661.68/2–2451: Telegram
The Ambassador in Yugoslavia (Allen) to the Secretary of State 1
1175. With reference to wide-spread speculation re possible attack on Yugoslavia, following is analysis of situation as viewed from Belgrade, even though Embassy has few solid facts to go on. My civil and military staffs are in general agreement with this report.
High Yugoslav leaders are still confident that attack against this country is not imminent. Recent party line has been somewhat less confident than tone used by Kardelj and Tito in speaking to Perkins (Embtel 1100, February 14),2 but change is probably due to desire by leaders to avoid overconfidence or relaxation. Admiral Manola, Chief of Yugoslav Military Intelligence, told Air Attaché Burnett today that he still had no knowledge of military activity in satellite states indicating preparation for attack.
From purely political point of view, I am inclined to doubt open aggression against Yugoslavia in near future. Tito has kept his status as Communist and neutral sufficiently clear to make any attack on him appear as flagrant aggression in eyes of world, including majority of those who are still unable to perceive clear-cut case of aggression in Korea, such as extreme group of British Labor Party. While Nehru can find justification for middle ground on Korean issue, he would find it extremely difficult not to put Indian Government solidly behind collective security in case of attack on Yugoslavia.
While it is dangerous to presume that Cominform leaders will act logically, I retain belief that West Germany is more likely than Yugoslavia to be next point of Cominform aggression in Europe.
[Page 1741]If Kremlin decides on attack elsewhere in Europe, Tito expects USSR will make simultaneous gesture of appeasement to Yugoslavia, in hope of keeping Yugoslavia neutral. Tito told Perkins and me that he would reject such an approach, since he would know it was not sincere. He says Soviets would try to leave Yugoslavia aside while it over-ran Europe, but he is aware that Soviets would take care of him later. He asserts he will participate with all his force in opposing aggression anywhere in Europe, to the same extent as other UN nations do.
I am not prepared at this moment to express full confidence that Tito will not attempt to remain neutral in case of war in Europe, despite his protestations to contrary. He might seek to preserve his strength unimpaired as long as possible, primarily because he knows that his regime will experience great difficulty in remaining in power after another world war, no matter who wins. His best chance of remaining in control might be, like the regimes in Turkey and Spain after the last war, to have a strong army in being.
I should add, however, that even a neutral Yugoslavia would be of great benefit to western allies in case of war and that it is therefore in our interest to maintain military posture of Yugoslavia, whether Tito is willing publicly to stand up and be counted on our side or not. I am confident that his neutrality would be benevolent, and it is possible that he would be with us actively from the start.