694.001/7–1351
The Secretary of State to the Secretary of Defense (Marshall)1
My Dear Mr. Secretary: I am in receipt of the letter of July 13 from the Acting Secretary of Defense forwarding a memorandum from the Joint Chiefs of Staff dated July 11, 1951 regarding the proposed Japanese Peace Treaty.2 We have considered the comments and recommendations of the Joint Chiefs of Staff as set out in paragraphs 2 and 3 of their memorandum to you of July 11, 1951.
Paragraph 2(a) refers to the fact that the Declaration on graves uses the phrase “Allied and Associated Powers” whereas in the Treaty text the phrase is “Allied Powers”.
The use of the phrase “Allied and Associated Powers” in the Declaration was inadvertent, resulting from the fact that the Treaty text originally used and defined the term “Allied and Associated Powers”. When this was shortened in that text to “Allied Powers” the corresponding change was not made in the war graves Declaration, which had been drafted by the United Kingdom. The discrepancy had, however, been caught and was already corrected in the Department of State Press Release (No. 616) of July 11, 1951 of the Treaty text.
Paragraph 3(a) reiterates the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff that it is essential that Communist China should not sign the Japanese Peace Treaty. That view is completely shared by the State Department and the Joint Chiefs of Staff need have no apprehension on this point.
Paragraph 3(b) suggests that Communist China should not get any benefits under the Treaty which that nation does not de facto hold. That is the intent and effect of the draft. In fact, the Japanese property referred to in Article 14(a)2 was liquidated by the National Government of China, prior to the coming into power on the mainland of the Communist regime.
Paragraph 3(c) indicates that it is essential that the proposed bilateral security arrangement with Japan should become effective simultaneously with the effectiveness of a Japanese Peace Treaty. This will be taken care of through the fact that Japan will be expected to ratify both treaties and deposit its instruments of ratification with the United States prior to corresponding action by the United States. Therefore, the United States can and will control the timing of coming into force so as to assure that, so far as the United States is concerned, the Treaty of Peace will not come into force without [Page 1224] the bilateral security treaty simultaneously coming into force. Since treaty language is of no legal effect until the treaty is ratified and instruments of ratification deposited, it is not practical by language in the treaty itself to control the timing of the ratification and furthermore, from the standpoint of the United States that attempt, by the Executive, might raise constitutional questions with the Senate. The Joint Chiefs of Staff may, however, feel assured that it is the intention, and that it will be kept within the power of the United States, to assure that the bilateral security treaty and our Treaty of Peace with Japan do come into effect simultaneously. With reference to the final sentence in paragraph 3(c) it can, I think, be assumed that the United States will exert its political influence with a view to assuring that other nations do not conclude treaties wth Japan which would be detrimental to the security interest of the United States in the Far East, specifically with respect to the operations in Korea.
Sincerely yours,