Foreign Relations of the United States, 1951, European Security and the German Question, Volume III, Part 1

396.1–PA/3–8151: Telegram

The United States Representative at the Four-Power Exploratory Talks (Jessup) to the Secretary of State ¹

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Paris, March 31, 1951—2 p. m.

5835. From Jessup. Ourtel 5824.² Introduction yesterday by Sov del of agenda item on Atlantic treaty has given West opportunity to demonstrate again that it wants to get on with drafting agenda rather than engage in propaganda exchanges or substantive discussions with Sovs here.

At tripartite mtg this morning Davies, Parodi and I agreed to recommend to our secretaries that fol proposal be tabled at quadripartite session Monday.

• “I. Examination of causes and effects of present internatl tensions in Europe and of means to secure real and lasting improvement in relations between USSR. US. UK and France, including fol questions:

  A. Existing level of armaments and armed forces, and measures for internatl control and reduction of armaments and armed forces, including those of USSR, US, UK and France, (subj to minor drafting changes),

  B. Demilitarization of Ger,

  C. Fulfillment of present treaty obligations and agreements,

  D. Measures for elimination of threat of war and fear of aggression.

• II. Completion of treaty for re-establishment of an independent and democratic Austria.
• III. Problems relating to re-establishment of Get unity and preparation of treaty of peace.”

This “common sense” approach wld be presented to Sovs as a serious draft in spirit of real negot, aimed at eliminating differences separating us.

All here agree that this approach shld be made Monday.

(1) Tactically it gives us an opportunity to get talks here moving in our direction.

(2) From propaganda point of view it presents us in excellent light and reasserts our unchanged attitude toward agreed task of reps to draft agenda.

(3) In view of tels from London (to Dept as 5155) and Moscow (to Dept as 1738)³ as well as reaction of Reber who arrived here this morning, addition of “and effects” in introductory sentence of item 1 we consider removes chief remaining disadvantaged phrase “demilitarization of Ger.”

If Dept approves above text, we wld appreciate views on whether we must under all circumstances, even to breaking point, insist on “Ger demilitarization” being second point under item 1.

It might develop that we wld have to decide whether it was more important to get Sovs to accept “and effects” in introductory sentence, with “Ger demilitarization” as first sub-point, or yield to Sovs if they refused “and effects” while insisting that “Ger demilitarization” cannot be listed first. Obviously we will seek to obtain both points but my question is whether Dept considers we must irrevocably stick by both, if choice develops.

This recommended approach for Monday reflects situation as it existed at tripartite mtg this morning but may of course be affected by private discussion at lunch today of four reps or by quadripartite mtg this afternoon, if Gromyko insists on holding one despite preference of three not to meet until Monday.⁴

If situation remains tactically unchanged this afternoon, I strongly urge Department approve recommended course as calculated protect our substantive interests as well as our tactical and propaganda position.⁵

[ Jessup ]

1. Repeated to London, Moscow, and Frankfurt.

2. Not printed. At the tripartite meeting on March 30 the Western Deputies agreed that the introduction of the “Parodi formula” would not be good tactics and decided to ask Gromyko to explain the differences between his draft and that of the Western Deputies. This was done at the 20th session on March 30 at the end of which Gromyko introduced the two following new agenda items:

   • “1. Atlantic Treaty and creation of American military bases in England, Norway, Iceland and in other countries of Europe and Near East.
   • 2. Treaties of peace with Italy, Rumania, Bulgaria and Hungary including their provisions on human rights, their military clauses and their final clauses on settlements of disputes; arguments of four powers concerning Germany and Austria, including questions of de-nazification and democratization and of war criminals.” (396.1–PA/3–3051)

3. Neither printed; they both expressed support of Jessup’s view that the new Soviet proposal should be taken seriously and accepted as a basis for discussion (396.1–PA/3–3051).
4. At the luncheon Gromyko agreed to postpone the 21st session until April 2 and gave the impression that he was “very anxious to have some Western draft which he could submit to Moscow.” Jessup concluded that further meetings would make no progress and “little sense” until the three Western Deputies agreed on a written proposal. (Telegram 5839 from Paris, March 31, 396.1–PA/3–3151)

5. At 5 p. m. Washington time the U.S. Delegation was informed that the draft was approved subject to the understanding that this was the limit of U.S. concessions. The draft was tabled at the 21st session on April 2 with Item I of the agenda revised, at the suggestion of Schuman, to read:

   “I. Examination of causes and effects of present international tensions in Eur and of means to secure real and lasting improvement in relations between Sov Union and US, UK and France, including fol questions relating to: existing level of armaments and armed forces, and measures for internatl control and reduction of armaments and armed forces, including those of USSR, US, UK and France; demilitarization of Ger; fulfillment of present treaty obligations and agreements; elimination of threat of war and fear of aggression.” Telegrams 5160 to Paris and 5851 from Paris, March 31 and April 2 (396.1–PA/3–3151 and 4–251).