Secretary of State’s Files: Lot 53 D 444, Box 419
Memorandum of Conversation, by the Acting Secretary of State
Subject: Call of the Australian Minister of External Affairs, Mr. Richard G. Casey, December 10, 1951
| Participants: | Mr. Richard G. Casey, Australian Minister of External Affairs |
| Mr. Percy C. Spender, Australian Ambassador | |
| U—Mr. Webb | |
| EUR—Mr. Bonbright1 | |
| BNA—Mr. Shullaw2 |
The Australian Minister of External Affairs, Mr. Richard G. Casey, called on me today accompanied by Ambassador Spender. I told Mr. Casey we were very pleased that he had found it possible to stop in Washington on his return to Australia and that we appreciated having an opportunity to get his views on current world problems. I remarked that we felt very close to Australia and deeply appreciated the way in which Australia has shouldered responsibilities in Korea where Australian forces have been in action since the beginning of hostilities. I also expressed appreciation for Australia’s recent decision to double its ground forces in Korea.
Mr. Casey thanked me for my remarks and said that he wished to make some comments on several subjects of particular interest to his government. He began by reviewing the role Australia had played in the formulation of the Colombo Plan of economic and technical assistance for South and Southeast Asia. He said that so far only India, Pakistan, Ceylon and British territories in Southeast Asia were participating [Page 748] in the plan but that it was Australian’s hope other countries in Southeast Asia would also come in. He said that two factors apparently were causing these governments to hold back. The first was the fear that in some way their participation in the Colombo Plan might result in their losing American assistance, which of course was on a much larger scale than anything they could hope to get from the countries participating in the Colombo Plan. The other factor was the continuing fear that colonialism might come back into the area through the medium of the Colombo Plan. Mr. Casey expressed the hope that we would find it possible to counteract these fears. He said that reassurances from Australia would obviously carry less weight in these countries than similar reassurances from the United States.
Mr. Casey continued his remarks on Southeast Asia by saying that in World War II Australia had been able to cover virtually the entire area of Southeast Asia in its foreign relations through Great Britain, France and the Netherlands. To meet the changed situation Australia is doing everything possible to improve its relations with the new governments in the area. Australian participation in the Colombo Plan is an expression of this interest.
Mr. Casey said that Australia had one extremely important problem in its relations with Indonesia which could destroy the whole basis for friendly and cooperative relations between Australia and Indonesia. This was the question of the future political status of Netherlands New Guinea. He said he had warned the Indonesians both at Djakarta and at Paris that if they persist in their agitation on this question they may destroy the whole fabric of Indonesian-Australian relations which were far more important to Indonesia than Netherlands New Guinea. Mr. Casey said that New Guinea would require millions of pounds to develop and that at the present time it has little value to Indonesia. Indonesia, he said, had built up the dispute with the Netherlands over the status of the territory into a prestige question. He added that the agitation in Indonesia for the territory was the work of a few demagogues, and he minimized the strength of public opinion in Indonesia on this issue.
Mr. Casey said that Australia was firmly opposed to Indonesia’s gaining control of Netherlands New Guinea whether by unilateral action or as the result of agreement between the Netherlands and Indonesia. He said that such a development could result in the fall of the present Australian Government and the return to power of Dr. Evatt.3 He added that there would be strong pressure on his [Page 749] government to take action if Indonesia appeared to be about to move into the territory. Mr. Spender was more specific in suggesting that such action by Indonesia might be countered by the use of force by Australia.
Mr. Casey stated that Australia believes it is important that the New Guinea question be placed on ice for the time being. Mr. Spender remarked at this point that, he feared Ambassador Cochran’s reiterated suggestions that the two parties should attempt to resolve their differences through bilateral negotiations had the effect, however unintentional, of bringing pressure to bear on the Netherlands to make further concessions.
I told Mr. Casey that I was sorry we had been unable to take the action requested by his government last week, namely that we ask the Indonesian government not to press for discussion of the New Guinea question at the Hague Conference. I explained that in our judgment such an approach would only have had the effect of making the Indonesians more adamant. We believed, furthermore, that to deny the Indonesians an opportunity to raise the question would have increased the possibility of their taking unilateral action. I told Mr. Casey that I appreciated having his views on this question and that they would receive careful consideration.