694.001/7–2451
Memorandum by the Deputy Director of the Office of Chinese Affairs (Perkins) to the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Rusk)1
Subject: Effects of Japanese Treaty Negotiations on Chinese National Government
CA has not participated in the discussions and decisions respecting Chinese participation in the Japanese treaty and its information and background on this subject is admittedly incomplete. However, on the basis of incoming and outgoing messages which it has seen, the following views have emerged.
It seems clear that exclusion of the Chinese Government from participation in the Japanese treaty will have serious political consequence on the internal and external position of that Government [Page 1222] and our relations with it. It is assumed that these consequences have been weighed and other considerations have been found to be over-riding.
However this may be, CA has some misgivings as to the way which the decision has been carried out. For example, Deptel 25, July 102 to Taipei, which was not sent to CA for clearance or comment, instructs the US Chargé to convey a message to the Chinese Government containing a line of thought bound to be unacceptable to the Chinese and couched in language likely to be offensive to them. Beyond this, as Miss Bacon has pointed out in her memo of July 11,3 the message contained a line of thought which could immeasurably increase our difficulty in maintaining the international position of the Chinese Government and its continued representation in the United Nations.
From another telegram (413 July 18 to London),3 which was not seen prior to transmission, CA has learned that the US has offered its good offices to the Italian Government in connection with the negotiation of a bilateral treaty between Italy and Japan, which will be in harmony with the proposed multilateral treaty. From the same telegram it is learned that US offer of good offices must be by US and UK jointly to help meet objections by Nationalist China that a similar offer was not made it by the US. CA doubts that the joint nature of the offer to Italy will prevent the Chinese from contrasting the US attitude toward an ex-enemy state and its attitude toward an active ally in the war against Japan.
CA is not informed regarding an action which the US may contemplate to assist the Chinese Government, after the conclusion of the multilateral treaty, to conclude a satisfactory bilateral treaty with Japan. CA suggests, however, that quite apart from our relations with the Chinese Government, a treaty of peace between that Government and Japan would be a source of friction between Peiping and Tokyo and would tend to prevent an improvement of relations between an independent Japan and Communist China. It is worth noting that strong economic pressures may develop for such a rapprochement and that such a rapprochement would be highly dangerous for the US position in the Far East.
Finally, CA urges that this Government neither attempt to induce the Chinese Government to accept nor in any other way support the negotiation of a treaty of peace between the Chinese Government and Japan which contains any restriction on the capacity of the former to sign for all of China.4