768.551/6–1851
Memorandum of Conversation, by the Secretary of State1
Subject: Courtesy call of General Koca Popovic
| Participants: | The Secretary |
| Assistant Secretary Perkins | |
| Colonel General Koca Popovic, Chief of Staff of the Yugoslav Armed Forces | |
| Vladimir Popovic, Yugoslav Ambassador | |
| Mirko Bruner, First Secretary, Yugoslav Embassy, Interpreter | |
| John C. Campbell, EE |
General Popovic came in on a courtesy call before his return to Yugoslavia. I told him that I was very glad that he had come to this country and that I had been told by General Bradley and other US military officials of the conversations the General had had with them. I asked him whether he was satisfied with the results. He said that he was reasonably satisfied and regarded the agreements reached here as initial steps toward further cooperation.2 I said that we regarded them in the same way. I then told General Popovic that I hoped he had been able to gain some impression of the attitude of the American Government and people in regard to his country. I said that the US had a great interest in that part of the world and admired the determination of the Yugoslav people and government to defend their independence. I said that we realized the existence of the threat of aggression against Yugoslavia and other free countries and trusted that the Yugoslav Government saw that all of us would have to work together to end that threat. General Popovic said that the Yugoslav Government saw the situation in the same light.
I indicated that the talks which the General had had here should be useful to both sides and inquired what he considered the next steps would be. He said that there would follow detailed technical [Page 1816] talks here to determine what equipment might be made available to Yugoslavia. I asked him about US officers going to Yugoslavia for technical talks. Mr. Perkins added that our military representatives regarded this as necessary as a means of becoming acquainted with types of Yugoslav equipment, training and other aspects of the problem. The General said that for political reasons the Yugoslav Government thought that it would be premature to have an American military mission go to Yugoslavia at this stage. He said that the technical talks should be begun here and that later we could see how things developed.
Ambassador Popovic mentioned that the Washington talks had been limited to military questions and said that it was necessary to put them in the broad context of political relations. He asked whether I could say anything on that point. I said that relations between the two countries had steadily improved and that the US fully understands Yugoslavia’s position and need for assistance. I referred to the recent conversations with the UK and France concerning economic aid to Yugoslavia over a longer period than hitherto and in addition to the emergency assistance which we had provided as a result of last summer’s drought. I said that in the military field the US desired to work with Yugoslavia on a basis of mutual confidence.
I asked General Popovic whether he would like to say anything in regard to Soviet intentions in Europe, particularly this year. He said that it was perfectly clear that Soviet intentions were not benevolent. He said that they were working both inside and outside of Yugoslavia with the aim of destroying Yugoslav independence. The question was not whether but when they would take action. I asked him about the military build-up in the satellite states surrounding Yugoslavia. He said that their armies were being built up to the point where they could be used against Yugoslavia at any time. He said that Bulgaria was the best equipped and trained army, followed by Hungary and Rumania. The Ambassador mentioned that in Hungary former officers of the old army were being called back to service, indicating the rapid expansion which was taking place.
In the course of further remarks concerning the usefulness of General Popovic’s visit, he stated that he intended to make a full report to Marshal Tito of American policy and attitudes toward Yugoslavia as he could judge them both by his talks with US military officials and his more general discussion of Yugoslav-American relations with me today.