641.74/10–3051: Telegram
The Ambassador in Egypt (Caffery) to the Department of State 1
609. General recommendations re my telegram 589 October 272 on shape of things to come in Egypt:
1. We must above all pursue moderation theme (rather than mediation). While this may well come to point where it has to be broached on Washington-London level, we have so far avoided resentments which such approaches are apt to produce. Stevenson has been more than cooperative and I believe that this channel should be exploited to utmost.
2. In contrast with moderation we must never give impression that we are deserting our British friends. This would be fatal to us and to them. However, we must at the same time keep path to the crack in the door. Large part of this process will have to be played locally by ear.
3. We still have “position” in Egypt, and our prestige is not at too low level. While we must be firm in support of principles we must be careful to avoid punitive measures against Egypt, such as shutting off of present economic (Point Four) aid, etc. This tightrope is not going to be easy to walk. Our British friends will be seeking our support for their actions and the Egyptians will be seeking our good will and intervention against such actions.
4. We must seek to restrain British military “trigger happiness” until such time as drastic action is justified. (Such action can be most effective.) We must also seek to restrain Egyptian trigger happiness (not so much on actual military measures, but rather on measures destined to provoke British into abrupt action).
5. Our USIE output should stress inherent dangers of those who seek to play ball with the Soviets, and give picture of what has happened in countries which have tried this dangerous game. We should also intensify USIE activities immediately aiming particularly at lower level mass approach as most effective weapon against growing extremist movements.
6. We must not only be guided by the factors in the local situation mentioned in the reference telegram but also seek to exploit every hesitation that exists in Arab States re Egypt’s actions. This should not, however, at this juncture be directed towards breaking up the Arab League.
7. We should proceed set up Middle East Command without Egypt, but continue emphasize regret non-Egyptian participation and leave [Page 414] door open for eventual Egyptian membership on full partnership basis.
8. Do a little prettying up of Four-Nation proposal but refrain from re-presenting proposals until auspicious moment.
9. It is necessary that we face up to fact proposals will not be accepted without something substantial on Sudan and begin laying groundwork with British to convince them of this. We should be prepared to associate US with Sudan offers if British make them sufficiently substantial.
10. Avoid attempts “push” Egyptians during this period during which such attempts can only boomerang our detriment. In particular avoid any appearance assisting in demise of Wafd power under circumstances which could result throwing Wafd in arms of Reds.
My more explicit where-do-we-go-from-here telegram will follow.3