751G.5/7–1151: Telegram
The Minister at Saigon (Heath) to the Secretary of State
96. Bao Dai arrived Saigon yesterday afternoon for brief visit and I saw him at noon today by appointment.
While Bao Dai insisted that he remained firmly optimistic that in long run VM wld be suppressed and Vietnam wld finally emerge as truly independent state, with stable govt and economy, he said he was very worried over effect in Fr of conclusion of what he calls a “compromise” between UN forces and Chi-North Korean forces.1 There had always been strong element in Fr Parliament and Govt in favor “compromise” with Ho Chi Minh which wld allow Fr withdraw their [Page 446] forces with semblance of honor and with great saving blood and treasure (see Legtel 1340, Jan 30;2 1363, Feb 2; and 1537, Mar 2). Peaceful arrangement Korean question might well strengthen this movement. He said that De Lattre wld never consent such arrangement since he was now entirely committed to victory over VM. De Lattre, Bao Dai insisted, wld resign before he wld consent be made instrument any arrangement which wld mean the rapid take over all IC by the international Commies.
Bao Dai then inquired whether actually there was any important element in Amer legis or exec branch which wld favor compromise with the Commie Viet Minh. I answered very firmly that while there were probably few in Congress who were not informed of true nature VM, I felt my govt was fully informed and aware dangers of any appeasement which wld allow Ho Chi Minh and his Commie directors of VM to share govt or territory of IC. What had happened in Czechoslovakia, Poland and other satellite states was clearly present in Wash’s mind. Bao Dai then asked me inform my govt that the elite of Viets Nationalists were now entirely anti-Commie and aware impossibility any compromise with Ho Chi Minh.
Full nationalist strength against Ho Chi Minh cld not be mobilized however until there was true Viets natl army entirely Viets commanded. For moment there were merely scattered battalions of indifferent morale and spirit because they were Fr commanded. Fr command was necessity at this transition stage but transition shld be brief as possible. Furthermore, it must be an army, he asserted, loyal to himself as chief of state. Idea of forming army with loyalty to Vietnam “the patrie” was entirely impractical at present moment. Idea of the “patrie” was too new. Vietnam’s “independence” was too recent. Strength of Cao Daists, Hoa Haos and other sectarian mil forces was their loyalty to a person, agent or chief of the cult.
In this connection he greatly regretted attitude Gen De Lattre toward Governor Giao, who by arrangement and with consent De Lattre’s predecessor, was to have been chief of staff Viets army. As chief of state, Bao Dai cld not himself personally supervise training and formation army. Giao had energy and wld have earned loyalty of officers and men of new army. Giao as chief of staff with Governor Tri as MinDef wld quite rapidly have developed Viets troops into patriotic, effective, loyal force.
Giao had his defects but he had his virtues of bravery, loyalty, energy and personal devotion to Bao Dai. Statement that Giao had “grafted” as governor Central Annam were false and malicious. These accusations were probably based on fact Giao disposed of certain “secret polit funds”, the expenditure and payee of which cld not be [Page 447] subjected normal accounting. Giao had not slightest temptation graft for in addition having personal fortune he cld always count on Bao Dai’s generosity. Bao Dai recently had given him some 500,000 piasters for personal expenses.
Tri had allowed himself be maneuvered by certain Vietnamese leaders into position of hostility to Huu so there had been nothing do but relieve him of governorship north Vietnam. He wld also have to relieve Giao of governorship Central Annam because of De Lattre’s animosity toward him. After “period of eclipse” Bao Dai thought he cld bring both men back into govt and perhaps pursue his original plan of having them command and administer Viets army. Quite frankly there were no other Viets that he knew of at present time who had special qualities and loyalty to take over formation def forces. Perhaps someone wld emerge.
Bao Dai said that many nationalists were enlisting or accepting commissions in Fr-commanded Viets battalions. They dislike serving under Fr but they realized they had to gain mil experience and there was always possibility Fr withdrawing their forces in which case Viets alone wld have to fight against Ho Chi Minn’s Commie army.
Bao Dai said Viet police had discovered and broken up Viet-Minh organization in Dalat. VM headquarters had been in city hospital. Operations were directed from, and grenades and guns were actually stored in, the hospital unknown to Viets doctors and Fr sisters serving there. They had tried and executed local VM chief and leader VM “assassination squad”. Feels these executions made Dalat much happier place than it had been for several months.
Bao Dai said principal reason for his visit Saigon was consult his physician. His trachoma had become much worse and he had had liver attack. He was also on a strict regimen and ordered not engage in physical sports or hunting for a time.
He wld leave for Hanoi on 13th and at July 14th ceremony wld decorate Gen. De Lattre.
Sent Dept 96, rptd info Paris 31, Hanoi unnumbered.