641.74/10–2751: Telegram
The Ambassador in Egypt (Caffery) to the Department of State 1
589. Now that dust beginning to settle I believe it desirable briefly recapitulate what has happened in Egypt recently and assess, reevaluate our policy.
1. Egyptians have been pursuing blindly fatalistic policy re Anglo-Egyptian negotiations. Their do or die attitude has now passed the “do” stage and they are faced with a possible “die” stage.
2. The effective and firm British action in Suez zone has brought this fact most unpleasantly to attention of the Egyptians. Despite all bluster about “British aggression” closest reflection we have of true Egyptian reaction is plaintive newspaper headline “but they evacuated Abadan”.2
3. Egyptians are surprised, hurt and deeply resentful. Their frustration and hatred is primarily focussed on British, but in the thrashings around, US French and Turk and West all came in for their share of abuse.
4. Frustration and hatred do not arise so much from fact Egyptians’ lives have been lost but more from fact that Egyptians have made such poor showing when put to test.
[Page 412]5. The army is not happy that politicians have placed it in un-evitable position of having its only effective division “trapped” in Gaza with Israelis on one side and a potentially hostile British force sitting on its supply lines.
6. The supply line is virtually exhausted and the hangover stage is not far away. The politicians have a few last weapons, among which is a rumored “declaration of war” against British. However, there is realization that this could only result in quick British occupation of whole country.
7. This has resulted in a surprising rash of exhortations to keep calm, typified by the pro-Wafdist Al Misri “Every attack on a foreigner will lead to the loss of the friendship of another nation and provide the enemy with a mortal weapon”. Egypt suddenly realizes that she needs friends, and has very few.
8. This is accompanied by vengeful note of “Let’s make friends with Russia”. This is so far not serious threat, and it is believed that on this issue the King could successfully hold line as such a move would not have the irresistable appeal that characterized abrogation.
9. There is increasing evidence that King would like to seize the first opportunity to effect a change of government. He cannot easily forget spot which Nahas has put him in nor Nahas’s defiance in persisting with abrogation proposals. King will not, however, take positive line until very sure of his ground.
10. It is unfortunate that circumstances did not permit our delaying proposals until the change envisaged in (9) took place. Even the most pliable of new governments could not accept the proposals without their being dressed up a bit. We can never get by with less than legal recognition of title “King of the Sudan”.
11. Our firm support of British has been of great help to them at time they needed help. It has also made our moderating voice more effective with them. It has not yet irreparably damaged us with the Egyptians who still have hope that the US can do something to save them from the mess which they are in. This, plus other pertinent factors mentioned above produce the “crack in the door” mentioned in previous telegrams.
In another telegram I shall recommend how, in my opinion, we can best exploit the situation.