790B.00/11–1351
Memorandum by the Ambassador in Burma (Key) to the Special Assistant to the Secretary of State (Battle)1
I telephoned Mr. William Lacy, Director of Philippine and Southeast Asian Affairs, this afternoon from the Embassy2 and expressed to him my puzzlement over recent telegrams from the Department and Singapore which indicated serious apprehensions and alarm about the present situation in Burma.
I stated that the situation which obtained in Burma at the time I left Rangoon two weeks ago, though unsatisfactory in certain respects, was certainly not so grave as to cause the deep anxieties revealed in the messages above mentioned. I stated that if the present apprehension was based on a message which emanated from a controlled agency [Page 308] about mid-October and which forecast alarming developments in the Mandalay-Bhamo-Lashio triangle, I wished to assure him that subsequent investigation had disclosed that the report was more alarming than the facts warranted. Furthermore, the Burmese authorities themselves were not concerned about the situation in the Mandalay area, nor did the British Vice Consul, stationed in nearby Maymyo, who was in close touch with the local military authorities, feel worried. In view of these considerations, it was the consensus that there was no particular reason for alarm. In fact, the Burmese military authorities were confident that they could cope with any attack mounted by the insurgents.
With regard to the proposed joint reexamination by the British and ourselves of our policies towards Burma, I expressed the hope that any such joint reexamination would take fully into account the fact that the Government of Burma does not want, nor would it accept, any substantially increased aid—especially military aid. Under no circumstances would Burma accept MDAP aid from us, in view of the strings attached to the latter and because of Burma’s clear-cut and repeatedly expressed policy of strict neutrality. Acceptance of large-scale military aid would immediately expose the Government to political attacks on the grounds that the latter was departing from its neutral policy and was siding with the Anglo-Americans. With regard to assistance which might be rendered by the UK and the US in the event Burma were invaded by the Communists, it should be borne in mind that no responsible official in Burma will publicly, or in most cases even privately, admit such a possibility. Consequently, any military plans predicated on the foregoing hypothesis would have to be kept in the strictest confidence, and no Burmese military officials or other officials could be expected in any way to discuss plans with the US and the UK. Thus, any talk of proffering substantial military aid to Burma is based on a complete lack of comprehension regarding the present Burmese picture. Mr. Lacy informed me that any conversations by the British and ourselves which would have to do with the reexamination of our policies towards Burma would take place in Paris and that I would be expected to take part in them. This, he pointed out, would give me an opportunity of clarifying any misconceptions which may exist on the military aid program.
I informed Mr. Lacy that I was puzzled by Mr. MacDonald’s3 stand as reported in Singapore’s 537 of November 6.4 In this message Mr. MacDonald has described Thakin Nu as “spiritual and acts like a person with a desire to be a monk—not political.” I pointed out to Mr. Lacy that such a description of Thakin Nu was in my opinion [Page 309] entirely incorrect. Thakin Nu is a devout Buddhist, but to say that he has no political sense is to overlook the fact that he dominates the present Government, which recently achieved a sweeping electoral victory, and that without him at the head of the party, the AFPFL would have practically no following. Mr. MacDonald evidently fails to appreciate the importance of Buddhism in Burma and its great political significance. A large measure of Thakin Nu’s political strength rests upon the fact that he is the outstanding champion of Buddhism and the most important lay Buddhist leader in Burma. Similarly, Mr. MacDonald’s statement that the Burmese Government “needs the support of the free world and military aid” reveals a lack of understanding of the present Burmese picture. In view of Burma’s “neutral” policy, nothing could be more embarrassing to Thakin Nu than too much support from the “free world”; the present Burmese Government has to exercise extreme caution in accepting American and British aid lest it be stigmatized by the opposition as the tool of Anglo-American imperialism. As for further “material aid”, it is not clear what MacDonald has in mind, but it should be pointed out that the United States is extending about as much ECA aid as Burma can absorb and, barring further appropriations from Congress, the amount ear-marked for Burma cannot be increased. It should also be pointed out that Burma has so far consistently refused to accept any aid under the Colombo Plan and will probably continue to refuse such aid for the reason that acceptance would expose the Government to the kind of criticism above mentioned.
In closing, I suggested that if we wished effectively to assist Thakin Nu and his Government, which is democratic and covertly anticommunist, there were two important steps which we could take. The first and most important would be to agree to the use of ECA counterpart funds to the amount equivalent of two million dollars for use by the Government in revitalizing religion, which in the case of Burma means revitalizing Buddhism, since that religion is practiced by the overwhelming majority of the inhabitants of Burma. This scheme, which the Prime Minister has urged in the most forceful terms and with respect to which he has been seeking our assistance for the past several months, would, in the Prime Minister’s opinion, strengthen him and his Government in a dramatic manner which could not possibly be duplicated were we to extend several times that amount of aid in the military or economic fields. Although the Prime Minister’s project might seem unorthodox to Occidentals, it must be borne in mind that Buddhism is a vital force in Burma and that the Prime Minister of Burma knows his people.
The second way in which I suggested that we could assist Thakin Nu would be by putting an end to the smuggling of arms to the KMT troops in Burma via Thailand. This would require Thai cooperation. [Page 310] It should not, however, be difficult at least to close the Thai air fields to planes smuggling arms into Burma. It should also not be difficult to end the unauthorized activities of Americans allegedly involved in the smuggling. Some indications, however slight, that we and the Thais are doing something about this scandalous situation which has caused the Burmese Government such embarrassment and concern would be all to the good and would relieve the tension which has arisen as a result of KMT activities in Burma. By stopping the smuggling of arms and supplies, the KMT’s would be discouraged from launching further incursions into China. They would also be less inclined to cause trouble within Burma.
I suggested that every effort, therefore, be made to assist the Burmese Government in regard to the above-mentioned two matters. In each case the Prime Minister has sought our assistance. It would, in my opinion, therefore be much more desirable to accede to requests already made than to come forth at this stage with proffers of assistance in fields in which the Government of Burma is not interested. Mr. Lacy indicated that the prospects of obtaining ECA acquiescence in regard to the Prime Minister’s project were very good. He promised to do everything within his power to obtain an early and favorable decision.