794.5/7–1351

The Secretary of Defense (Marshall) to the Secretary of State

top secret

Dear Mr. Secretary: The Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers has advised the Department of Defense that progress in bringing the Japanese National Police Reserve to a state of combat effectiveness for the defense of Japan is severely restricted by the lack of qualified officers. As you know, former Japanese “career officers” are barred from holding office by a policy decision of the Far Eastern Commission. In order to meet this situation, General Ridgway has proposed certain measures which would permit the “de-purging” of a limited number of former Japanese officers. I am inclosing copies of cables1 from SCAP to the Department of the Army in which the reasons and justifications for these proposals are set forth in full.

SCAP has proposed, first, to permit the de-purging, on an individual basis, of officers below the rank of General or Admiral who can be shown to have been opponents of Japanese totalitarianism and expansionism. [Page 1195] He has been advised that the Department of State and the Department of the Army have no objection to a broad interpretation of the pertinent FEC directive in this respect.

Second, SCAP has proposed to effect the blanket de-purging of several thousand junior officers through an administrative interpretation of the term “career officers”, as used in the FEC directive, which would exclude from the category of “career officers” those commissioned on or after 7 July 1937, the date when Japan first became engaged in major hostilities. This would be a logical extension of SCAP’s previous action in which he excluded from the category of “career officers” those commissioned after 7 December 1941.

Assistant Secretary of State Rusk, in a letter of June 22, 1951,2 to Assistant Secretary of the Army Johnson, has expressed the opinion that the latter proposal might appear to undermine a decision of the Far Eastern Commission and, hence, might adversely affect General Ridgway’s international position as SCAP. For this reason, he suggested that the de-purging of military officers be administered on a case-by-case basis so that those officers commissioned after 7 July 1937 who actually intended to make a career of the military service would remain under the purge. This would require provision for the hearing of evidence in each individual case.

This suggestion has been fully considered. General Ridgway has stated that the procedure suggested by the Department of State would (1) release fewer persons, (2) impose an added administrative burden on both the Japanese Government and his headquarters, and (3) so delay the actual release of persons as to vitiate its value as an interim measure.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff have advised me that, in view of the urgent need to provide an immediate source of competent officers for the Japanese National Police Reserve, they consider that it is vitally important for the United States to concur in SCAP’s proposal with the least practicable delay. I concur with the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff as to the necessity for this action. I also wish to express my agreement with General Ridgway in his view that the proposed definition of “career officers” is not inconsistent with the spirit and intent of the FEC decision.

Accordingly, I hope that you may be able to indicate your concurrence in this proposal as soon as possible.3

Faithfully yours,

G. C. Marshall
  1. Not printed.
  2. Ante, p. 1137.
  3. For further documentation on this topic, see the memorandum of September 4, by Robert J. G. McClurkin, (by then) Deputy Director of the Office of Northeast Asian Affairs, to U. Alexis Johnson, p. 1328.