611.00/2–1351
Memorandum of Conversation, by the Special Assistant to the Secretary of State (Smith)
| Participants: | Secretary Acheson |
| John Hightower, Associated Press | |
| Don Gonzales, United Press | |
| George E. Durno, International News Service |
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The interview then turned to Yugoslavia. The Secretary indicated that it was possible that the increase in tension in this area was the result of propaganda. He said the question of any attack on Yugoslavia by the satellites was of major strategic importance to the U.S. He said that an attack might develop in several ways. It could be an effort by the satellite forces alone. Quite apart from numbers and strength, there was some doubt whether the Hungarian, Bulgarian and Rumanian troops would fight against Yugoslavia. It was possible that the satellites would be helped by “volunteers” from the Soviet Union. Conceivably, the Soviet Union would use the Red army, but this was unlikely since it would not only end the Soviet peace propaganda campaign but also create the possibility of general war. The Secretary said that if the Red army was used, it would probably be in connection with the Soviet decision to start general war.
The Secretary said that Tito had not asked us for arms. He added that Tito was probably deciding whether such a request would do him more harm than good. He indicated that the U.S. would not want to see the forces of Yugoslavia, Greece and Turkey destroyed piece-meal because the total number of troops in these three countries is probably larger than any army General Eisenhower would be commanding for some time. He said he did not know what Greece and Turkey would do if the satellites attacked Yugoslavia. They might confine their reaction to defending their own territory. In answer to a question, the Secretary said that his comment about air bases in the Mediterranean at his last press conference referred to our activity in strengthening the southern flank in Europe.
[Page 1732]The Secretary was asked about Mr. Lippmann’s suggestion that the U.S. tell the satellites that an attack on Yugoslavia would result in immediate retaliation by the United States. The Secretary said that if Mr. Lippmann wished to debate the question of whether or not such a commitment was wise, he felt that this would be a profitable discussion. However, he had doubts as to the specific way which Mr. Lippmann suggested should be used to convey this commitment to the Soviet Union. He pointed out that the first problem would be to arrive at the United States Government policy on making this additional commitment. He had certain doubts whether the commitment would be a deterrent or a provocation. He thought there might be other ways to accomplish the purpose of the proposal without a public statement. In this connection, he was asked by Mr. Durno whether the U.S. had large stores of arms in Trieste which could be moved quickly to Yugoslavia in an emergency. The Secretary said he did not know whether this was true or not but that he had not heard of it.
The Secretary said that he did not know whether an attack would be made on Yugoslavia in the spring but we had to make our plans so that any eventuality would be covered.
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- The omitted portions concern subjects unrelated to Yugoslavia.↩