No. 868
768.5/3–351
Memorandum of Conversation, by the Director of the Office of Eastern European Affairs (Reinhardt)1
top secret
[Washington,] March 3,
1951.
Mr. Joyce and I saw Velebit at 5:30 p.m. last evening and handed him the prepared statement.2 I made orally the following additional points:
- 1.
- Washington was continuing to ascertain whether additional items might be added to the 2nd package. I could give him no assurances, but wanted him to know that the effort was being made.
- 2.
- I told him we would have to inform the British if and when the project got underway. Also I asked him to be sure that his [Page 1742] people did not speak to the British before we did. He said he understood and agreed.
- 3.
- I said that Army had pointed out that 181 M 105 mm was more than the given number of guns could fire. That 120 M was our figure. If the Yugos didn’t want the extra or any other items to let me know immediately so we would not have to pack them.
- 4.
- The 1st package was a full cargo for an 8 to 10,000 ton vessel. We suggested New Orleans as the port. The material would be ready shortly after the beginning of April. He said he saw no difficulties.
- 5.
- I told V[elebit] that Mr. Frank Lindsay, whom he knew, was to be his contact for carrying out the operation. That he should deal directly with him regarding package 1 as soon as he had the green light from Belgrade. With respect to the balance of the program he was to continue to deal with me.
- 6.
- V[elebit] seemed pleased with the communication; said he should have a reply in 2 or 3 days from Belgrade and that he thought this was the beginning of what would develop into a far wider collaboration.
F[rederick] R[einhardt]