768.00/5–3151: Despatch
The Chargé in Yugoslavia (Beam) to the Secretary of State 1
No. 928
Subject: Evolution of Yugoslav Policy in the Past Year
The passage of May Day 1951, a holiday given over to celebrating the achievements of the Yugoslav Communist Party, provides an opportune occasion to comment on the evolution of the Yugoslav situation over the past year.
In May 1950 the keynote of the Yugoslav Government’s policy was strict independence from both East and West. Despite the obvious difficulties of the situation, the CPY faced the future with confidence: Yugoslavia had survived the two critical years since its expulsion from the Cominform; it had succeeded in elevating its dispute with the Kremlin from the dangerous status of a communist family quarrel to that of a problem of world significance; it had been elected to the Security Council and developed genuine cooperation with the United Nations, and it looked to that organization as its life-line of security against Soviet attack; it had improved its relations with the West; it thought that the ambitious Five Year Plan would be reasonably successful, and that substantial loans for further industrial development could be obtained from the IBRD; from the ideological standpoint it was hopeful that its stand against the Kremlin would enlist sympathy among communists abroad, and it was confident that a break between Russia and Communist China was imminent.
But two events of unexpected and extraordinary importance, one external and the other internal, occurred in the summer of 1950 that sharply affected Yugoslavia’s position both politically and economically and brought about an acceleration of its orientation toward the West. The Korean war revealed the willingness of the Soviet Union to utilize satellite forces for military aggression, and showed that reliance upon the UN for defense meant ultimate reliance upon the United States as the most effective military force behind it. Similarly the 1950 summer drought virtually wrecked Yugoslavia’s fragile economy and brought home sharply the realization that urgently needed and effective assistance could be obtained in time only from the United States.
[Page 1796]Between the ouster from the Cominform and the two major events of the summer of 1950 mentioned, the Yugoslav Government had already slowly and cautiously developed its relations with the West. Its experience in discovering that it could deal with the major Western powers on a basis of complete non-interference in its domestic affairs gave it encouragement. Moreover, the regime was, and is, thoroughly confident of its ability to maintain itself in power in shifting closer to the West. The Korean war, the satellite military build up, and the severe drought having made clear the urgency and essentiality of United States economic, political and military backing, the Yugoslav Government recognized it had an interest as well in taking steps that would improve American public and Congressional opinion toward the regime.
Besides this need for improvement of its external position, the Yugoslav Government was aware of two other needs relating to its internal policy: the necessity of taking steps to increase popular support of the regime, and the necessity of economic reorganization to put agriculture and industry on a more efficient basis through stimulation of incentive.
In recent moves the Government has dovetailed these needs of foreign and domestic policy in a manner designed to meet the desired ends without giving the appearance of bowing to external pressure. In seeking to gain popular support and to stimulate agriculture and industry, the Government undertook a campaign to mitigate unpopular administrative practices of the local People’s Committees, temporarily abandoned the drive to collectivize agriculture, abolished forced deliveries of most categories of foodstuffs, relaxed pressure on the church, tolerated some degree of popular criticism, decentralized federal control of industry, and gave assurances that the price of most agricultural and industrial products will be permitted to be determined by the law of supply and demand. Most recently, it has moved a step closer to supporting UN policy in Korea by voting in favor of the embargo on shipments of war materials to Communist China.
The motivations behind these several steps are varied. The following interpretation of their significance may contribute to an objective appraisal of the recent evolution of Yugoslav policy.
Mitigation of unpopular administrative practices of local People’s Committees. The Government’s campaign in this respect is motivated solely by domestic considerations, namely the desire to bring about a more sympathetic popular attitude towards the regime. The People’s Committees have been the unpopular instruments of implementing government and party policies, and have undoubtedly taken advantage of their authority by exercising arbitrary and autocratic rule. The new Party line is designed to correct this attitude, to improve local government, and thereby gain greater public [Page 1797] support for the regime as a whole. The new policy also encourages the participation of a wider range of candidates for the People’s Committees, in an effort to supplant unpopular autocratic members and to make the Committees more responsive to public feeling.
Abandonment of drive to collectivize agriculture. Both domestic and foreign policy considerations appear to have led to this action. The unpopularity of collectivization pressures, the poor showing made by many collectives, and the need for developing peasant incentive, combined on the domestic side to bring about the relaxation; at the same time, from the foreign angle the new policy has its propaganda advantages as a liberalization measure. It should be borne in mind, however, that the new policy is primarily a tactical move, born of necessity, and that it may be of temporary character. The private sector of agriculture will be at a disadvantage as collective farms will sell for less than market price and will receive state support through lower taxes and other special concessions.
Regarding basic CPY policy toward the peasantry, it is pertinent to note that, despite the fast early pace of the collectivization drive, Tito’s attitude has been fundamentally far more amenable toward the Yugoslav peasantry than Stalin’s has been toward the Russian peasant. It will be recalled that in the correspondence leading to the Cominform break, Tito was criticized for saying, “We do not tell the peasants that they are the strongest pillar of our state in order that, eventually, we may get their votes, but because we know that that is what they are, and because they should be aware of what they are.” Tito’s attitude in this respect is reminiscent of that of Bukharin, who stressed that there must be harmonious relations between urban workers and peasants, and in particular that the peasants must be prosperous in order to supply more food to the towns. It will be recalled that when Stalin turned on Bukharin in the late ‘20’s, disowning the latter’s policy of “alliance with the peasantry”, and launched collectivization at a furious pace, the great famine of 1932–33 ensued.
