396.1–PA/5–2951: Telegram
The Secretary of State to the Embassy in France 1
priority
niact
6447. For Ambassador and Jessup from Secy. Needless to say, I am much disturbed by the developments reported urtel 7321,2 which are latest indication that in recent days Fr are becoming hypnotized by their electoral situation. I gather from what Parodi told you this morning there is even some doubt that Queuille and Schuman will recommend to Cabinet sending of note. It seems clear that unless they take strong initiative chances of Cabinet approval are extremely slim. In [Page 1145] your discretion and if you think it wld be helpful, you may therefore present the fol personal message from me to Schuman. This might at least ensure our view being adequately considered by Cabinet.
“Dear Mr. Schuman: I learned from Mr. Jessup today that you have been thinking of the possibility that the Deputies might recess the four-power conversations in Paris for a month in the hope that during this period the international situation might change in such a way as to make possible an agreement on an agenda for the Foreign Ministers meeting later in a better atmosphere. You know of course that I am deeply conscious of the problems and difficulties facing the Fr Govt at this time and want to avoid any action which wld add to them. But I think that a recess of the Deputies meeting wld be harmful to the Western position and wld increase rather than diminish any feeling of uncertainty which may exist. My own view is that if properly handled, the dispatch of notes to the Soviet Govt will not run a serious risk of causing a break and that on the contrary this procedure holds out the best hope of bringing about early agreement for a meeting of the four Foreign Ministers. It seems to me that a note which contains a direct invitation for such a meeting, including a proposed date, wld be difficult for the Soviets to reject and wld appeal strongly to Western public opinion. I think that there are very real risks in the indefinite continuation of the present situation in the Deputies and that the best thing we cld do wld be to address the notes to the Soviet Govt immediately. I mention these factors in order that you may have them before you when you consider this problem with your colleagues tomorrow.
With warmest regards and best wishes.”
If Fr Cabinet refuses to agree to dispatch of tripartite notes sug you consider possibility of getting Fr and Brit consent to our dispatching note unilaterally containing invitation from us as host govt. My thought wld be that Brit and Fr might reply on fol day accepting invitation. While this procedure has certain disadvantages it may be that it wld appeal somewhat more to Fr than tripartite notes.3
- This telegram was drafted by Bonbright; cleared by Secretary Acheson, Perkins, Laukhuff, Ferguson, and Reinhardt; and repeated to London, Moscow, and Frankfurt.↩
- Not printed, but see footnote 2, infra.↩
- On May 30 Jessup reported that he had delivered Secretary Acheson’s letter to Schuman that morning and that he had been told that the French Cabinet had agreed to the delivery of the notes on May 31. (Telegram 7357 from Paris, May 30, 396.1–PA/5–3051)↩