851G.00R/11–3051: Telegram
The Consul at Singapore (Goodyear) to the Secretary of State
613. Dept pass ECA. To Bissell1 from Griffin.2
1. US econ aid program Viet basically on right track for US objectives and shld be contd as orig conceived. Those objectives remain [Page 549] sound and practical if new govt is to be supported in policies necessary to build loyalty and appreciation among population. However, I believe it is necessary for US clearly to realize the greatest impediment to success of US program and attainment objectives is nature of present Huu Govt, its lack of vitality and public leadership, its lack of enthusiasm for progressive progress that wld improve the gen welfare of peasants.
2. We are dealing with able land owners—mandarin type—functionaire govt. Its weakness is not that it is subordinate in many ways to Fr but that it is in no sense the servant of the people. It has no grass roots. It therefore has no appeal whatsoever to the masses. It evokes no popular support because it has no popular program. It has no popular program because nature of its leaders tends to an attitude that this wld be a “concession”. This govt might reluctantly try to mollify public opinion, but it does not consist of men who wld lead public opinion. Therefore though France–Vietnam Armed Forces may cont to win small engagements for ltd objectives, no real progress is being made in winning war, which depends equally on polit solution.
3. It has been perhaps error in judgment in believing essential struggle has been between the constricting polit influence and pressure of Fr—which undoubtedly still exists and patriotic effort of Viets to win increasing degree of independence. Perhaps the essential struggle is one not undertaken—which is to get grass roots ability, conviction and patriotism on behalf of people of Viet into the govt. So-called independence Huu Govt represents means nothing to masses. It simply means a change of functionaires, not a change of social direction, not a drive to advance lot of the people. Revolution will continue and Ho Chi-minh will remain popular hero, so long as “independence” leaders with Fr support are simply native mandarins who are succeeding foreign mandarins. The period of mandarin and functionaire govt in Asia is over. The present type of govt in Viet is a relic of the past as much as Fr colonialism.
4. I believe this predicament is now fully realized by Fr. There is little doubt of fact they know they are fighting war that cannot be won without a polit solution, and the polit solution depends at least as much upon the relationship of Govt of Viet with masses of people of Viet as upon the relationship with Fr on subj of independence. The issue in Viet, in my mind, is more than nationalism and Francophobia. It is old Asian issue that destroyed the Kuomintang in Chi, Communist opportunity to exploit insecurity, and hunger and wretchedness of masses of people to whom their govt has failed to make an effective appeal. The Huu Govt makes no such appeal. Its heart is not in that kind of appeal. If it talked land reform it wld never be believed. It is my opinion that Fr are now fully awake to this [Page 550] predicament. They realize that their interests are not being served by a Viet Govt that not only has no appeal to masses but that has no program and perhaps only doubtful sympathy for masses. Such condition will not help the Fr to extricate themselves from the milit burden. Nor will it help US to lessen the load of increasing costs the Fr require us to share. It is my opinion that we shld consider this problem jointly with the Fr, to the end that a govt with some grass roots instincts, intentions and social purpose may result.
5. It may be pointed out that US is now engaged in massive milit assistance in Indochina and an econ program of great potential social and polit impact. Fr are insisting on an even greater Amer participation in Fr costs of def ending this semi-independent state. US has paid for right to exercise stronger voice in determination of policies. Fr failure to achieve satis polit results out of compliant, obedient landowners nonreform Cabinet may now make possible a practical and farsighted program for improving polit situation, which in itself awaits improvement of social outlook Viet Govt, a condition now obvious to Fr. I believe Fr are ready for that. If we fail to secure their collaboration for setting up a govt fitted for its job by something better than obedience to Fr, then one day we will discover that the Fr in disgust and discouragement will abandon their attempt to defend this flank of sea.
6. I have discussed this outlook with Heath but did not have time to draft cable before leaving Saigon.
Dept pass Saigon, Paris. Sent Dept 613, rptd info Saigon 20 for Heath (Saigon ECA for Wilkinson [Williamson]), Paris 3 (Paris OSR for Porter).3
- Richard M. Bissell, Jr., Acting Administrator, Economic Cooperation Administration.↩
- R. Allen Griffin, Special Far East Representative of the Economic Cooperation Administration since November 9, was on a tour of ECA missions. He had visited Indochina prior to his arrival in Singapore.↩
- Paul R. Porter, Acting U.S. Special Representative in Europe, Economic Co-operation Administration.↩