Foreign Relations of the United States, 1951, Asia and the Pacific, Volume VI, Part 1

Policy Planning Staff Files: Lot 64D563¹

Substance of Discussions of State–Joint Chiefs of Staff Meeting at the Pentagon Building, December 21, 1951, 11:30 a.m.²

Washington, December 21, 1951

top secret

[Extract]

Present

General Bradley	Mr. Matthews13
General Collins	Mr. Bohlen
Admiral Fechteler3	Mr. Nitze14
General Vandenberg4	Mr. Allison15
Admiral Fife5	Mr. Perkins
General Lee6	Mr. McGhee16
General Hull7	Mr. Knight17
General Bolte8	Mr. Ferguson18
Admiral Wooldridge9	Mr. Stelle19
General Cabell10
Admiral Lalor11
General Ruffner12
Colonel Carns

. . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Mr. Matthews: We thought it might be useful to talk about Indochina. (At this point Mr. Lacy joined the meeting.)

General Bradley: I think we ought to discuss Indochina. It looks as if things might move to a climax there at any time. As of now so far as the military side of it goes the situation stands with Indochina ranking next to Korea on the MDAP list. We have equipment moving there now and more is going there shortly.

Mr. Matthews: The accumulation of intelligence reports of possible Chinese moves against Indochina together with the recent bad news of DeLattre’s health and the indications of continuing French dissatisfaction with their position and the possibility of a growth of French feeling that they might have to pull out seem to us to add up to a situation that needs some careful thinking.

General Vandenberg: It seems to me that the question really is, are we or are we not prepared to let Southeast Asia go?

Mr. Allison: There would be a real danger of losing Southeast Asia if Indochina went Communistic.

General Collins: I think the assumption that all of Southeast Asia would be lost if Indochina goes Communist needs careful analysis.²⁰ As far as the resources go, most of the tin is in Malaya and the oil in the Netherland East Indies. If the British really wanted to, I believe from the military point of view Malaya could be held even if Indochina were lost. If this were the case, we would still be able to get both tin and oil.

General Bradley: You probably have to calculate the loss of Indochina and the loss of at least Siam and Burma.

General Collins: I agree that Siam and Burma would be lost and so important rice areas would be lost, but the British should be able to hold Malaya. This is a different situation from Indochina. In Indochina the French are holding a long perimeter which the Communists might be able to punch through at any point. In Malaya the British ought to be able to hold on to Kra. They would have water on each side of them and a very short line to hold.

General Bradley: I just don’t think we could get our public to go along with the idea of our going into Indochina in a military way.

Mr. Matthews: You mean ground troops.

General Bradley: Yes.

Mr. Matthews: The difficulty is that the pattern will probably be a gradual increase of Chinese support rather than dramatic all-out Chinese intervention.

General Collins: There are two things that impress me about the Indochina situation. The first is the difficulty of getting able native leadership. De Lattre says Bao Dai is the best man available and he is far from a great leader. The number two man, Huu, is not trusted either by De Lattre or Bao Dai, so that you just don’t have competent or at least trusted leadership. The second thing is that as of now the Indochina thing is clearly a one man show. If anything should happen to De Lattre, it might go to pieces. Frankly, I think we must face the probability that Indochina will be lost.

Mr. Nitze: If we get an Armistice in Korea and then quietly swallow the loss of Indochina, the adverse public relations consequences would be tremendous. We should consider very carefully what is involved.

General Bradley: Maybe we could use the “larger sanction” in the Indochina situation as well as in the Korean.

Mr. Bohlen: The difficulty will be that a Chinese increase in support will probably be gradual and covert rather than sudden and open. Does General Collins think that the French could hold on if the Chinese don’t come in in force?

General Collins: Yes, I think they probably could hold on if the Chinese don’t come in, but there is no chance that they really can clean up the situation.

Mr. Nitze: What would it take to put them in a position to clean up the situation?

General Collins: A great deal. In Indochina the French have given up what are the best natural defensive positions, the bases in the mountains. Their position now is a long perimeter on the plains. To clean up the situation would require a general offensive.

Mr. Lacy: An NSC paper is now being drafted which takes up the question of the use of U.S. forces.²¹ May I ask what the Joint Chiefs feeling is on whether we should participate with the British and French in military conferences on Indochina and the Southeast Asia area.

General Bradley: I think a staff paper²² is almost completed on that point and I believe that the paper will recommend that we not participate. Personally I disagree with that position. I think we should be prepared to confer on the problem provided we make it clear that we are not committing ourselves to anything.

General Collins: I would go along with that if there were a clear understanding that we were not making any commitments. The danger is that the French always say “We can’t do anything, you can, so if you don’t do anything that’s your responsibility”.

General Bradley: I think we can give you a decision on the question of our participation in a military conference very quickly.

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1. File of the Policy Planning Staff of the Department of State, 1947–1953.
2. Beginning in January 1951, the Joint Chiefs of Staff and representatives of the Department of State met regularly, generally on a weekly basis. The purpose of these conferences was to exchange information and opinions rather than to achieve agreement on the various issues discussed. The source text indicates that this record is a State Department draft not cleared with any of the participants.
13. H. Freeman Matthews, Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs.
3. Adm. William M. Fechteler, Chief of Naval Operations.
14. Paul H. Nitze, Director of the Policy Planning Staff.
4. Gen. Hoyt S. Vandenberg, Chief of Staff, U.S. Air Force.
15. John M. Allison, Acting Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs.
5. Vice Adm. James Fife, Deputy Chief of Naval Operations (Operations).
6. Maj. Gen. Robert M. Lee, Director of Plans, Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff, Operations, U.S. Air Force.
16. George C. McGhee, Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs.
7. Gen. John E. Hull, Vice Chief of Staff, U.S. Army.
17. Ridgway B. Knight, Acting Deputy Director of the Office of European Regional Affairs.
8. Lt. Gen. Charles L. Bolte, Deputy Chief of Staff for Plans, U.S. Army.
18. John H. Ferguson, Deputy Director of the Policy Planning Staff.
9. Rear Adm. Edmund T. Wooldridge, Representative of the JCS on The Senior Staff, NSC.
19. Charles C. Stelle, Deputy Director of the Office of Intelligence Research.
10. Maj. Gen. Charles P. Cabell, Director of the Joint Staff, Joint Chiefs of Staff.
11. Rear Adm. William G. Lalor, Secretary, Joint Chiefs of Staff.
12. Maj. Gen. Clark L. Ruffner, Deputy Assistant to the Secretary of Defense (International Security Affairs).
20. For text of NIE–20, “Resistance of Thailand, Burma, and Malaya to Communist Pressures in the Event of a Communist Victory in Indochina in 1951,” March 20, see p. 27.
21. Reference is presumably to the preparation of the NSC Staff Study contained in report NSC 124, February 13, 1952; for text, see United States–Vietnam Relations, 1945–1967, Book 8, pp. 468–476.
22. Not identified.