Foreign Relations of the United States, 1951, Asia and the Pacific, Volume VI, Part 1

493.009/5–2851: Telegram

The Ambassador in Indonesia (Cochran) to the Secretary of State

secret
priority

Djakarta, May 28, 1951—6 p. m.

1671. Received by Djuanda afternoon 28th my request. Asked him help me review situation in light Indo statement on embargo following cabinet meeting last week (Embtel 1651) and Govt statement to Parliament today (Embtel 1668).¹ I said press had carried confusing stories on whether rubber should be included in embargo. I had been unhappily impressed by anti-American attitude of press.

Djuanda said not single cabinet member anticipates rubber will not be included in embargo. Said they all realize it must be included. Said decision taken however not to mention rubber or any other commodity in govt’s statement on policy toward UN resolution. He said Indos waiting to see if and when British let it definitely be known that rubber is to be included. They feel British may delay and bargain with US while Indos lose heavily thru drop in rubber price and are likely be discriminated against by British in Malaya. In explanation latter point Djuanda said Indos fear priority will be given in Malaya to remilling and exporting rubber of domestic origin. With more restricted market for rubber exported out of Malaya Indos fear their rubber may not receive equality of treatment in remilling and may remain unsold. Consequently they want to work toward getting best possible arrangement with British and at same time obtain just “as favorable treatment from US as British may obtain thru bargaining over inclusion Rubber.” I told Djuanda that reasonable amount looking after own interest expected but, as I had told Subardjo and Amb Ali last week (Embtel 1651), I cautioned against over playing this with US.

Djuanda referred to our conversation of year ago when he advocated US interest itself in buying slab and other low grade rubbers directly from Indo. He said native producers are ones now likely suffer most thru decline in rubber market and possible congestion low grade rubber in Malaya for remilling and re-export. He regrets no way appears open to bring relief directly to this situation.

As to criticism of US policy, Djuanda admitted this had been recently even sharper than usual. He asked whether I thought there might be some rather malicious Dutch business influence back of Diah.² Djuanda said he thought he had seen several instances recently of Dutch endeavoring make difficulties for Americans in Indo. I told him we could live thru that satisfactorily but I was more concerned as to whether Indo Govt is to survive and be strong in its attitude toward Communists and other enemies of Indo institutions.

Djuanda said he was hopeful as to Sukiman Govt. He thought today’s statement properly showed determination put security first and to punish illegal activities of whatever origin. He said convinced that if political strife between Masjumi and PNI parties can be put down and real coalition govt function, such govt will last and will take strong measures against Communism. He told me most secretly that Attorney General already has list of Communist leaders against whom action is proposed soon as govt feels sufficiently solidified to back such action. He said most dangerous point for dissidence between 2 major parties is that of planning for general elections. He said one contemplated system in favor Masjumi while another would give advantage to PNI. He hopes compromise on this question may be reached soon and genuine cooperation between parties ensue. He said if this not achieved govt will be short-lived and situation serious. Djuanda optimistic however as to outcome.

Djuanda reminded me that Indo press criticism just as critical of Indo as of US Govt. He hopes as coalition govt grows stronger it will have more influence on press and better reaction. When I mentioned desire give every possible support to govt particularly if it is really determined develop Indo into bona fide member free nation group, he recommended I pursue present policy of maintaining good relations with Cabinet members, of acquainting them frankly with American attitude and of refraining from mixing in propaganda battle with Communist elements.³

Cochran

1. Not printed.
2. B. M. Diah, editor of Merdeka.
3. In telegram 1311 to Djakarta, May 29, Ambassador Cochran was instructed to inform the Indonesian Government that the United States would not bargain with Indonesia and was not bargaining with the United Kingdom about the full applicability of the United Nations resolution concerning rubber (493.009/5–2851).