Foreign Relations of the United States, 1951, Asia and the Pacific, Volume VI, Part 1

794.00/9–451

Memorandum by the Deputy Director of the Office of Northeast Asian Affairs (McClurkin) to the Director of that Office (Johnson)¹

top secret

[Washington,] September 4, 1951.

Subject: Depurge of Former Japanese Career Officers.

In connection with the problem of depurging Japanese “career officers” commissioned after July 7, 1937, Colonel Everett, who has just returned from Tokyo, has informed us that the recent action taken by SCAP was in effect a blanket de-purge, with no review of cases on an individual basis.² He states that the Government Section advised the Japanese Government to depurge all officers commissioned after July 7, 1937, with the exception of persons who were members of the so-called Tojo clique and that the Japanese Government simply went through the pile of cases, weeding out these cases (which were very few in number) and approving the remainder for depurge.

Under the circumstances, where we are faced with a fait accompli, we have two alternatives if we feel called upon to defend this action:

1) Continue to maintain the fiction that the records of the depurgees show them to have been opponents of Japanese expansionism and totalitarianism; or,

2) Accept the SCAP formula that persons commissioned after July 7, 1937, should be excluded from the category of “career officers”.

Obviously, neither of the foregoing alternatives is particularly desirable: the former is patently dishonest, and the latter is very weak from the legal point of view. It follows that the best course for SCAP and the U.S. Government to adopt would be to avoid any comment on the subject if such can possibly be done. However, if we feel that we are forced to defend the action at San Francisco or in the FEC or ACJ, I believe the latter alternative offers the only possible basis for a reasonably satisfactory explanation.

I am attaching hereto a draft of a proposed telegram to SCAP in reply to his request for concurrence with his formula for justification of the depurges. In general it follows his line of reasoning, but sets forth the case somewhat more succinctly. The draft has been concurred in by Colonel Everett, by Miss Fite of L/FE (after discussion with Mr. Tate) and by Mr. Merchant.³

The Army is pressing us for speedy action in the matter; in addition, the subject may be raised at San Francisco, although we would hope that the necessity for any United States comment would not arise. Consequently, I should appreciate receiving your approval or comments by telephone if possible.

1. Memorandum drafted by Douglas W. Overton of the Office of Northeast Asian Affairs.

2. In telegram C 69141 to the Department of the Army, August 18, General Ridgway had reported that 5,774 Japanese officers had already been depurged during August, with action on another 30,000 expected by the end of the month. “These actions are based on examinations of individual records pursuant to State and DA view expressed Para 1 of DA 93011 of 2 Jun 51. [See footnote 5, p. 1140.] However, since literal compliance with the requirement stipulated in DA 93011 that a ‘substantial case’ be made that ‘such individuals have been opponents of Jap expansionism and totalitarianism’ would have limited the number of possible depurgees to a mere handful of former officers of questionable qualifications, and since the urgency of the military need would not permit further delay, it has been nec to permit the Jap Govt to administer the depurge procedure on the basis of screening criteria predicated on presumptions which in effect permit blanket depurge of younger officers as contemplated in the original SCAP proposal and individual depurge of senior officers whose records reveal no implication in notorious Army incidents of the 1930, war crimes, and secret or extremist organizations and movements including the post surrender period.”

   [By “original SCAP proposal” was meant in this context depurge of all officers commissioned on or after July 7, 1937, without reference to possible intent of an officer, in taking a commission, to become an officer of career.]

   General Ridgway had concluded by requesting State and Defense Departments comments on possible formula for justification of this action, and had himself recommended that justification be on the grounds of a SCAP definition of the term “career officer” rather than on evidence of opposition of depurgees to expansionism and totalitarianism. (794:5/8–1851)

3. The text of this draft, not printed, is virtually identical to that of telegram DA 81477 from the Department of the Army to SCAP, September 14, also not printed (794.5/9–1451).