Abolition of forced deliveries of most foodstuffs. Largely the same considerations prompted this measure. Forced deliveries at low prices were bitterly resented by the peasantry, with the result that plantings fell off and shortages of food were acute. The new policy is designed to restore peasant incentive and mitigate opposition to the regime. Though a concession to the realities of the situation, the new policy coincides too with the need for showing the West evidence of domestic liberalization.
Relaxation of pressure on the church. Policy toward the church over the past year has reflected consideration both for domestic and foreign policy needs. Domestically, the Government has relaxed pressures in its drive to mitigate hostility and to bring about broader popular acquiescence to its rule. It has achieved a substantial détente with the Orthodox Church through the enthronement of a Patriarch who is willing to cooperate with the regime. The problem of relations with the second largest church, the Roman Catholic, has been much more difficult, but pressures against it have nevertheless lessened to some extent in the past year. It is possible that both the Government and the Church have a mutual [Page 1798] desire to reach a basic accord, if that could be achieved without either side appearing to retreat on basic issues. It is also apparent that although the Government was reluctant to prosecute and imprison Archbishop Stepinac in 1946 (and was until the past year equally reluctant to release him because of sensitivity to foreign pressure), Marshal Tito has in the past year publicly stated his willingness to release the Archbishop on condition that he leave the country. The reasons for this change of attitude are threefold: (1) primarily to placate public opinion in the West, particularly in the United States, by demonstrating more liberality toward the Church; (2) to remove the most emotional issue impeding the reaching of a church-state accord with the Vatican; and (3) to influence more favorably public sentiment in Croatia and Slovenia toward the regime. The release of Stepinac would, of course, have an adverse effect on Orthodox sentiment, but the Government appears to be willing to take the step as its relations with the Orthodox Church are now on a sound and normal basis, and as the banishment of Stepinac, after serving a substantial part of his sentence, would not look like condonation.
Amelioration of relations with the churches does not, however, imply any fundamental change of the Government’s attitude toward religion. It remains basically hostile. What the regime is seeking to do is to gain public support by adopting what appears to be a more liberal attitude toward the Church, but at the same time relying on its communist indoctrination of youth to break the strength of the church in another generation. The success of this policy is reflected in marked decrease in young church-goers. Adult church attendance, on the other hand, is high. A capital precept is that while the regime feels it can afford better relations with the churches, it will not tolerate any organized opposition on their part.
Toleration of popular criticism. There has been a striking relaxation over the past year in this respect. There are of course very definite limitations in the application of this policy, and freedom of expression in the Western sense does not exist. Criticism of the communist character of the regime, either oral or written is not permitted, but “grumbling” remarks by the populace are countenanced which a year earlier would have brought arrest or even prison sentences. The more tolerant attitude has had a beneficial effect on public morale.
Decentralization of federal control of industry. In proposing this revolutionary development the Government seeks to bring about more efficiency in industry by drastically reducing cumbersome federal bureaucratic organization, and to promote initiative on the part of management and labor by giving them more direct operational responsibility and commensurate rewards for the successful operation of their individual establishments. While motivated by these practical and compelling considerations, the decentralization move also has great propaganda value as depicting further revolutionary progress in the attainment of Marxist ideals in contrast to the Soviet concept of centralized state control. It has the incidental merit of appearing, to the West, as a further step toward liberalization [Page 1799] of the regime. In its initial stage, however, decentralization is proving very difficult to carry out.
Price determination by law of supply and demand. The announced reversion to the law of supply and demand as the determinant of prices of most agricultural and industrial products is an interesting phenomenon. It is a clear concession to necessity, a tacit admission that state regulation of price and distribution has failed. No attempt is being made to rationalize the new policy in terms of communist theory or practice; it is looked upon frankly as a step backward. Thus, although it partly restores a free market, and is ostensibly a liberal measure, it may not be anything more than a temporary abandonment of previous government policy to socialize the marketing of agricultural and industrial production. In essence, the policy is akin to the New Economic Policy expedient of the Soviet Union in the early ’20s.
Shift in Korean policy. The adoption of a firmer attitude in support of the UN on the Korean issue, as demonstrated in the affirmative Yugoslav vote on the embargo of war materials to Communist China, appears to have been motivated largely by the growing necessity of satisfying Western public opinion, particularly American. Adoption of a firmer attitude appears to have been influenced also to some extent by waning hope that the Peking regime will detach itself from Soviet policy.
From the foregoing it is apparent that recent changes in Yugoslav policy have been motivated by a variety of considerations. It is evident, however, that the basic lines are being evolved in a definite pattern, in accordance with Tito’s concept that “the class struggle should proceed in accordance with special Yugoslav conditions.” Two fundamental considerations appear to be shaping the major lines of Yugoslav domestic and foreign policy. On the domestic side, the regime is aware of the necessity of achieving genuine popular support; it is seeking to accomplish this through liberalization of the methods by which it rules and implements its political, economic and social program. Kardelj epitomized this policy in saying that the Government sought to evolve a form of communism that would not be the “bugbear” that Soviet communism represents in the world today. In developing this policy the regime is confident of its ability to maintain power while relaxing some of the stringency of its controls and permitting a certain diminution of Party dictation. In brief, the whip-and-carrot technique has been modified to provide for less whip and more carrot. As for foreign policy, the Government is demonstrating its willingness to develop friendly political, social and economic relations with the Western world with the sole reservation that those relations do not impede the development of Yugoslavia as a communist society.
The evolution of Yugoslav domestic and foreign policy over the past year would appear to justify the hope that the communist state being developed in Yugoslavia, divorced from Soviet imperialist [Page 1800] policy, and characterized by a maturing moral conscience, will be of a nature that will enable it to live in reasonably normal relationship with the non-communist world.
For the Ambassador:
- Also sent to Moscow, Warsaw, Budapest, Bucharest, and Prague.↩