694.001/7–1351
The Acting Secretary of Defense (Lovett) to the Secretary of State
top secret
Washington, July 13, 1951.
Dear Mr. Secretary: I am forwarding
herewith for your information and consideration a copy of a
memorandum from the Joint Chiefs of Staff, dated 11 July 1951,
regarding the Japanese Peace Treaty with declarations appended
thereto. A copy of this memorandum was forwarded informally to the
State Department on 11 July.
With respect to Paragraph 3c of the memorandum
of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, I share their view that the security
interests of the United States will be jeopardized unless there is
some provision that the bilateral security arrangement becomes
effective simultaneous
[Page 1193]
with any Japanese Peace Treaty. This is particularly true with
respect to the operations in Korea. I believe that the documents
relating to the Japanese Peace Treaty should be strengthened to
include some assurances that the Japanese Government will
simultaneously ratify the Peace Treaty and the bilateral security
arrangement with the United States.
I shall make further recommendations to you in connection with the
views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff concerning the use of Japan as a
base in the Korean operation or in a war other than the Korean
operation in my comments on the text of the bilateral treaty, which
you submitted on 10 July to the Department of Defense for
comment.1 The Joint Chiefs of
Staff and the Joint Secretaries have this matter under
consideration.
Faithfully yours,
[Enclosure]
Memorandum for the Secretary of
Defense
top secret
Washington, 11 July
1951.
Subject: Japanese Peace Treaty and Declarations
Appended Thereto.
[Here follows comment by the JCS
regarding the language of the proposed Declaration by Japan
regarding war graves.]
3. The following are the comments and recommendations of the
Joint Chiefs of Staff relative to the 3 July 1951 draft2 of the proposed Peace Treaty, as
amended:
-
a.
- It does not make provision for preventing the signing
of the Treaty by China. In this connection, the Joint
Chiefs of Staff note that the Secretary of State in his
letter to you of 28 June 19513 has stated
that he confirms “that China will not be permitted to
sign this treaty.” The Joint Chiefs of Staff appreciate
this assurance inasmuch as they consider it to be
essential that Communist China not sign the Japanese
Peace Treaty;
-
b.
- Article 21 accords to China the benefits of Articles
10 and 14 (a) 2 of the Treaty. By
the terms of this article, among other things, China is
entitled to seize and retain all the property of Japan
which is subject to its jurisdiction on the date of
coming into force of the Treaty. The specific language
of Article 14 (a) 2 and the
implications thereof are not clear. In any event, the
Joint Chiefs of Staff strongly object to according
voluntarily to Communist China any right or benefit
which that nation does not now de
facto hold. They recommend, therefore, that
Articles 21 and 14 (a) 2 be
revised, in unmistakable terms, so as to prevent such
eventuality; and
-
c.
- There is no provision in the Treaty or in related
documents which would make it possible to insure that
the Treaty will not come into force before the
conclusion of any bilateral security arrangements
between the United States and Japan providing for both a
United States garrison in Japan and the United States
use of Japan as a base in the Korean operation or in a
war other than the Korean operation. The Joint Chiefs of
Staff emphasize their view that, under present and
foreseeable world conditions, the security interests of
the United States would be jeopardized unless such a
bilateral security arrangement becomes effective
simultaneous with any Japanese Peace Treaty. Further, if
the United States fails to ratify the Japanese Peace
Treaty, but other nations do ratify it, the United
States must use its political influence to the maximum
to insure that those nations do not conclude treaties
which would be detrimental to the security interests of
the United States in the Far East, specifically with
respect to the operations in Korea.
4. The Joint Chiefs of Staff recommend that you take such action
as you deem appropriate on their comments and recommendations
above, upon your ascertaining that the enclosed documents in
fact represent the current views of the Department of State
relative to a Japanese Peace Treaty.
For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:
Omar N. Bradley
Chairman
Joint Chiefs of Staff
