japanese people is concerned, there has already become evident a sizable body of opinion which is strongly opposed to it (as well as to the general purposes of the bilateral agreement) and which has given every indication that it will continue this adamant attitude. The Japanese Communists constitute but one small segment of this body of opposition. Much more important in terms of internal political influence is the opposition to rearmament and the bilateral agreement voiced by the Socialist Party and its affiliated labor unions. Somewhat allied with this considerable body of opinion is the liberal intelligentsia and the student element. Many of the Socialist and labor leaders as well as the leaders of the non-Communist liberal intelligentsia as represented by such men as Dr. Nambara of Tokyo University appear to view the problems of Japan’s future, especially the security problem, from an overidealistic standpoint. They appear willing to ignore or at least to minimize all the harsher realities of the present-day global situation and seem to believe that somehow Japan can find a comfortable, secure niche outside the hazards of the global East-West struggle. They accordingly appear convinced that any rearmament, even for self-defense, or any military understanding with the United States will only draw Japan into the vortex of a struggle which could otherwise be miraculously avoided.

While this body of opposition to Japan’s rearmament and a security agreement with the United States by no means reflects majority opinion and at present does not command sufficient political power to determine governmental policy, this element is articulate and able to exert an immeasurable but real influence on public opinion within as well as outside Japan. With this group we have an important selling job to do.

Aside from this Socialist-labor-intelligentsia element, it is believed that most other Japanese either strongly favor Japan’s rearmament and the proposed bilateral agreement or are without very definite opinion on the question. The Democratic Party (the conservative opposition) has already strongly committed itself in favor of rearmament. The Liberal (Government) Party is, of course, committed to the Cabinet’s decisions with respect to the bilateral agreement, and has generally indicated an intention to support a rearmament program for defense. It therefore appears that virtually all conservative elements in Japan would today support a rearmament-for-defense program. There also appears to be general acceptance among the most conservative groups of the bilateral security agreement, providing, however, this agreement does not impose too far-reaching extra-territorial limitations on Japan’s post-treaty sovereignty.

However, despite theoretical support on the part of large groups of influential Japanese for rearmament, the danger remains that Japan if caught between a semi-colonial attitude on the part of the United States and a failing standard of living may be reluctant to assume its responsibilities in meeting the security needs of the free world and prefer to take its chances in the role of a third or neutral force, possibly oriented toward Nehru’s India.

b. approach

1. The United States should support and assist the establishment of Japanese ground forces and the establishment of an armed coast guard.

2. Decisions as to the establishment of a Japanese navy and air force should be reserved.

3. While pre-war Japanese militaristic spirit should not be revived, the United States through its informational program in Japan should impress on the Japanese the need to assist in its own self-defense in cooperation with the free world.

4. Steps should be taken to integrate the three Pacific security arrangements into one unit so that Japan will be able to identify itself as an equal partner with the other countries in the Pacific in the defense of the free world and will as a matter of prestige be willing to assume its responsibilities.

V. Administrative (Role of the Embassy in Post-Treaty Japan)

a. problem

Proposals to establish an autonomous military establishment in Japan as a result of the stationing of United States garrison forces here and an independent procurement authority, directly threaten the prestige and influence of the United States Ambassador in Tokyo. The need of the United States to speak through one voice cannot be overemphasized. United States policy and decisions as to how to deal with the Japanese Government must stem from the Embassy and not from establishments independent of the Embassy. Otherwise the various arms of the United States Government could be played off one against another, policies could be inconsistent and confused, the prestige and influence of the United States reduced to a minimum.

1. The United States Ambassador should be clearly recognized as the senior United States representative and as possessing the primary responsibility for the implementation of United States policy in Japan. While the commander of the garrison forces would possess clearly defined military functions, major problems relating to security matters should be dealt with through the Embassy. A military attaché at the Embassy would be in the position to advise the Ambassador as to the needs of the military establishment.

2. Any and all programs relating to procurement and economic assistance should recognize the primary responsibility of the Ambassador in this field. While special technical staffs may be required within the Embassy to deal with certain of these problems, final authority should lie with the Ambassador.

I trust that you have seen the numerous other communications which we have been sending in on various aspects of our post-treaty policies in Japan, and that this letter will make some additional contribution to your thinking on this subject.

Your thoughts on cultural programs for Japan and a Japanese-American seminar have been passed on to Sax Bradford and Margaret Williams in our public affairs section who will shortly forward to you their comments.

Sincerely yours,

W. J. Sebald

1. Not found in Department of State files.
1. Not found in Department of State files.
2. For text of NSC 48/5, May 17, see p. 33.