611.51G/6–2951
Memorandum by the Assistant Director for Non-European Affairs, Office of International Security Affairs (Bingham) to the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Rusk)
Subject: Saigon’s No. 2355 of June 29, 1951
Since S/ISA is deeply concerned with the subject matter of Minister Heath’s telegram, we have given considerable thought to it and [Page 448] submit the following comments for your consideration in the preparation of a reply. We have delayed submitting this memorandum in the expectation that Mr. Blum of ECA would probably comment, but no such comment has yet come to our attention.1
Minister Heath’s telegram is certainly a model of clarity and forcefulness. He argues very persuasively in support of the instructions he would like to receive. Nevertheless, we have grave doubts about his recommendation number 4 which would seem to put United States personnel in Indochina in the position of the “Hear No Evil” monkey. Moreover, we are worried about the absence of any recommendation with respect to the job of persuading the French to move farther and faster in the direction of building up the strength and independence (within the French Union) of the Associated States. In view of the tenor of the whole telegram, the absence of any such recommendation is not surprising.
From Minister Heath’s telegram, it is not clear just what he fears in Indochina, if his recommendations are not accepted. Is he afraid that the French will pull out and leave Indochina an easy victim for the Communists? He does not say so, and surely this eventuality is hardly likely, in view of the enormous French investment in Indochina and many other factors. Is he afraid that the French will refuse further military assistance from us and so weaken their defensive strength? Again, he does not say so, and the evidence would indicate the unlikelihood of this eventuality. Is he afraid that the French will make it virtually impossible for ECA to operate effectively in Indochina? This might seem like a rational fear, particularly in the light of the events which happened in Indochina within a few hours after Minister Heath’s telegram was sent.2 However, in the light of the subsequent French actions, it would seem that they are not by any means planning to take such drastic action.
In short, Minister Heath, in marshalling the arguments for his position, creates in the reader a sense of anxiety about threatening dangers, without specifying what those dangers are. In part, he does this by stressing the vital character of the role the French are playing in defending Indochina from the Communists, although no one has seriously proposed that the French might leave or that we might seek to persuade them to leave.
[Page 449]The dangers we see in Minister Heath’s approach and particularly in his recommendation no. 4 are: (1) that we may give to the French, the Associated States and the other peoples of South and Southeast Asia the impression that, because we deem the defensive role performed by the French to be vital to the security of the area, we are prepared to back the French 100 per cent in their dealings with the Vietnamese and (2) that this in turn will weaken our bargaining position with the French, impair our influence with those Vietnamese who are not convinced of the sincerity of the French intentions in Indochina, and—most serious of all—damage our standing in Asia as a whole by identifying us with colonialism.
Specifically, we have no serious quarrel with any of Minister Heath’s recommendations, except no. 4. With respect to no. 1, Minister Heath would presumably prepare his request to General De Lattre with a background factual presentation covering the number of Americans actually operating in Indochina, the basis on which ECA–STEM aid is being furnished, etc. and perhaps also give a few examples of objectionable anti-American activity on the part of French officials. With respect to recommendation no. 2, the resolution of the difficulty of the bilaterals will doubtless affect the nature of the approach. In this connection, Mr. Blum’s attitude and position (see Toeca 786 of July 1)3 impress us as sound.
As for recommendation no. 4, it is hard to believe that Minister Heath actually meant what he said. If his proposed instructions were literally followed, it would promptly get around Indochina that United States officials would “not even listen” to Vietnamese complaints about the French, no matter how well founded they might be. It would seem far preferable merely to warn United States personnel against giving the impression that the United States automatically concurs with anti-French complaints and arguments.
Finally, while we are ready to assume that Minister Heath omitted the point only because he regarded it as so basic a part of American policy that it need not be restated, we believe any reply should remind him of the importance of persuading the French to build up the strength and independence of the Associated States. It should be possible to convince the French that such a course in the long run offers them the only way to escape from the crushing military burden they now carry in Indochina and at the same time avoid the kind of an upheaval which could result in their losing Indochina altogether.
- Comments by Robert Blum, Chief of the Special Technical and Economic Mission at Saigon, were contained in telegram Toeca 841, July 12; for extracts, see Infra.↩
- The signature of bilateral Economic Assistance Agreements with each of the Associated States was scheduled for June 29. However, French authorities interposed objections of a substantive as well as procedural nature. For information on this subject, see telegram 2364 from Saigon, June 30, p. 439. Regarding the agreements ultimately concluded, see editorial note, p. 490.↩
- Not printed.↩