Office of the Historian
No. 861

661.68/2–1451: Telegram

The Ambassador in Yugoslavia (Allen) to the Secretary of State 1

secret
Belgrade, February 14, 1951—3 p.m.

1101. Assistant Secretary Perkins had highly useful talks with Kardelj and Tito yesterday.2 In separate conversations he emphasized US Government and public interest in Yugoslav efforts to maintain its independence in face of Soviet and satellite threats.3

[Page 1733]

In talk with Kardelj, Perkins referred to requests being made by Yugoslav Government for further assistance and pointed out present attitude of US Congress and public would make additional assistance most difficult to obtain without clear public indication by Yugoslav Government of what it would do in case of war.

Kardelj reviewed at length reasons for Yugoslav Government’s policy of refraining from close alignment with any bloc. He said public opinion inside Yugoslavia was not ready for such alignment, but in another year this situation might be different.

In subsequent conversation with Tito, latter said he had received report of Kardelj conversation and would be glad carry discussion further. Much same ground was gone over, Tito pointing out he could not join any bloc because Yugoslav people, in case aggression here, must be absolutely certain their government had done nothing whatever to justify Soviet allegations West Powers had had aggressive intentions against USSR with Yugoslavia as base of operations.

. . . . . . .

Perkins’ visit was well timed. It not only gave opportunity for valuable exchange of views with Yugoslav officials, but demonstrated continuing interest in Yugoslavia and was therefore of considerable importance for public morale.

Allen
  1. Repeated to London and Paris.↩
  2. Assistant Secretary Perkins visited Belgrade on February 13 and 14 in the course of his tour of various European capitals in February; see Document 850.↩

  3. In telegram 1100 from Belgrade, February 14, Ambassador Allen provided the following additional information:

    “During conversation with Tito and Kardelj yesterday, Perkins said U.S. Ambassadors from Cominform countries did not think either satellites or USSR were preparing for imminent attack anywhere in Europe. Kardelj and Tito both said their own information led them to same conclusion. Tito added from his knowledge of Russian and Soviet psychology, he did not think they would take action which would label USSR as aggressor in world opinion.” (661.00/2–1451)

    Regarding the meeting of Eastern European Chiefs of Mission referred to by Perkins, see Document 610.

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