740.5/2–2051: Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom1

secret

4104. For Achilles from Barnard. (Re Depto 536 Feb 202)

I. Overt Sov control GDR is exercised through Sov Control Comm. In order to give GDR outward appearance sovereign state, Comm has undergone progressive reduction in size and has transferred many functions its predecessor, Sov Mil Admin, to East Ger regime.

At same time USSR has been relying increasingly on less obvious means control, such as operating through Commie party of Eastern Ger (SED), strengthening direct lines control between Moscow and East Berlin, and inclusion GDR into orbit network econ, polit and cultural agreements. Although SED maintains close ties with other Eur Commie parties it has not yet been admitted to Cominform, probably because this wld result diminution Czech and Polish power positions in Cominform.

Sov Army strength Eastern Ger remained fairly stable during last few years. In recent months there has been some increase in ground forces, bringing their strength to 355,700. Autumn maneuvers indicated that Sov forces Eastern Ger reached relatively high level training.

East German “Alert Police” now numbering about 53,000 being reorganized into skeleton divisions or regiments. Yet no evidence expansion to be started near future. Recruitment age groups 18 to 23 wld Support force 250,000 men. Reliability in mil operation probably assured if deployed as aux branch Sov force, though extremely doubtful if used spearhead attack West Ger in Korea-type situation; loyalty force assured for security measures where no outside contact involved. Coast guard and air force units in formation but not progressed far.

East Ger econ pattern set by attempt build up heavy industry with minimum outside help, emphasis on production drives, performance wages within framework state directed and planned though not completely, state run economy. Present emphasis increase output mines, steel and machine building industry. Tendency concentrate distribution state run stores and gradually abolish double pricing system by scaling down list cheap rationed goods while simultaneously slashing prices unrationed goods. Due to rise in production, diminishing impact Sov takings with simultaneous tendency reintegrate most Sov AG’s [Page 2003] into Ger economy. Abolition traditional agricultural cooperatives and simultaneous extension functions official Peasant’s Mutual Aid assocs bring East Ger agri closer officially denied goal collectivization.

Aside from isolated incidents and covert opposition such as espionage, no evidence organized open resistance against Commie rule Eastern Ger. Resistance mainly passive in nature, such as reluctance participate wholeheartedly in regime sponsored plethora of “plans” and congresses. Such passive resistance largely confined older age groups in population.

Officially tolerated anti-Commie strength concentrated mainly in churches which to date not been totally subject govt objectives and all-out govt campaign. Such polit groups as Eastern Christian Democratic Union and Liberal Democratic Party enjoy only nominal role.

Existing West Ger antipathy toward Sov and Commie rule undoubtedly stronger Eastern Ger especially since GDR rulers have repeatedly shown they are defending Sov rather than Ger interests. Judging by their repeated attempts justify Oder-Neisse line as a “peace frontier” they are keenly aware deleterious effect public opinion definitive transfer Poland Germany’s Eastern territories. Also, lame attempts justify Sov policy Ger PWS reflect similar awareness. Sov econ depredations, although now less in public eye, provide further source discontent. Reverse unity campaign from Western Ger concentrating civil liberties and free elections begin show some effect on eastern regime.

Re Sov intentions reflected East Ger, continued heavy movement rolling stock may be for mil purposes, but as of IAC estimate Mar 9 no firm evidence any unusual influx mil equipment or mil personnel.

II. US has pursued policy not extending either de facto or de jure recognition GDR and has succeeded obtaining support members Brussels Pact Dec 1949 and other Western Eur nations. Essential relations between these countries and GDR are carried on only at lowest technical level with understanding formal recognition not implied. US relations with GDR are carried on through Sov control authorities. Also US policy oppose GDR participation internatl orgs in which any western occupation powers are members.

US seeks frustrate, insofar as possible, Sov attempts consolidate their position East Ger as base operations against West Berlin and West Ger by:

  • (1) maintaining Western Allied position non-recognition GDR and encouraging other govts follow same policy.
  • (2) rigidly restricting East–West trade to nonstrategic materials. Although Sov Zone reps have successfully sabotaged efforts negot new agreement, controls over movement goods from West Ger to East Ger and from West Ger to Berlin have been tightened and further improvements are in prospect.
  • (3) in connection and collaboration with West Ger authorities, utilizing all propaganda media to expose undemocratic, totalitarian, police state character East Ger regime and counteract false anti-Allied propaganda Sov–Commie origin.
  • (4) taking all feasible measures bolster economy West Berlin so it able withstand Sov pressure.
  • (5) reaffirming our intention remaining Berlin and resisting energetically all Sov efforts incorporate city into territory GDR.

[ Barnard ]

Webb
  1. This telegram, drafted by Barnard and cleared by the Bureau of German Affairs, the Office of Eastern European Affairs, and the Divisions of Research for USSR and Eastern Europe and for Western Europe, was reported to Paris for MacArthur.
  2. Not printed; it asked for background information and a statement of U.S. policy toward the Soviet Union and its East European satellites for a future discussion in the NATO Council of Deputies. (740.5/2–2051)