740.5/4–1151: Telegram
The United States Deputy Representative on the North Atlantic Council (Spofford) to the Secretary of State 1
Depto 758. ECC for ISAC.
1. At the ECC mtg in Heidelberg on 3 April the comite considered the paper circulated by OSR entitled, Approach to Administration of US Aid. ECC endorsed the genl approach of this paper and accepted the conclusion. This action will appear in the minutes of the mtg. Subsequently ECC members have concurred in text of paper and directed that it be forwarded to ISAC.
“The Approach To The Administration Of US Aid.
“1. In administering aid programs, it is of course elementary that there is always a difficult line to be drawn between the point at which (a) inadequate US aid may discourage constructive Eur action and the point at which (b) softness on our part may encourage the postponement of essential and difficult decisions which Eur Govts may inevitably face. There is still a lag between the US sense of urgency and determination to get on with the job and corresponding Eur attitudes. The Eur govts are aware of this, and also know of our concern over the econ stress and psychological and polit difficulties with which they are beset. Consequently, they are understandably tempted by the attractive possibility that, if they hesitate long enough, we may be moved by sympathy and impatience to step in and pick up the check.
“2. To the extent that this were to be done, it wld result in inadequate utilization of Eur resources and an excessive drain on those of the US. This cld have serious polit repercussions at home. But something else is also involved which runs even deeper, namely, the moral and psychological factors growing out of a polit process. Within the Eur countries, the initial burden of decision falls on a particular defense minister or foreign min or finance min. In the present situation [Page 132] he has the choice between (a) turning to the US for assistance or (b) impressing the needs of the situation upon his colleagues in the govt, with the govt in turn impressing them upon its parliament.
This latter course involves explanation, persuasion, and public discussion which have far-reaching consequences over and above increased appropriations. Within the govt and the parliament it tends to promote resolution thru the exercise of resolution. Among parliament and the people it means a process of education and psychological preparation for possible dangers and difficulties ahead. All this tends to be lost to the extent that mins can avoid efforts of this kind by turning to the US for increased assistance.
“3. There is ground to hope that the situation described in para 1 may be a transitional phase, which may be superseded in time by a situation in which all the countries associated together will proceed on the basis of a common appraisal of the facts and needs, and in full recognition by each that org for self defense is its own primary responsibility. If and when such a new situation is achieved, responsible initiative and voluntary performance by each NATO country cld be expected to be such as to constitute a solid basis for mutual undertakings (including the provision of aid where needed) in a spirit of partnership. We shld seek to establish conditions under which this transition wld be accelerated, we shld avoid actions which might delay it.
“4. Meanwhile, the problem described in para 1 persists. It of course is relevant not only to the admin of econ aid, but also to milit aid, and more broadly to all aspects of our finan relations with Western Eur in the present phase. For example, it emerges clearly in current discussions of (a) intra-Eur milit transfers and (b) stimulating the use of currently excess capacity in certain NATO countries for production of milit goods. Our approach to the problem involves a delicate matter of balance, and concrete questions must obviously be settled by practical judgments of the specific facts. This is especially true in those cases where the risks of initial delays must be weighed against the benefits of a possibly larger and sounder effort based on a distinct awareness of responsibility and self interest. We are inclined to believe that, as a generalized approach to the question of administering US aid during the present phase in Eur, better results on the whole wld be achieved, in the US interest and in the common interest, by offering US aid more sparingly and expecting larger performance by the Eur countries themselves. We appreciate the risk that such an approach on the US side cld deteriorate into self-righteousness, but believe that this can be avoided. The approach must be managed with the utmost understanding and tact, and with constant awareness that we are dealing with sensitive questions of degree. But, in the actual state of affairs, we feel that this shld be our approach.”
- Repeated to Paris for Katz and Schuyler, to Frankfurt, and to Heidelberg for Handy.↩